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Abstract 
 
Universal jurisdiction is a relatively new concept in South Africa and a rather 
controversial concept in international criminal law. It is often discussed but rarely 
applied. Universal jurisdiction refers to the power of a State to punish certain crimes 
irrespective of where they were committed. Such crimes need not be connected to the 
State in question via the more traditional links of territory, nationality or direct State 
interest. These crimes are typically the worst crimes in international law such as 
genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. The argument goes that those who 
commit these types of offences become hostis humani generis, or the enemies of all 
mankind. Therefore just like the pirate of old any nation that captures them is entitled 
to exercise its jurisdiction over them, on behalf of all mankind.  But at the same time a 
feature and founding principle of international law is the sovereign equality of States. 
And under international law criminal jurisdiction is a prerogative of sovereign States. 
States have territorial jurisdiction over crimes committed within their territory, for 
having control over a territory is essentially what it means to be sovereign. This 
means that one nation’s attempt to exercise jurisdiction over persons that also fall 
under the jurisdiction of another nation could be perceived as the undermining of the 
second nation’s sovereignty. 
 
It is submitted that a proper understanding of universal jurisdiction internationally, 
and in South Africa, is vital because the Constitutional Court recently ordered South 
African authorities to investigate torture committed by Zimbabwean officials against 
Zimbabwean citizens that was allegedly committed in Zimbabwe. In other words the 
court ordered South African authorities to exercise universal jurisdiction over 
Zimbabwean officials. This thesis has as goal to critically examine the claims made, 
and authorities, cited in support of universal jurisdiction, as it is believed that these 
are usually theoretical and unpractical in nature. It is submitted that balance and a 
measure of realism is imperative to this debate. Contrary to popular opinion, it is 
submitted, that the history of international relations has not favored universal 
jurisdiction and there is no indication that this situation has fundamentally changed or 
will change in the near future. 
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The thesis continues to examine, after a consideration of the likening of pirates to 
modern international criminals, the claim that old authorities such as Grotius and De 
Vattel provide support for universal jurisdiction.  An analysis follows of the so-called 
‘Lotus principle’, which is said to mean that any State may exercise jurisdiction over 
serious offences because there is no rule prohibiting it. The trials of German war 
criminals by the Allies, in the aftermath of WWII, is also said to have evidenced 
universal jurisdiction and this claim is critically examined. The same applies to the 
trial of Adolf Eichmann by Israel.  
 
The examination of provision for universal jurisdiction in international law continues 
when the jurisdictional provisions of the Genocide, War Crimes and Torture 
Conventions are examined and specifically applied to South Africa. The drafting 
process of these Conventions is carefully studied to understand the intention and 
circumstances prevalent at the time. In the process specific countries and international 
case law dealing with these Conventions is also considered.     
 
The jurisdictional triggers of the International Criminal Court are surveyed and it is 
questioned whether it provides for universal jurisdiction and whether it can then be 
said to support member States in exercising universal jurisdiction on its behalf. 
 
The research findings on universal jurisdiction and the ICC are finally applied to 
South Africa especially with reference to the Constitutional Court decision on the 
torture committed in Zimbabwe before conclusions are drawn as to what South 
Africa’s international and domestic duties entail. 
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Opsomming 
 
Universele jurisdiksie is ‘n relatief nuwe konsep in Suid-Afrika en ‘n redelik 
kontroversiële konsep in internasionale strafreg. Dit word gereeld bespreek maar 
weinig toegepas. Universele jurisdiksie verwys na die bevoegdheid van ‘n Staat om 
sekere misdrywe te straf ongeag waar dit gepleeg is. Die betrokke Staat hoef nie enige 
van die traditionele verbindings soos territorialiteit, nationaliteit of direkte Staats-
belang met sodanige misdrywe te hê nie. Hierdie misdade is tipies van die ergste 
misdade in internasionale reg, soos volksmoord, oorlogsmisdade en misdade teen die 
mensdom. Die argument is dat diegene wat hierdie tipe misdrywe pleeg hostis 
humanis generis, of vyande van die mensdom word. Daarom, net soos die seerower 
van ouds, is enige nasie, wat hulle in hegtenis neem geregtig om sy jurisdiksie, 
namens die ganse mensdom, oor hulle uit te oefen. Maar terselfde tyd is 'n kenmerk 
en grondbeginsel van internasionale reg die soewereine gelykheid van State. En onder 
internasionale reg is strafregtelike jurisdiksie 'n prerogatief van soewereine State. 
State het territoriale jurisdiksie oor misdade wat binne hul regsgebied gepleeg is, want 
om beheer oor 'n gebied uit te oefen is in wese wat soewerein wees behels. Dus kan 
een Staat se poging om jurisdiksie uit te oefen oor persone wat ook onder die 
jurisdiksie van 'n ander Staat val beskou word as die ondergrawing van die tweede 
Staat se soewereiniteit. 
  
Dit word aan die hand gedoen dat 'n behoorlike begrip van universele jurisdiksie, 
beide internasionaal, en in Suid-Afrika van uiterse belang is, veral omdat die 
Konstitionele Hof onlangs Suid-Afrikaanse owerhede beveel het dat marteling 
gepleeg in Zimbabwe, deur Zimbabwiese amptenare, teen Zimbabwiese burgers 
ondersoek moet word. Die hof het dus beveel dat die Suid-Afrikaanse owerhede 
universele jurisdiksie moet uitoefen oor Zimbabwiese amptenare. Hierdie tesis het ten 
doel om die gesag gewoonlik genoem, ter ondersteuning van universele jurisdiksie, 
krities te beskou, veral omdat dit gewoonlik teoreties en onprakties van aard blyk te 
wees. Hierdie tesis poog om ‘n noodsaaklike balans en mate van realisme tot die 
debat te voeg. Anders as wat algemeen aanvaar word ondersteun die geskiedenis van 
internasionale betrekkinge nie universele jurisdiksie nie en is daar ook geen 
aanduiding dat hierdie situasie onlangs fundamenteel verander het, of in die nabye 
toekoms sal verander nie. 
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Die tesis beskou voorts, na 'n oorweging van die vergelyking van seerowers met 
moderne internasionale misdadigers, die bewering dat die ou skrywers soos De Groot 
en De Vattel hul steun verleen aan universele jurisdiksie. Hierna volg ‘n ontleding 
van die sogenaamde "Lotus beginsel", wat glo beteken dat enige Staat jurisdiksie mag 
uitoefen oor ernstige oortredings, bloot omdat daar geen reël is wat dit verbied nie. 
Die verhore van Duitse oorlogs misdadigers deur die Geallieerdes, na die Tweede 
Wêreldoorlog, word ook dikwels as bewys gebruik van universele jurisdiksie en word 
ook krities bekyk. Dieselfde geld vir die verhoor van Adolf Eichmann deur Israel.  
 
Die voorsiening gemaak vir universele jurisdiksie word verder ondersoek deur te let 
op die jurisdiksionele bepalings in die Konvensies oor volksmoord, oorlogsmisdade 
en marteling en dit word telkens op Suid-Afrika van toepassing gemaak. Daar word 
veral noukeurig gelet op die opstel proses van hierdie Konvensies ten einde te bepaal 
presies wat die bedoeling en heersende omstandighede toe was. In die proses word 
spesifieke lande en internasionale gesag wat met die Konvensies te make het 
oorweeg. 
 
Die Internasionale Strafhof, en of dit voorsiening vir universele jurisdiksie maak, 
word ondersoek ten einde te bepaal of dit enigsins gesê kan word dat die Hof lidstate 
aanmoedig om universele jurisdiksie te beoefen. 
 
Laastens word die bevindings oor universele jurisdiksie en die Internasionale Strafhof 
toegepas op Suid-Afrika, veral met verwysing na die Konstitusionele Hof beslissing 
oor die marteling in Zimbabwe, voordat gevolgtrekkings gemaak word oor wat 
presies Suid-Afrika se internasionale en plaaslike pligte behels.   
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
On 29 October 2014 the Constitutional Court confirmed the Supreme Court of Appeal 
and the North Gauteng High Court in Pretoria’s rulings that ordered the South African 
National Prosecuting Authority and the South African Police Service to investigate 
the arrest and torture of political opponents of the ZANU-PF that occurred during 
2007 in Zimbabwe.
1
 While making this order the court declared that South Africa has 
an international obligation to … prosecute crimes against humanity.2 The court thus 
found that that there is a duty on South African authorities to investigate and 
prosecute international crimes even if they were committed elsewhere and by 
foreigners. Or in other words that there is a duty on South African authorities to 
investigate and prosecute international crimes based on universal jurisdiction. This is 
a rather new and revolutionary idea. It is rather new because South Africa, like other 
common law jurisdictions, has traditionally been reluctant to exercise extraterritorial 
jurisdiction. Immediately questions abound. What exactly is universal jurisdiction? 
How did we reach this point in international criminal law and South African law 
where a court makes such an order? Was the court correct and what is now expected 
of South African authorities when it comes to exercising universal jurisdiction? This 
thesis is offered as an attempt to critically engage with these vital questions and to 
provide, what will hopefully be, valuable and timely caution and guidance. 
 
The approach followed throughout this thesis is to critically consider, and determine 
the validity of, the usual justifications for universal jurisdiction. It is submitted that 
scrutinizing the history, and examples, of universal jurisdiction is the best way to 
determine whether the theory is presently capable of practical application. 
 
                                                        
1 South African Litigation Centre and Another v. National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others [2012] 
ZAGPPHC 61 (hereafter ‘SALC v. National Director of Public Prosecutions’); National Commissioner of the 
South African Police Service v Southern African Human Rights Litigation Centre (485/2012) [2013] ZASCA 
168; 2014 (2) SA 42 (SCA); [2014] 1 All SA 435 (SCA) (27 November 2013) and National Commissioner of 
the South African Police Service v Southern African Human Rights Litigation Centre and Another [2014] ZACC 
30 
2 SALC v. National Director of Public Prosecutions 81 
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At the outset universal jurisdiction is defined as a State essentially exercising 
jurisdiction in the absence of any other acceptable base of jurisdiction, especially the 
territorial principle. That is because sovereign nations jealously guard over their own 
territories and do not lightly suffer other nations meddling in their internal affairs. 
This is the very reason that universal jurisdiction is such a controversial concept. The 
first chapter continues by showing how proponents of universal jurisdiction usually 
promote it by tracing its roots to the law exercised in ancient days over pirates. They 
argue that pirates of old were responsible for particularly heinous offences and by 
committing them they became hostis humanis generis, or the enemies of all mankind. 
The result was that any nation into whose hands these pirates fell was entitled to 
exercise jurisdiction over them on behalf of all nations. 
 
The analogy between pirates and modern human rights offenders is frequently made 
and in the same breath certain passages by old writers like Hugo de Groot and 
Emerich de Vattel are invoked to show how universal jurisdiction is the wisdom of 
the ages. Chapter 1 ends by contending that it is untenable to use these old writers as 
support for universal jurisdiction. 
 
Chapter 2 begins with a discussion of the 1927 Lotus Case
3
 and a reflection on the 
disquieting tendency by supporters of universal jurisdiction to construe this case as a 
mandate for exercising universal jurisdiction simply because their mantra goes that: 
“there is no rule prohibiting it.”  
 
At the end of World War II the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals played a significant 
role in the development of international criminal law. Since the establishment of these 
tribunals certain crimes have generally been considered ‘international crimes’. These 
crimes are a violation of international law and are often said to be punishable directly 
under international law. It is often stated that such crimes may be tried by national 
courts or international tribunals. Examples of such crimes are: war crimes, piracy, 
slave trading, genocide, crimes against humanity and torture.
4
 These crimes were 
                                                        
3 Lotus Case (France v Turkey) 1927 PCIJ Reports, Series A, no 10 
4 Gerhard Erasmus & Gerhard Kemp ‘The application of international criminal law before domestic courts in 
the light of recent developments in international and constitutional law’ 27 South African Yearbook of 
International Law (2002) 65-66; Eichmann v Attorney-General of Israel (Supreme Court of Israel) Case No. 
336/61, 29 May 1962, 36 ILR 277 296; Robert Cryer et al ‘An Introduction to International Criminal Law and 
Procedure’ 2nd edition (2010) Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 51 
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historically not subject to universal jurisdiction.
5
 Nonetheless many scholars find their 
justification for the exercise of universal jurisdiction over international crimes in the 
prosecution of WWII crimes.
6
 The advocates of universal jurisdiction contend that 
these crimes are crimes against mankind or crimes contra omnes with their 
perpetrators the enemies of all people. They are thus punishable by any state on behalf 
of the international community.
7
 It is further often stated that the exercise of 
jurisdiction by the Allies over the Germans provide examples of universal 
jurisdiction. Like the case was with the pirate so too with the war criminal because it 
is primarily the similarly heinous nature of their crimes that provide motivation for 
the exercise of universal jurisdiction
8
. Simple? Yes. Correct? No. Where chapter 1 
challenges the equation of pirates with war criminals and the notion that universal 
jurisdiction was exercised over piracy because of its heinous nature. Chapter 2 will 
question whether trials in the aftermath of WWII including the trial of Adolf 
Eichmann provide precedents for the exercise of universal jurisdiction. It will become 
apparent that the foundation in history for universal jurisdiction is not as sturdy as it is 
often declared to be. 
 
Chapter 3 analyses the conventions drafted after WWII to deal with some of the most 
serious crimes under international law. These are the Genocide, Geneva and Torture 
Conventions. They are also called ‘human rights’ conventions. The jurisdictional 
provisions of these conventions, in so far as they relate to universal jurisdiction, will 
be examined and discussed. Under every convention the current position in South 
Africa is discussed with the lessons learnt from other countries applied here.  
                                                        
5 Cedric Ryngaert (Jurisdiction) (supra) 110 stating that crimes that traditionally gave rise to universal 
jurisdiction were crimes against telegraph and telephone cables, counterfeiting, trafficking in Negroes, 
piracy, trafficking in women and children, and trafficking in obscene publications and toxic drinks.  
6 Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F. 2d 571 (6th Cir. 1985) 582; American Law Institute (1987) ‘Restatement of 
the Law (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States’ paragraph 404; Theodor Meron ‘International 
Criminalisation of Internal Atrocities’ 89 American Journal of International Law (1995) 554; Chris C Joyner 
‘Arresting Impunity: The Case for Universal Jurisdiction in Bringing War Criminals to Accountability’ 59 Law 
and Contemporary Problems (1996) 155-156, 166, 172; Michael P Scharf  ‘Application of Treaty-Based 
Universal Jurisdiction to Nationals of Non-State Party States’ 35 New England Law Review (2000-2001) 369; 
Madeline H Morris ‘Universal Jurisdiction in a Divided World: Conference Remarks’ 35 New England Law 
Review (2001) 344-345; Maximo Langer ‘The Diplomacy of Universal Jurisdiction: The Political Branches 
and the Transnational Prosecution of International Crimes’ 105 American Journal of International Law 
(2011) 3; Kenneth C Randall ‘Universal Jurisdiction under International Law’ 66 Texas Law Review (1988) 
802-810 
7 André Mbata B Mangu ‘States rights versus human and people’s rights in international law: Sovereign 
immunity and universal jurisdiction before the International Court of Justice’ 15 Stellenbosch Law Review 
(2004) 478 
8 CF Neels Swanepoel ‘The Emergence of a Modern International Criminal Justice Order’ (2006) Thesis 
submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of Doctor Legum, Faculty of Law, Department 
of Procedural Law and Law of Evidence, University of the Free State, 36; André Mbata B Mangu (Sovereign 
Immunity and universal jurisdiction) (supra) 485 
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It will be concluded that universal jurisdiction was expressly excluded in the 
Genocide Convention. Although there has been a recent tendency to prosecute 
perpetrators of genocide in foreign countries this involves mainly offenders from the 
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda who are prosecuted in Europe. This is ascribable to 
the fact that in both these cases there were Security Council resolutions calling on UN 
member States to assist the international tribunals in arresting and prosecuting these 
suspects. The result was that nations could work together and with international 
backing to curb international crimes and with no fear of a political backlash from the 
two States in question. 
 
Although the phrase ‘universality of jurisdiction for grave breaches’ appears in the 
Geneva Conventions there is a gaping gulf between the theory and the practice of how 
few universal jurisdiction prosecutions have actually taken place for war crimes and 
grave breaches. It is argued that the provision for ‘universality’ was made to solve the 
logistical nightmare in the wake of WWII. Until then jurisdiction over war criminals 
had traditionally belonged to belligerents. But keeping jurisdiction limited to 
belligerents in the aftermath of WWII would have meant that war criminals could 
escape to neutral countries and those they had wronged would then be precluded from 
punishing them. A system of extradite or try was put in place to make sure that those 
most harmed by war criminals were able to obtain custody of their enemies and even 
if they couldn’t manage that, the nation where they were hiding would be obliged to 
punish them. Under the Geneva Conventions we will consider the position in 
Belgium, in its case against the Democratic Republic of Congo in the ICJ and its War 
Crimes Act as well as similar legislation in Spain. 
 
The Torture Convention expressly incorporates the principle of universal jurisdiction 
as an international obligation of all States parties without any precondition other than 
the presence of the alleged torturer. Yet in practice almost no one ever exercises 
universal jurisdiction over torturers. It is argued that the famous Pinochet case 
involving allegations of torture committed in Chile and coming under scrutiny in the 
U.K. is not an example of universal jurisdiction. The example of the Zardad case is 
also used as a practical illustration of the difficulties inherent in the exercise of 
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universal jurisdiction. In conclusion the ICJ torture case of Belgium v. Senegal is 
considered. 
 
In Chapter 4 the jurisdictional provisions and triggers of the International Criminal 
Court are considered. The principle of complementarity, meaning that the ICC relies 
primarily on member States for prosecution, is explained. It is then shown that the 
ICC does not provide for universal jurisdiction. In the light of its narrow jurisdictional 
provisions it is also argued that the ICC cannot be said to provide incentive to 
member States to exercise universal jurisdiction. 
 
Chapter 5 considers the position of international law in South Africa. Domestic 
legislation providing for cooperation with the ICC and for universal jurisdiction is 
considered. The SALC case is then analyzed and critically discussed. The discussion 
involves a study of comparative State practice and the position of prosecutions in 
terms of universal jurisdiction in terms of customary international law. 
 
Chapter 5 ultimately concludes whit this thesis finding that the “evidence” for the 
acceptance of universal jurisdiction in practice is very scarce and not well settled in 
law at all. The earliest arguments that pirates were subject to universal jurisdiction 
right through to the recent arguments that the ICC implicitly calls for the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction are usually unpersuasive, shallow and driven by rhetoric. 
Publicists on the issue all use the same examples, usually taken out of context, 
without critically examining them and then try to make their arguments persuasive by 
proliferating examples and quoting others who do the same as authority. 
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Definition of, Rationale for and Historical Development of Universal 
Jurisdiction 
 
1.1 Definition and demarcation of the concept of universal jurisdiction 
 
To understand what universal jurisdiction is it might be helpful to start with as short a 
meaning as possible of what jurisdiction under international law means. The Oxford 
dictionary defines jurisdiction as the territory that a legal authority extends over.
9
 
Cedric Ryngaert in his book on the topic defines jurisdiction as somehow relating to 
sovereignty, that in a world where States are equally sovereign they give shape to 
their sovereignty by adopting laws relating to persons, activities or legal interests. 
Jurisdiction gains an international element when a State in pursuance of its sovereign 
interests abroad adopts laws that are not only of purely domestic concern. The public 
international law of jurisdiction is then tasked with balancing the sovereignty-based 
assertions of one State with that of another. Its purpose in this is to ensure a peaceful 
co-existence between States through upholding the principles of non-intervention and 
the sovereign equality of States.
10
  
 
For a practical definition of universal jurisdiction one may have regard to the Institute 
of International Law that in 2005 adopted a resolution which resolves that certain 
crimes under international law may be prosecuted by any State whatever, having no 
connection at all with the offence, and in the absence of any other bases of 
jurisdiction recognized by international law.
11
 The Princeton Principles on Universal 
Jurisdiction similarly state that ‘Universal jurisdiction is criminal jurisdiction based 
solely on the nature of the crime, without regard to where the crime was committed, 
the nationality of the alleged or convicted perpetrator, the nationality of the victim, or 
any other connection to the state exercising such jurisdiction’.12 As to the nature of 
                                                        
9 The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English (8th ed.) Clarendon Press, Oxford 
10 Cedric Ryngaert ‘Jurisdiction in International Law’ (2008) Oxford University Press, Oxford, 5-10 
11 Institut de Droit International, Resolution on Universal Criminal Jurisdiction with Regard to the Crime of 
Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes, adopted in Krakow, 2005, <www.idi-
iil.org/idiF/resolutionsF/2005_kra_03_ft.pdf>; See also: Luc Reydams ‘Universal Jurisdiction, International 
and Municipal Legal Perspectives’ (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press) (2003) 5; Johan D Van der 
Vyver ‘Universal Jurisdiction in International Criminal Law’ 24 South African Yearbook of International Law 
(1999) 114-115; Kenneth Randall (Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) 788 
12  The Princeton Principles On Universal Jurisdiction (23 July 2001), Principle 1 (available at 
www.princeton.edu/~lapa/unive_jur.pdf) 
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the crime MC Bassiouni writes that the exercise of universal jurisdiction ‘ought 
generally to be reserved for the most serious international crimes such as genocide, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes’.13 
 
As to the other bases of jurisdiction recognized by international law, and to better 
understand where universal jurisdiction fits in, one may look to the authoritative 
research conducted in 1932 by the Harvard Law School.
14
 The research determined 
that five main principles of jurisdiction exist. 
  
 First was the principle of territoriality whereby a State exercises jurisdiction 
over an offender because the offence was committed on the territory of that 
State. This principle could be extended to cases where only a part of the 
offence was committed on the territory of the State concerned. 
 The next was active nationality, whereby a State that exercises jurisdiction 
over an offender does so on the basis that the offender is a national of the State 
concerned. 
 The next base was the inverse of active nationality namely passive nationality, 
which means that a State exercises jurisdiction over an offender on the basis 
that the victim of the offence is a national of the State concerned. 
 There was also the protective principle in terms of which a State exercises 
jurisdiction over an offender on the basis that the offence was prejudicial to 
the vital interests of the State concerned. 
 The last base was universal jurisdiction or what the study termed the 
universality principle. Here a State exercises jurisdiction over an offender 
irrespective of any question of nationality or place of commission of the 
offence, or of any link between the prosecuting State and the offender. The 
study also made the distinction between universal jurisdiction and the less 
wide and extreme subsidiary universality principle. Where the last-mentioned 
principle is applied a State may only exercise universal jurisdiction after the 
State entitled to exercise jurisdiction in terms of one of the other bases of 
jurisdiction has refused to accept the proffered extradition of the offender. 
                                                        
13 M. Cherif Bassiouni ‘The History of Universal Jurisdiction’ in Stephen Macedo (ed.) ‘Universal Jurisdiction’ 
(2004) University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 40 
14 Harvard Research in International Law, 'Jurisdiction with respect to Crime' 29 American Journal of 
International Law (1935) Special Supplement (Part 2) 445 
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Thus a distinction between different forms of universal jurisdiction was already made 
in 1935. There was a difference between what the study calls extreme universal 
jurisdiction and universal jurisdiction exercised by a State after that State had offered 
to extradite an offender to a State with a more acceptable or stronger link to either the 
offence or offender and that offer of extradition had been declined. Recently this 
distinction has been called the distinction between ‘absolute’ or ‘pure’ universal 
jurisdiction (the last mentioned also known as universal jurisdiction in absentia) and 
‘conditional’ universal jurisdiction, (sometimes known as ‘universal jurisdiction with 
presence’).15 Universal jurisdiction in absentia arises when a State seeks to assert 
jurisdiction over an international crime (usually by investigating it and/or requesting 
extradition of the suspect) even when the suspect is not present in the territory of the 
investigating State. Under this version States may, at least theoretically, investigate 
and/or prosecute suspects for certain serious international crimes. They do not need 
any of the usual territoriality, nationality or other jurisdictional links to the offence. 
On this view, the suspect need not even be in the forum state for a case to be initiated. 
But it is usually only after he enters the territory of the forum state that he is arrested 
and prosecuted. This is when the form becomes conditional universal jurisdiction or 
universal jurisdiction exercised when the suspect is already present in the State 
asserting jurisdiction.
16
 
 
It should be stated immediately that territorial jurisdiction has traditionally been the 
most accepted and least contentious base of jurisdiction.
17
 Universal jurisdiction, 
exercised by a State over any offence without regard to any connection to that State, 
or the interests of other States does not sit well with the classical State-centered view 
of public international law.
18
 This is because a feature and founding principle of 
                                                        
15 Robert Cryer et al ‘An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure’ (2nd ed.) (2010) 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 52; Antonio Cassese ‘Is the Bell Tolling for Universality? A Plea for 
a Sensible Notion of Universal Jurisdiction’ 1 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2003) 592-3; Georges 
Abi-Saab ‘The proper Role of Universal Jurisdiction’ 1 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2003) 596, 
601 
16 Robert Cryer et al (Introduction to International Criminal Law) (supra) 52; Charles C Jalloh ‘Universal 
Jurisdiction, Universal Prescription?’ A Preliminary Assessment of the African Union Perspective on 
Universal Jurisdiction’ (2010) 21 (1) Criminal Law Forum 7-8 and Roger O’Keefe ‘Universal Jurisdiction: 
Clarifying the Basic Concept’ (2004) 2 Journal of International Criminal Justice 735-760 
17 M. Cherif Bassiouni (History of Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) 40 ‘Throughout the course of legal history, 
jurisdictional powers have primarily been exercised in accordance with the principle of territorial 
jurisdiction.’ 
18 Cedric Ryngaert (Jurisdiction in International Law) (supra) 106  
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international law is the sovereign equality of States.
19
 And under international law 
criminal jurisdiction
20
 is a prerogative of sovereign States
21
. States have territorial 
jurisdiction over crimes committed within their territory, for having control over a 
territory is essentially what it means to be sovereign. This means that one nation’s 
attempt to exercise jurisdiction over persons that traditionally fall under the 
jurisdiction of another nation could be perceived as the undermining of the second 
nation’s sovereignty.22 Universal jurisdiction is not based on notions of sovereignty 
and State consent
23
 and this is exactly what makes it so tricky and controversial.
24
  
 
1.2 Rationale for universal jurisdiction 
  
After possessing a basic definition for, and a demarcation of, the concept of universal 
jurisdiction it will help to understand the arguments often presented to justify its use. 
The diverse arguments defending the use of universal jurisdiction vary among the 
numerous writers on the subject. This thesis attempts to distinguish the main 
arguments and critically examine their validity. In so doing it is hoped that clarity and 
simplicity will be brought, in practice, to what is often a mystifying concept. 
 
Many writers argue that it is solely in the heinous nature of certain crimes that the 
motivation for the exercise of universal jurisdiction must be sought and that it is the 
heinous nature of these crimes that make their suppression the concern of the 
international community.
25
 This is why it is stated that the theory of universal 
jurisdiction transcends national sovereignty. According to MC Bassiouni the 
reasoning goes that certain core values are shared by the international community and 
they are deemed important enough to justify overriding the usual territorial limitations 
                                                        
19 John Dugard ‘International Law: A South African Perspective’ (4th ed.) (2011) Juta, Cape Town, 146  
20 Jurisdiction can refer to the power to make laws, the power to adjudicate a matter and the power to 
punish. In this thesis it means all three of these.  
21 Ian Brownlie ‘Principles of Public International Law’ (5th ed.) (1998) Clarendon Press, Oxford, 303 
22 Eugene Kontorovich ‘The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdiction’s Hollow Foundation’ 45 Harvard 
Journal of International Law (2004) 189 
23 Henry Kissinger ‘The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction’ Foreign Affairs (July/August 2001) 86 
24 M. Cherif Bassiouni (History of Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) 39 ‘If used in a politically motivated 
manner or simply to vex and harass leaders of other states, universal jurisdiction could disrupt world order 
and deprive individuals of their basic rights. Even with the best of intentions, universal jurisdiction could be 
used imprudently, creating unnecessary frictions between states and abuses of legal processes.’  
25 CF (Neels) Swanepoel ‘Universal jurisdiction as procedural tool to institute prosecutions for international 
core crimes’ Journal for Juridical Science 32(1) (2007) 119; Matthew Garrod ‘The Protective Principle of 
Jurisdiction over War Crimes and the Hollow Concept of Universality’ 12 Criminal Law Review (2012) 764; 
Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Congo v. Belgium), ICJ Reports 2000, per Dissenting Opinion of Judge Ad 
Hoc van den Wyngaert, p. 167, www.icj-cij.org/ last visited on 23 September 2013   
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to the exercise of jurisdiction. This is known as the normative universalist position.
26
 
Gerhard Werle describes this position by stating that: ‘[c]rimes under international 
law are directed against the interests of the international community as a whole. It 
follows from this universal nature of international crimes that the international 
community is empowered to prosecute and punish these crimes, regardless of who 
committed them or against whom they were committed. Therefore, the international 
community may defend itself with criminal sanctions against attacks on its elementary 
values’.27 Underlying this discourse is the idea that States may even if not obliged, at 
least be authorized, to exercise universal jurisdiction over heinous offences that shock 
the conscience of mankind.
28
 Cedric Ryngaert defines this position well when he 
writes that ‘[a]ny State would have the right, or even the obligation, to prosecute core 
international crimes without the consent of the territorial or national State. In so 
doing, such a ‘bystander’ State would not exercise its own sovereignty, but act as an 
agent of the international community enforcing international law in the absence of a 
centralized enforcer of the core values of that community’.29 Luc Reydams calls this 
the ‘unilateral limited universality principle’ in terms whereof any State may 
unilaterally exercise its jurisdiction over certain offences with an international 
character, even in absentia.
30
 This is in essence a moral justification for universal 
jurisdiction. It is thus argued that States have the authority to exercise universal 
jurisdiction over core crimes on the basis of the jus cogens character of the 
prohibition of ‘core crimes’. 31  Ryngaert writes that this moral justification has 
become the ‘dominating legitimizing discourse of universal jurisdiction over core 
crimes against international law’.32  This means that proponents are, in a sense, not 
even trying to justify the use of universal jurisdiction by reference to its historical 
significance or acceptance anymore. Because it is morally wrong to leave 
reprehensible offences unpunished universal jurisdiction is justified. 
 
Bassiouni, however, also mentions a pragmatic policy oriented approach founded on 
the recognition that sometimes there exists certain shared international interests that 
                                                        
26 M. Cherif Bassiouni (History of Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) 42 
27 Gerhard Werle ‘Principles of International Criminal Law’ (2nd ed.) (2009) TMC Asser Press, The Hague, 64 
28 Cedric Ryngaert (Jurisdiction) (supra) 113 
29 Cedric Ryngaert (Jurisdiction) (supra) 114 
30 Luc Reydams (Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) 38-42 
31 Cedric Ryngaert (Jurisdiction) (supra) 112 
32 Cedric Ryngaert (Jurisdiction) (supra) 113 
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require an enforcement mechanism not limited to national sovereignty.
33
 The main 
distinctions between the two approaches are that they differ in the nature and the 
sources of the values/interests that give rise to an international crime. They also differ 
in their definition of the international community and the nature and extent of the 
legal rights and obligations upon States in terms thereof.
34
 Bassiouni points out that 
the universalist normative position can be traced back to early Christian concepts of 
natural law. But as he points out contemporary authors mistakenly assume that early 
jurists and philosophers intended to extend their universalist views of certain wrongs 
to include universal criminal jurisdiction, when that was never their intention.
35
 In 
other words although there was a measure of agreement as to certain crimes being 
universally condemned this did not necessarily translate into everyone being entitled 
to punish these offences. Or put differently still, universal offences does not 
automatically mean universal jurisdiction over those offences. Bassiouni further 
argues that many legal scholars have advocated the theory of universality without 
clarifying the philosophical foundation of that theory. He argues that the universal 
jurisdiction exercised over pirates on the high seas has become the foundation for the 
modern theory of universal jurisdiction for certain international crimes.
36
  Most 
scholars, however, have gone further in an attempt to validate the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction over war criminals, and other serious offenders, by comparing it 
to the ancient exercise of universal jurisdiction by States over pirates. This likening of 
serious crimes with piracy is the first argument this thesis examines. 
 
A note concerning the moral discourse and justification surrounding universal 
jurisdiction, before we turn to the piracy analogy as its philosophical foundation. 
Studying universal jurisdiction has been an enlightening and exhilarating endeavor 
because it proves to be a compressed study of the theory, and practical implications, 
of international criminal law taken to its logical end.  
 
The moral argument is a strong one. Of course someone may ask how an argument 
could be made against a morally commendable effort to bring atrocious criminals to 
book? It might help to state that the very reason this I chose universal jurisdiction as 
                                                        
33 M. Cherif Bassiouni (History of Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) 42 
34 M. Cherif Bassiouni (History of Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) 42 
35 M. Cherif Bassiouni (History of Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) 43 
36 M. Cherif Bassiouni (History of Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) 43 
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topic was due to my excitement and pride at a South African Judge taking a bold 
stand against a Zimbabwean government who seem to think that they are invincible. I 
still feel this way. But after thorough studies it seems clear that feelings and moral 
justification alone is no guarantee that something will work. Such a viewpoint will not 
necessarily prove popular but it is submitted that it is essential to bring balance and 
perspective to an often one-sided debate. 
 
 
1.3 Universal jurisdiction and the piracy analogy 
 
According to Article 102 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 
(UNCLOS) piracy is subjected to universal jurisdiction.
37
 The Princeton Principles on 
Universal Jurisdiction
38
 call piracy the paradigmatic universal jurisdiction crime. And 
further claim that the piracy analogy is ‘crucial to the origins of universal 
jurisdiction’.39 Advocates of universal jurisdiction have relied on piracy as support, 
precedent and inspiration for universal jurisdiction over other crimes. They have used 
the piracy analogy to show that history is on their side, that it is an old and settled 
doctrine and that therefore there is no cause for concern.
40
 Scharf and Fischer
41
 
describe it as follows: 
 
‘Most scholars point to piracy as the first crime of universal jurisdiction recognized by the 
international community, and liken other crimes to piracy in order to justify, by analogy, the 
application of universal jurisdiction to those crimes.’ 
 
 Eugene Kontorovich
42
 explains as the piracy analogy as follows:  
 
‘According to the piracy analogy, international law created piracy as universally cognizable 
because of its extraordinary heinousness. Universal jurisdiction was never about piracy per se, 
the argument goes, but about allowing any nation to punish the world’s worst and most 
                                                        
37 See also American Law Institute (1965) ‘Restatement of the Law (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the 
United States’ 
38The Princeton Principles (supra) 
39 Princeton Principles (supra) 45; See Eugene Kontorovich (The Piracy Analogy) (supra) 185; Vanni E 
Treves ‘Jurisdictional Aspects of the Eichmann Case’ (1963) 47 Minnesota Law Review 571 ‘Whether 
universal jurisdiction over war crimes may be lawfully asserted will be seen to depend on large part on 
whether this view of piracy, and the analogies drawn from it, can be sustained.’ 
40 Eugene Kontorovich (The Piracy Analogy) 208 and the authorities and quotes in the footnote he mentions 
there 
41 Michael P Scharf & Thomas C Fischer (2001) ‘Foreword’ 35 New England Law Review (2001) 227-8 
42 Eugene Kontorovich (The Piracy Analogy) (supra) 185 
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heinous crimes. Thus universal jurisdiction over human rights violations is simply an 
application of the well settled principle that the most heinous offences are universally 
cognizable and not, as critics contend, a radical and dangerous encroachment on nations’ 
sovereignty.’ 
 
The piracy analogy can basically be described as follows: Universal jurisdiction was 
traditionally exercised over piracy. The primary motive for this was piracy’s 
particularly heinous nature. This led to pirates earning the title of hostis humanis 
generis (or the enemies of all mankind). Modern human rights offences, including 
war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity are equally heinous offences and 
those who commit them are similarly deemed enemies of all mankind. It is thus 
permissible for any State to prosecute them, just as they may pirates, using universal 
jurisdiction and in so doing act as an agent of the international community.
43
 
 
But in 1935 Harvard Research in the American Journal of International Law
44
 
determined that universal jurisdiction had not expanded beyond piracy because there 
was no agreement on the “basis” for treating crimes similarly to piracy. However this 
“basis” has subsequently, at least for the supporters of universal jurisdiction, become 
the heinousness inherent in piracy and the new international crimes.
45
 Under the 
heinousness argument, it was the substantive nature of pirates’ acts that made them 
susceptible to universal jurisdiction.
46
 KC Randall
47
, for example, argues that:  
 
‘A more accurate rationale for not limiting jurisdiction over pirates to their state of nationality 
relies on the fundamental nature of piratical offences. Piracy may comprise particularly 
heinous and wicked acts of violence or depredation.’  
 
                                                        
43 Different Courts have similarly depicted the particular heinousness of piracy to justify the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction over war criminals and torturers and etc.; See Eichmann Case (supra) 291 and 292 
and Filartiga v. Pena-Irala 630 F 2d 876 (2nd Cir 1980) where the court declared at 890 that "for purposes of 
civil liability, the torturer has become-like the pirate ... before him hostis humani generis, an enemy of all 
mankind.” 
44 Harvard Research in International Law: Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime (Universality-Piracy) 29 
American Journal of International Law (Supplement 1935) 569 
45 See footnote 16 (supra) for authority and also The Princeton Principles (supra) 48 
46 Eugene Kontorovich (The Piracy Analogy) (supra) 205 and also the Arrest Warrant Case (supra) Joint 
Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal who at 61 described piracy ‘as the classical 
example of a crime regarded as the most heinous by the international community.’  
47 Kenneth Randall (Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) 795; See also Willard B Cowles ‘Universality of 
Jurisdiction over War Crimes’ 33 California Law Review (1945) 217-8 (arguing that universal jurisdiction 
should be extended to war crimes because, like piracy, they are morally heinous); See also M Cherif 
Bassiouni ‘Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes: Historical Perspectives and Contemporary 
Practice’ 42 Virginia Journal of International Law (2001) 157  
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But this analogy of piracy to other international crimes, based on their inherent 
heinousness, seems to the writer to have been made uncritically. In fact many writers 
on the subject of universal jurisdiction simply assume the piracy analogy as a fact and 
move swiftly on to discuss how universal jurisdiction subsequently applies in modern 
international criminal law.
48
 But considering the analogy and the resultant arguments, 
one only has to ask a few simple questions of it, and as you do severe doubts arise. 
Ask for instance: Was the reason for subjecting piracy to universal jurisdiction really 
because of its heinous nature? Was it not rather because pirates committed their crime 
on the high seas, which was outside any particular nations jurisdiction? And therefore 
it was practically wise and expedient to allow any and all nations to capture and 
punish them? Ask also if piracy was particularly heinous? Was it considered worse 
than normal murder, rape or robbery? And were there times when acts of piracy were 
condoned and even encouraged by States albeit under the name of privateering? 
Before answering these questions it would be useful to briefly show why such an 
exercise is indispensable and relevant. 
 
1.3.1 Necessity of questioning the validity of the piracy analogy as the basis of 
universal jurisdiction 
 
Asking and answering the questions mentioned above is no mere theoretical exercise. 
It goes straight to the heart of the difficulty inherent in universal jurisdiction, namely 
that it is a radical and dangerous encroachment of another nation’s sovereignty. State 
actors most often commit the core crimes of war crimes, genocide and crimes against 
humanity. These State actors belong to sovereign states that will not take kindly to 
other States exercising universal jurisdiction over their leaders and nationals. This is 
elementary. Yet someone like KC Randall,
49
 in his often-quoted article on universal 
jurisdiction, curtly dismisses this concern by stating that in practice it will almost 
never happen and it will not prove a problem. But Luc Reydams
50
 maintains the exact 
opposite. He describes the problem forcefully as follows:  
 
‘To constitute an act of piracy iure gentium subject to universal jurisdiction the locus delicti 
must be the high sea or a place outside the jurisdiction of any State. Furthermore, only acts of 
                                                        
48 Kenneth Randall (Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) and also Johan D van der Vyver ‘Universal Jurisdiction in 
International Criminal Law’ 24 South African Yearbook of International Law (1999) 117 
49 Kenneth Randall (Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) 821 
50 Luc Reydams (Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) 58 
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violence committed for private ends by crews or passengers of private craft can constitute 
piracy iure gentium. State agents, State craft, and official acts are excluded from the purview 
of the definition, …These two particular constitutive elements, the locus delicti and the 
private act(or) requirement, explain why universal jurisdiction over piracy is undisputed. Such 
jurisdiction cannot possibly infringe on another State’s sovereignty. They also make piracy 
inappropriate for analogies, yet some jurists bracket together pirates, war criminals, criminals 
against humanity, and torturers as hostis humanis generis, ie enemies of all mankind.’  
 
In addition a group of African States has recently complained about what they 
perceive to be the selective use and abuse of universal jurisdiction in its exercise 
mainly over African officials by a handful of European States. The result has been a 
heated debate raging before the U.N General Assembly and Sixth Committee on the 
scope and applicability of universal jurisdiction
51
 As Matthew Garrod points out:  
 
‘The essence of this debate is the perceived conflict between two values of international law, 
namely preventing the impunity of perpetrators of international crimes on the basis of 
universality, on the one hand, and protecting the principles of sovereignty, sovereign equality 
and political independence and the immunities of incumbent State officials, on the other. The 
comments and statements made by governments illustrate the controversial, political nature of 
the concept of universality, and the lack of clear agreement as to its scope and application. 
More importantly, they also reveal great confusion as to the validity of this concept, and 
indeed, its very foundation, under international law.
52
 
 
Matthew Garrod goes on to point out that most States have taken as their starting 
point the assumption that the validity of universal jurisdiction under international law 
is beyond doubt.
53
 Thus, the African Union, in its request for the inclusion of 
universal jurisdiction in the agenda of the General Assembly, having undertaken “a 
thorough study”, declared that: 
 
‘[u]niversal jurisdiction is a well-established principle of international law the purpose of 
which is to ensure that individuals who commit grave offences, such as piracy, slavery, 
torture, genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, do not do so with impunity.’54 
 
                                                        
51Report of the Secretary-General on The Scope and Application of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction (29 
July 2010) (U.N. Doc. A/65/181); Matthew Garrod (The Protective Principle) (Supra) 764; Sienho Yee, 
‘Universal Jurisdiction: Concept, Logic, and Reality’, 10 Chinese Journal of International Law (2011) 504 
52 Matthew Garrod (The Protective Principle) (supra) 821; Secretary-General Report on Scope of Universal 
Jurisdiction (supra) paragraphs 108-111 
53 Matthew Garrod (The Protective Principle) (supra) 821 
54 Cited in Matthew Garrod (The Protective Principle) (supra) 821 
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But one year later before the Sixth Committee, the Group of African States retreated 
from their earlier position and asserted that: 
 
[t]here was as yet no generally accepted definition of universal jurisdiction and no agreement 
on which crimes, other than piracy and slavery … it would apply … [and that] the principle 
hardly existed in most domestic jurisdictions.55 
 
It is therefore submitted that South African authorities will have to critically re-
consider the validity and very foundation of universal jurisdiction. It is not too far 
sought to imagine a challenge being brought against an attempt on the part of South 
Africa to exercise universal jurisdiction over another African State based on the 
stance taken above by the group of African States. As matters currently stand it is not 
at all certain what the outcome of such a challenge will be. It is submitted that if 
universal jurisdiction is to be used then attempting to support it, by using broad 
unsubstantiated assumptions and popular rhetoric won’t do. Only a critical 
examination that verifies or refutes the legitimacy of the historical basis of universal 
jurisdiction, as a starting point, and among other things will and should convince a 
court. 
 
1.3.2 Contesting the legitimacy of the piracy analogy 
 
The questions asked of the piracy analogy above will now be considered. Because 
piracy is not the theme of this research the areas of concern will not be studied in any 
great detail but will only be mentioned and briefly touched upon as far as they relate 
to the origin of universal jurisdiction. 
 
1.3.2.1 Jurisdiction on the high seas: no threat to sovereignty 
 
The first point has already been alluded to above and is so obvious that it might easily 
be overlooked. This concerns the high seas where piracy was normally committed. 
The high seas were not regarded as belonging to any one nation but instead belonging 
to all States. For purely practical reasons, the high seas were, for purposes of 
jurisdiction, regarded not as res nullius but as res omnium communes.
56
 As pointed 
                                                        
55 Cited in Sienho Yee (Concept, Logic and Reality) (supra) 524 
56 Johan van der Vyver (Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) 117 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 29 
out above the popular belief today among scholars is that universal jurisdiction 
developed over piracy because it was a particularly heinous crime. But very few 
consider whether it did not in fact develop because of the lack of effective jurisdiction 
of States over the high seas.
57
 It would then simply have developed as a matter of 
expediency and pragmatism allowing any nation to punish pirates they captured on 
the high seas to avoid the pirates going unpunished.
58
 Harvard Research in a draft 
convention on jurisdiction found that universal jurisdiction over piracy was justified 
‘upon the ground that the punishable acts are committed upon the sea where all have 
an interest in the safety of commerce and no State has territorial jurisdiction.’59 Thus 
for piracy to be considered subject to universal jurisdiction it had to be committed 
where no State had territorial jurisdiction. Therefore piracy could not possibly 
infringe on another nation’s sovereignty. It simply did not pose the complicated 
challenges that universal jurisdiction over core crimes poses today. It is this difference 
that fundamentally distinguishes universal jurisdiction over piracy from universal 
jurisdiction over modern core crimes and which make analogies between them 
inappropriate.
60
 It is also a much more apparent and logical reason for the 
development of universal jurisdiction over the crime than trying to show that it was 
regarded as particularly heinous. This writer entirely agrees with Judge Moore, who 
in his dissenting opinion in the Lotus Case, stated that ‘piracy by law of nations, in its 
jurisdictional aspects, is sui generis.’61  Even if writers argue that the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction over piracy was not so much based on the heinous nature of the 
offences but purely for pragmatic reasons so as to enable States to cooperate in 
curbing a common threat, it undermines the foundation for a unilateral exercise of 
universal jurisdiction. Ryngaert calls this argument the ‘common interest rationale’, 
which acknowledges that the conduct of those who perpetrate serious international 
crimes in one State has an impact on other States and as such it poses a potential 
                                                        
57 Mitsue Inazumi ‘Universal Jurisdiction in Modern International Law: Expansion of National Jurisdiction for 
Prosecuting Serious Crimes under International Law’ Intersentia, Antwerp (2005) 50 
58 Martins Paparinskis ‘Piracy’ in Antonio Cassese (ed.) The Oxford Companion to International Criminal 
Justice Oxford University Press, Oxford (2009) 454 
59 Harvard Research in International Law: Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime (supra) 566 
60 Luc Reydams (Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) 58; Madeline Morris (A Divided World) (supra) 345 
‘Because no specific precedent existed prior to WWII for subjecting war crimes and crimes against 
humanity to universal jurisdiction, it is unsurprising that that the extension of universal jurisdiction to 
those crimes would have relied in part on analogies to the law of piracy. There was however one important 
flaw in that analogy…Universal jurisdiction over war crimes and crimes against humanity, therefore, can 
become a source and an instrument of interstate conflict, in a way that universal jurisdiction over piracy 
was designed to avoid… The significant implications of the flaw in the analogy went unaddressed’ 
61 Lotus Case (France v Turkey) 1927 PCIJ Reports, Series A, no 10 (Moore, J., dissenting) 69 
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threat to all States. All States thus have an interest in prosecuting the wrongdoer.
62
 
This is especially the case with crimes like piracy, drug offences, hijacking, hostage-
taking, and other terrorist acts, which lends itself to justification under the common 
interest rationale.
63
 But as Ryngaert aptly points out, the common interest rationale is 
not very helpful to justify the exercise of universal jurisdiction over crimes against 
international humanitarian law (war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity). 
When States work together there is usually no controversy. Alfred Rubin, arguably 
the authority on piracy, after extensive research and writing on the subject, reaches 
the conclusion that in practice universal jurisdiction was only exercised over piracy 
when no State was in a position to object. He States that at the time territoriality was 
the dominant rule in Europe regarding the reach of prescriptive and enforcement 
jurisdiction and piracy was limited to acts on the high seas, beyond territorial claims 
to jurisdiction.  He further writes that even then it was not truly “universal” as it was 
only exercised when the State asserting jurisdiction had jurisdiction to adjudicate in 
the form of a particular legally protected interest, like, for instance, the protection of 
its nationals as victims of the piracy.
64
  
 
1.3.2.2  State sponsored piracy? 
 
Piracy could not be considered particularly heinous if States sometimes condoned it 
and often relied on it. Yet this is exactly what would happen. Antonio Cassese argues 
that piracy is not an international crime because during the heyday of its enforcement, 
universal jurisdiction over piracy was suspended when piracy was committed on 
behalf of a State. The name given to such State sponsored piracy was privateering.
65
 
Eugene Kontorovich has done extensive research on this aspect and convincingly 
shows that privateering was nothing but piracy done when sponsored by a State.
66
 
Alfred Rubin mentions that the “crime” of “piracy” was reduced to acts done (the 
taking of another’s property) by persons who did not submit to a legal order 
“recognized” by whatever officials of whatever legal order had the question before 
it.
67
 The conduct of pirates and privateers was similar; they seized merchant ships 
                                                        
62 Cedric Ryngaert (Jurisdiction) (supra) 106 
63 Cedric Ryngaert (Jurisdiction) (supra) 107 
64 Alfred, P Rubin ‘Ethics and Authority in International Law’ (1997) Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
109 & 164 
65 Antonio Cassese International Criminal Law Oxford University Press, New York (2001) 23-25  
66 Eugene Kontorovich (The Piracy Analogy) (supra) 210 - 223 
67 Alfred Rubin (Ethics and Authority) (supra) 164 
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through threat of lethal force. Yet privateers were not subject to universal jurisdiction 
and were not even considered criminals.
68
 All a privateer needed in order to stop and 
seize cargo and ships on the high seas, and to avoid being treated like a pirate for his 
efforts was a letter of marque and reprisal from a nation.
69
 International law 
recognized this licensed plunder and all nations recognized the right of other 
sovereigns to authorize privateering.
70
 A nation would always authorize these letters 
of marque against their adversaries and this saved them the expense of maintaining 
large standing navies.
71
 Although pirates had a fearsome reputation as murderers and 
torturers, murder and torture were not necessary elements of the international crime of 
piracy. And even pirates who never mistreated their victims were still fully subject to 
universal jurisdiction.
72
 On the other hand privateers would often engage in piratical 
conduct and they would still not be subject to universal jurisdiction.
73
  It is worth 
quoting Kontorovich where he says the following: 
 
‘The heinousness premise of the piracy analogy holds that certain actions by their very nature 
make the perpetrators amenable to any nation’s jurisdiction. Torture and genocide evoke a 
visceral repugnance. The repugnance would not be diminished if the torture or genocide had 
the blessing of nations, generals or religious authorities. Yet clearly this is not how piracy was 
regarded by the nations of the world, for a document signed by a third-tier official of a 
second-rate province could transform a universally punishable pirate into an innocent 
privateer.’
74
 
 
Matthew Garrod points out that during the peak of piracy in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries colonial trade produced wealth, that led to power and gave rise 
to competition and war between Spain, England, France and the Netherlands. Trade 
was in fact so important that its disruption on the high seas was treated, and often 
described, as violating the law of nations. Pirates were the enemy and had to be 
suppressed because they undermined trade and wealth. In a de facto war between 
                                                        
68 Eugene Kontorovich (The Piracy Analogy) (supra) 210 
69 Eugene Kontorovich (The Piracy Analogy) (supra) 211, 220 ‘The fact that nations authorized plunder at 
sea greatly offended the sensibilities of some contemporary observers. If, as some people thought, the 
privateer was morally no better than the pirate, then the letter of marque amounted to governmental 
involvement in a rather dirty business.’   
70 Eugene Kontorovich (The Piracy Analogy) (supra) 211 
71 Eugene Kontorovich (The Piracy Analogy) (supra) 213 
72 Eugene Kontorovich (The Piracy Analogy) (supra) 215 
73 Eugene Kontorovich (The Piracy Analogy) (supra) 216 “Indeed excesses by privateers were recognized to 
be inevitable. Pirates and privateers drew their crews from the same rough and destitute labor pool. Pirates 
were often laid-off privateers. Piracy thus encouraged privateering. As Daniel Defoe wrote in 1724 
‘Privateers in Time of War are a Nursery for Pirates against a Peace.’” 
74 Eugene Kontorovich (The Piracy Analogy) (supra) 211 
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many of these States on the seas in the New World privateers were used very 
effectively by one State against another. Privateers proved so effective in warfare that 
Spain was eventually forced to negotiate a peaceful settlement. This agreement made 
many privateers superfluous who almost automatically resorted to piracy. It was 
during this time and because of the threat that they posed to trade that pirates started 
being called names like the ‘enemy’ and ‘hostes humani generis’ with their acts 
described as heinous. Garrod explains that at a time when one nations pirate was 
another’s privateer it was a lack of sovereign authority that led to pirates being given 
these condemnatory labels. He wonders whether such labels did not develop in an 
attempt to distinguish pirates from privateers? He says: ‘[a]s the two practices are 
distinguishable only in nomine and with regard to State sanction, it is illogical to say 
that as a matter of international law, one of them gave rise to universal jurisdiction 
because it is ‘heinous’, while the other was lawful and honourable.’75 
     
1.3.2.3 Piracy more heinous than murder, rape or robbery? 
 
If universal jurisdiction was exercised over pirates because piracy by its very nature 
was regarded as a particularly heinous crime, one may immediately ask why, at the 
same time, other heinous crimes like murder and rape were not also subject to 
universal jurisdiction? According to Kontorovich piracy was simply a subspecies of 
robbery and was often defined by reference to robbery on land.
76
 Piracy was also no 
more heinous than ordinary robbery and less so than murder.
77
 Kontorovich refers to 
the case of United States v Palmer
78
 where the Supreme Court had to decide what to 
do with the defendants who stood accused only of stealing goods from a ship. If the 
Court decided to endorse a broad interpretation by government of the offence the 
defendants would hang, and if on a narrow one, they would not be punished at all. To 
make his point Kontorovich quotes Justice Johnson, who in his dissenting judgment, 
argued that government’s proposed interpretation created an unfair inconsistency 
between the punishment of robbery on land and sea. Accordingly Justice Johnson 
held: 
 
                                                        
75 Matthew Garrod ‘Piracy, the Protection of Vital State Interests and the False Foundations of Universal 
Jurisdiction in International Law’ (2014) 25:2 Diplomacy and Statecraft 195-200 
76 Eugene Kontorovich (The Piracy Analogy) (supra) 223 
77 Eugene Kontorovich (The Piracy Analogy) (supra) 225 
78 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 626-31. 
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‘It is literally true, that under [the majority’s interpretation] a whole ship’s crew may be 
consigned to the gallows, for robbing a vessel of a single chicken, even although a 
robbery committed on land for thousands, may not have been punishable beyond 
whipping or confinement.’79 
 
1.3.3 Concluding remarks on the piracy analogy 
 
If piracy could sometimes mean robbing a vessel of a single chicken, and if all 
seafaring nations, in the common interest of nations to exploit others for wealth, 
legalized piracy whenever it suited them by merely calling it privateering, it would be 
very hard to argue that piracy was regarded as inherently or extraordinarily heinous. 
And if universal jurisdiction did not apply to piracy because of its heinous nature then 
it cannot simply be argued that now it must a fortiori apply to the inherently heinous 
acts of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.
80
 
 
1.4 Historical roots 
 
As pointed out above
81
 the proponents of universal jurisdiction have relied heavily on 
piracy as historical support for universal jurisdiction. But they didn’t stop there. They 
have also invoked the writings of the eminent jurists Hugo Grotius and Emerich de 
Vattel in their quest to show that universal jurisdiction is nothing new but the wisdom 
of the ages.
82
 We will therefore have to determine if such a position is justifiable by 
considering the original texts. 
 
 
  
                                                        
79 United States v Palmer (supra) 639 
80 Even staunch supporters of universal jurisdiction have abandoned the piracy analogy, see Claus Kreß 
‘Universal Jurisdiction Over International Crimes and the Institut de Droit International’ (2006) 4 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 569 ‘It should go without saying that piracy does not even come close to match 
the ‘heinousness’ of genocide or crimes against humanity, the former crime, in terms of gravity being 
comparable rather to ordinary robbery. It also remains open to doubt whether piracy constitutes a crime 
under international law… The sui generis characterization of piracy on the high seas as a crime of customary 
universal jurisdiction would seem to rest upon a combination of the absence of a territorial sovereign and 
the typical difficulty of establishing one of the traditional bases for alternative forms of jurisdiction such as, 
in particular, the nationality of the alleged offender.’ 
81 Paragraph 1.2 (supra) 
82 Diane F Orentlicher ‘Settling Accounts: The Duty To Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime’ 
(1990-1991) 100 Yale Law Journal 2556; Louis René Beres ‘On International Law and Nuclear Terrorism’ 
(1994) 24 Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 20, note 40; Darren Hawkins ‘Universal 
Jurisdiction for Human Rights: From Legal Principle to Limited Reality’ (2003) 9 Global Governance 347-65 
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1.4.1 Hugo de Groot (Hugo Grotius) (1583 – 1645) 
 
We can start by considering Grotius’ views on the matter. His views may be 
particularly important because not only is he widely acclaimed as the father of 
international law
83
 but also in South Africa we are so privileged as to have him as one 
of our ‘own’ Roman-Dutch jurists. The passages often relied on read as follows: 
 
‘The matter that necessarily comes next under consideration is the case of those, who screen 
delinquents from punishment. It was before observed that, according to the law of nature, no 
one could inflict punishment, but a person entirely free from the guilt of the crime which he 
was going to punish. But since established governments were formed, it has been a settled 
rule, to leave the offences of individuals, which affect their own community, to those states 
themselves, or to their rulers, to punish or pardon them at their discretion. But they have not 
the same plenary authority, or discretion, respecting offences, which affect society at large, 
and which other independent states or their rulers have a right to punish, in the same manner, 
as in every country popular actions are allowed for certain misdemeanors. Much less is any 
state at liberty to pass over in any of its subjects crimes affecting other independent states or 
sovereigns, On which account any sovereign state or prince has a right to require another 
power to punish any of its subjects offending in the above named respect: a right essential to 
the dignity and security of all governments. 
[…] 
But as it is not usual for one state to allow the armed force of another to enter her territories 
under the pretext of inflicting punishment upon an offender, it is necessary that the power, in 
whose kingdom an offender resides, should – upon the complaint of the aggrieved party – 
either punish him itself, or deliver him up to the discretion of that party. Innumerable 
instances of such demands to deliver up offenders occur both in sacred and profane history.  
[…]  
Yet all these instances are to be understood not as strictly binding a people or Sovereign 
Prince to the actual surrender of offenders, but allowing them the alternative of either 
punishing or delivering them up. 
[…] 
What has been said of punishing or giving up aggressors, applies not only to those, who 
always have been subjects of the sovereign, in whose dominions they are now found, but to 
those also, who, after the commission of a crime, have fled to some place for refuge.’84 
 
                                                        
83 John Dugard ‘Grotius, the jurist and international lawyer: Four hundred years on’ (1983) 100 South 
African Law Journal 214 
84 Hugo Grotius ‘The Rights of War and Peace, Including the Law of Nature and of Nations’ translated from the 
original Latin by A.C. Campbell, with an Introduction by D. J. Hill, New York: M. Walter Dunne (1901) 
Available at http://oll.libertyfund.org/index.php?option=com_staticxt&staticfile= show.php%3Ftitle=553 
&Itemid=28. Book II, Chapter XXI & IV. Last visited on 14 October 2013 
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And also: 
‘It is proper also to observe that kings and those who are possessed of sovereign power 
have a right to exact punishment not only for injuries affecting immediately themselves or 
their own subjects, but for gross violations of the law of nature and of nations, done to other 
states and subjects. 
[…] 
It was the theme of praise bestowed upon the heroes of antiquity, that in their most arduous 
undertakings they avenged the wrongs of others rather than their own.’85 
 
Taken only at face value it is easy to see how scholars can employ these passages in 
support of a natural law justification for foreign intervention through universal 
jurisdiction.
86
 But on closer scrutiny this argument seems to be wrong and not only 
textually but also contextually indefensible. 
 
Considering the first passage mentioned above, Grotius is arguing that delinquents 
should not be shielded from punishment. He declares that it is a settled rule that 
offences that affect a certain community should be left to that State responsible to 
punish or pardon such offenders at their discretion. But that discretion is limited 
where these offence affect society at large and other States also have a right to punish 
such offences. He then likens the interest these other states have to the actio popularis 
available in, as he says, all countries for certain misdemeanors. He then says that a 
State may even less pass over offences that affect other independent States. This 
places the emphasis squarely on his mention of the State acting in terms of the actio 
popularis because he contradistinguishes it from a case where a state was in fact 
directly [own emphasis] affected by an offence. He was thus in favor of States acting 
on behalf of other States or their subjects even where they were not directly affected 
by an offence.
87
 This is further proved by the last quoted paragraph above, that the 
heroes of antiquity were praised for avenging the wrongs of others rather than their 
own. The actio popularis has been defined in South Africa as ‘championing the cause 
                                                        
85 Hugo Grotius (The Rights of War and Peace) (supra) Book II, Chapter XL 
86 See for example Cedric Ryngaert (Jurisdiction) (supra) 108; who does not quote the entire section but 
only certain parts, which make it seem that Grotius was in favor of universal jurisdiction, ie. ‘(arguing that 
States have a right ‘to exact Punishments, not only for Injuries committed against themselves or their 
Subjects, but likewise, for those which do not peculiarly concern them, but which are, in any Person 
whatsoever, grievous Violations of the Law of Nature or Nations’ and that ‘any State would have the moral 
imperative to punish the perpetrators of delicta juris gentium’, [f]or […]it is so much more honorable, to 
revenge other Peoples Injuries rather than their own […] Kings, beside the Charge of their particular 
Dominions, have upon them the care of human society in general’). 
87 For example Luc Reydams ‘The Rise and Fall of Universal Jurisdiction’ in William A. Schabas and Nadia 
Bernaz (eds.) Routledge Handbook of International Criminal Law Routledge, London (2010) 339 also argues 
along similar lines against using Grotius as support for universal jurisdiction. 
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of the people’.88 It describes an action brought on behalf of someone else when the 
one bringing the action was not per se affected by what happened. Grotius supports 
this action and applies it to States taking up matters that do not directly affect them, 
but on behalf of other States and not against them. Did Grotius thus believe any state 
might exercise universal jurisdiction over offences affecting ‘society at large’? 
 
The answer is no. And one may know this by considering the quoted paragraphs in 
textual context of De Jure Belli ac Pacis, the perspective and context from which 
Grotius wrote and the modern definition of universal jurisdiction. To be sure, in 
taking these aspects into consideration, the present writer believes that Grotius never 
even imagined or considered the concept of universal jurisdiction.  
 
To start with context in the text itself, regard can instantly be had to the name of the 
book. De Jure Belli ac Pacis means ‘On the law of war and peace’. This is important 
to remember because a large section, and maybe even the most of the book, is devoted 
to the concept of a just war. Keeping this in mind it is important to note what Grotius 
states immediately prior to the much cited paragraph about kings having a right to 
punish not only injuries affecting themselves, or their subjects but also for gross 
violations of law and nature done to other states and subjects. Just before this passage 
Grotius states, as a fact, that wars are undertaken as forms of punishment.
89
 If 
understood in the immediate context of punishment defined as war, the paragraph 
takes on a completely different meaning to what is often propagated. This 
interpretation fits in with the title, theme and context of the book and must be 
preferred. Seen in this way he was saying that kings or sovereigns have a right to 
wage war not only when they are injured but also when other states and subjects are 
treated in gross violation of the law of nature or nations. Obviously waging war and 
exercising universal jurisdiction are two different things. As Matthew Garrod points 
out it is also very important to remember that the law of nature or nations referred to 
here must be read in the light of other works by Grotius which he wrote to defend the 
waging of war by the Dutch East India Company against Portugal and Spain in the 
East Indies to have access to the lucrative trade in the area. Grotius wrote that 
                                                        
88 Wood v Odangwa Tribal Authority 1975 2 SA 294 (A); See also Alfred, P Rubin ‘Actio Popularis, Jus Cogens 
and Offenses Erga Omnes’ (2001) 35 New England Law Review 265-280; Egon Schwelb ‘The Actio Popularis 
and International Law’ (1972) 2 Israel Yearbook of International Law 46-56  
89 Hugo Grotius (The Rights of War and Peace) (supra) Book II, Chapter XX at XXXVIII 
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humanity is united by trade, is a necessity for the human race and preventing trade is 
an offence against nature herself. Hence sovereigns, and specifically the Dutch, had 
permission to punish foreign nationals and even use military force in a ‘just war’ to 
protect their trade under the authority and in the interest of the law of nations.
90
  
 
The next aspect to consider is that Grotius wrote from a state sovereign perspective 
and respect of states and their sovereignty was key to his teaching.
91
 The first four 
paragraphs by Grotius quoted above mention that a sovereign cannot shield from 
punishment someone who has aggrieved another sovereign. The underlying idea is 
that there should be no safe havens for fugitives. It is further an arrangement between 
sovereigns. The offender here discussed is an individual/ or maybe even a group of 
criminals but certainly not another sovereign or its agents. The next paragraph 
mentions the fact that it is not usual for one state to enter the territory of another with 
its armed force in order to exact punishment on an offender. That is why extradition 
of such an offender should be allowed or else the state should punish him itself. This 
is a practical arrangement to prevent war because one state entering another with its 
armed force sounds a lot like war. This interpretation again fits in with the context 
and the argument set out above. Hence it would mean that should a sovereign 
consider itself sufficiently injured by a fugitive, and the harboring state refuses to 
extradite or try the fugitive then a sovereign would be justified in attacking the 
fugitive and the state that seeks to shelter him. It seems likely that Grotius meant that 
in such a case war would be the remedy available to a state.
92
 Not an elaborate 
attempt to exercise jurisdiction over the state leaders who are indirectly offending an 
aggrieved state. It seems that even the passage about the nobility of avenging the 
wrongs of another means that States should be allowed to act on behalf of other States 
to punish those who had harmed the other State. He does not say that States should act 
against other States on behalf of the subjects of the other State for wrongs done to 
those subjects. Grotius respected governments and envisioned a system of cooperation 
between them. Why would he then be used as authority for universal jurisdiction, 
                                                        
90 Matthew Garrod (Piracy and the False Foundations of Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) 198 & 203 
91 Hugo Grotius (The Rights of War and Peace) (supra) Book II, Chapter XX at XXX where he states that 
‘sovereign princes, magistrates, and rulers of every description’[s] authority is the keystone of the fabric of 
society.’ 
92 John Dugard (Grotius) (supra) 219 ‘Grotius recognizes the right of humanitarian intervention, that is, the 
right of states to intervene forcibly on behalf of persons oppressed by their own sovereign.’ 
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which is often described as diametrically opposed to notions of sovereignty?
93
 Using 
Grotius to support universal jurisdiction seems wrong if one considers that State 
actors often commit core
94
 crimes. Yet some argue very convincingly that the only 
logical justification for exercising universal jurisdiction over core crimes is precisely 
because state actors commit them.
95
 How can these two divergent views of respect of 
sovereignty on the one hand and its total disregard on the other be reconciled? It is 
very difficult. But it is impossible to attempt to do so by invoking the writings of 
Grotius. He would probably cringe at the contemporary interpretation of his words. 
 
Lastly it is submitted that those who rely on Grotius as support for universal 
jurisdiction will have to prove that he envisioned or even contemplated this concept. 
Yet there is no attempt on their part to do so, instead they attempt to use him to verify 
their claims. The context of sovereign states that he found himself in at the time, 
combined with the immediate context of his own substantial works, testify against 
their fanciful interpretation of one or two passages. It is submitted that weighed 
against the overwhelming evidence against such an interpretation that mere 
conjecture, speculation and wishful thinking will certainly not shift this burden. If 
Grotius did not emphatically stipulate that he envisioned universal jurisdiction there is 
nothing to do but accept that he didn’t mean to and probably never even considered it. 
John Dugard, citing Sir Hersch Lauterpacht said that the enduring appeal of De Jure 
Belli ac Pacis stems, above other things, ‘from its rejection of raison d´état as the 
basic premise of international relations and from its attempt to inject morality, justice 
and idealism into the international legal order.’96 It is true; Grotius was indeed ahead 
of his time in striving for a just and decent world order world where states cooperated 
with and helped each other. Yet, for all the idealist and visionary that he was, not even 
he imagined a concept as unorthodox as universal jurisdiction. 
 
 
                                                        
93 Robert Cryer ‘International Criminal Law vs State Sovereignty: Another Round?’ (2005) 16(5) European 
Journal of International Law 979 ‘When sovereignty appears in international criminal law scholarship, it 
commonly comes clothed in hat and cape. A whiff of sulphur permeates the air. Generally, international 
criminal law scholars see sovereignty as the enemy. It is seen as the sibling of realpolitik, thwarting 
international criminal justice at every turn.’ 
94 War crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity 
95 Win-chiat Lee ‘International Crimes and Universal Jurisdiction’ in Larry May and Zachary Hoskins (eds.) 
International Criminal Law and Philosophy (2010) Cambridge University Press, New York 15-38 Lee’s entire 
argument is based on the fact that universal jurisdiction can only logically apply, and is only justified, when 
core crimes are committed by government officials or on their behalf.’ 
96 John Dugard (Grotius) (supra) 215 
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1.4.2 Emerich de Vattel (1714 – 1767) 
 
As noted above many scholars also invoke the writings of the influential Swiss 
philosopher Emerich de Vattel in support of universal jurisdiction.
97
 These supporters 
point to a passage from Vattel’s Law of Nations as support of their claims. This 
passage reads as follows: 
 
‘Although the justice of each nation ought in general to be confined to the punishment of 
crimes committed in it’s own territories, we ought to except from this rule those villains, who, 
by the nature and habitual frequency of their crimes, violate all public security, and declare 
themselves the enemies of the human race. Poisoners assassins, and incendiaries by 
profession, may be exterminated wherever they are seized; for they attack and injure all 
nations, by trampling under foot the foundation of their common safety. Thus pirates are sent 
to the gibbet by the first into whose hands they fall.’98 
 
Eugene Kontorovich has already argued, both compellingly and comprehensively so, 
that Vattel did not support universal jurisdiction.
99
 A brief comment to show that 
Vattel should also not be quoted as support for universal jurisdiction should suffice 
here. It is important to remember that Vattel was a close reader of Grotius. By looking 
at Vattel’s views it will further assist us to see whether the interpretation given of 
Grotius’ paragraphs quoted above is accurate. Firstly the offenders Vattel mentions in 
this passage are those who offend against nations, not the government agents 
themselves. This is borne out by the argument below. Kontorovich points out that 
Vattels’ use of the hostis humanis generis phrase meant that he considered them the 
enemy in the military sense, with the emphasis placed on the ‘hostis’ part.100 That is 
why Vattel says that enemies of all mankind may be exterminated wherever they are 
                                                        
97 Eugene Kontorovich (The Piracy Analogy) (supra) 230 
98 Emer de Vattel ‘The Law of Nations, Or, Principles of the Law of Nature, Applied to the Conduct and Affairs 
of Nations and Sovereigns, with Three Early Essays on the Origin and Nature of Natural Law and on Luxury’ 
(2008) edited and with an Introduction by Béla Kapossy and Richard Whitmore (Indianapolis: Liberty 
Fund) Available at http://oll.libertyfund.org/title/2246 /212414. Last visited on 21 October 2013 
99 Eugene Kontorovich (The Piracy Analogy) (supra) 230-236 
100 Eugene Kontorovich (The Piracy Analogy) (supra) 232 “Hostis” means enemy in the military sense. Its 
application to pirates stemmed from the theory that a nation’s vessels could attack pirates as if they were 
military enemies, even absent a declaration of war or any formal hostilities. The terms provenance has long 
been forgotten by all but a few scholars of piracy and the law of war, but it was certainly understood by 
Vattel, a close reader of Grotius. By calling the broader category of wrongdoer “hostis” Vattel situates this 
passage in the context of military operations (which remain a primary focus throughout the book), and in 
the context of adjudication.  See also Grotius himself, immediately after, and in the context of his passage 
quoted earlier, about ancient heroes avenging the wrongs of others and not themselves. He says: ‘Upon this 
principle there can be no hesitation in pronouncing all wars to be just, that are made upon pirates, robbers, 
and enemies of the human race.’ Hugo Grotius (The Rights of War and Peace) (supra) Book II, Chapter XL 
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seized. As Kontorovich points out immediate extermination and trial are different 
things.
101
 
 
The often-quoted passage by Vattel can thus not be used as support for universal 
jurisdiction. In another section Vattel considers universal jurisdiction only to reject it. 
To quote Kontorovich on this aspect: 
 
‘He (Vattel) writes that if a State itself is not directly harmed by a violation of the law of 
nations, it has no business attempting to punish that violation… The Law of Nations is a 
defense of a robust notion of national sovereignty, one that trumps notions of universal justice. 
“It does not, then, belong to any sovereign, to set himself up for a judge of his conduct, and so 
to oblige him to alter it,” Vattel wrote in a passage that would be quoted by Alexander 
Hamilton.’102 
 
1.4.3 Concluding remarks 
 
A brief contemplation of Grotius’ and Vattels’ views on universal jurisdiction has 
shown that Grotius probably never even considered it and Vattel considered it, only to 
reject the idea. It is submitted that the fanciful interpretation of a handful of passages 
from their writings, as support of universal jurisdiction, should not confuse us. 
Universal jurisdiction over heinous offences does not have the backing of history in 
the practice of piracy or the endorsement of the old writers. In the next chapter we 
consider the Lotus Case of 1927, which is forever cited in arguing that universal 
jurisdiction may be exercised, simply because there is no rule against it. And 
immediately after this we will consider the effect WWII and subsequent happenings, 
including the Eichmann trial, have had on universal jurisdiction. 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
101 Eugene Kontorovich (The Piracy Analogy) (supra) 231-232 ‘This point is important because a serious 
objection to universal jurisdiction, particularly in a constitutional system of separated governmental 
powers, is that it gives courts too great a role in matters affecting foreign relations at the expense of the 
political branches.’   
102 Eugene Kontorovich (The Piracy Analogy) (supra) 233 quoting Vattel: ‘“The Spaniards violated all rules 
when they set themselves up as judges of the Inca Achaulpa. If that prince had violated the law of nations 
with respect to them, they would have a right to punish him. But they accused him of having put some of his 
subjects to death… for which he was not at all answerable to them.” (Emphasis added)’ 
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Chapter 2 
 
The Lotus Case, The Aftermath of WWII and the Eichmann Trial 
 
2.1 The Lotus Case 
 
2.1.1 Facts of the Lotus Case 
 
A discussion of the Lotus Case is essential to a proper understanding of 
jurisdiction.
103
 In this case a French ship, the Lotus, collided with a Turkish ship the 
Boz-Court, on the high seas. The latter ship sank and a number of crewmembers and 
passengers lost their lives. The Lotus picked up the survivors and put into port in 
Turkey. Here, the officer of the watch on board the Lotus at the time of the collision 
was arrested, tried and convicted of culpable homicide. France objected to Turkey’s 
exercise of jurisdiction and the dispute was referred to the Permanent Court of 
International Justice.  France contended that the Turkish courts, in order to have 
jurisdiction, should be able to point to some specific entitlement to jurisdiction 
recognized by international law in favor of Turkey. Turkey, on the other hand, 
asserted that it had jurisdiction unless it was forbidden by international law. The 
Court, by the President’s casting vote, ruled in favor of Turkey. It held: 
 
‘International law governs relations between independent States. The rules of law binding 
upon States therefore emanate from their own free will as expressed by conventions or by 
usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law and established in order to regulate 
between theses co-existing independent communities or with a view to the achievement of 
common aims. Restrictions upon the independence of States cannot be presumed. 
 
Now the first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a State is that-failing 
the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary-it may not exercise its power in any form in 
the territory of another State. In this sense jurisdiction is certainly territorial; it cannot be 
exercised by a State outside its territory except by virtue of a permissive rule derived from 
international custom or from a convention. 
 
                                                        
103  Lotus Case (France v Turkey) 1927 (supra); John Dugard (International Law: A South African 
Perspective)(supra) 147 ‘The starting point for any discussion of jurisdiction is the Lotus Case.’ 
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It does not, however, follow that international law prohibits a State from exercising 
jurisdiction in it’s own territory, in respect of any case which relates to acts which have taken 
place abroad, and in which it cannot rely on some permissive rule of international law. Such a 
view would only be tenable if international law contained a general prohibition to States to 
extend the application of their laws or the jurisdiction of their courts to persons, property, and 
acts outside their territory, and if, as an exception to this general prohibition, it allowed States 
to do so in certain specific cases. But this is certainly not the case under international law as it 
stands at present. Far from laying down a general prohibition to the effect that States may not 
extend the application of their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to persons, property and 
acts outside their territory, it leaves them in this respect a wide measure of discretion which is 
only limited in certain cases by prohibitive rules; as regards other cases, every State remains 
free to adopt the principles which it regards as best and most suitable. 
 
This discretion left to States by international law explains the great variety of rules which they 
have been able to adopt without objections or complaints on the part of other States; it is in 
order to remedy the difficulties resulting from such variety that efforts have been made for 
years past, both in Europe and America, to prepare conventions the effect of which would be 
precisely to limit the discretion at present left to States in this respect by international la, thus 
making good the existing lacunae in respect of jurisdiction or removing the conflicting 
jurisdictions arising from the diversity of the principles adopted by the various States. 
 
In these circumstances, all that can be required of a State is that it should not overstep the 
limits which international law places upon its jurisdiction; within these limits, its title to 
exercise jurisdiction rests in its sovereignty.’104 
 
The controversy surrounding this case focuses more on the dicta than the actual 
decision. The decision was simple enough in that the Court found that because the 
effects were felt on the Turkish vessel, which is considered an extension of the 
territorial State, a prosecution might be justified from the point of view of the 
territorial principle.
105
 Important however for purposes of our discussion is the dictum 
that ‘[r]estrictions upon the independence of States cannot…be presumed’, which has 
since been taken to proclaim a presumptive freedom of States in general. And this is 
whence originates the expression ‘Lotus principle’ for the view that States have a 
right to do whatever is not prohibited by an international law or custom. Supporters of 
                                                        
104 Lotus (supra) paragraphs 18-19 
105 Lotus (supra) page 23 
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universal jurisdiction consistently use the ‘Lotus principle’ to justify the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction.
106
 
 
2.1.2 Burden of proof 
 
It seems to the present writer that for the lack of historical precedent and authority for 
universal jurisdiction the next best thing is claiming that it should still be exercised 
because nothing prohibits it. Surely this is not an argument or justification for the 
exercise of universal jurisdiction? It is not an argument at all.
107
 Yet this is often the 
best argument there is. In fact by their very reliance on this argument adherents of 
universal jurisdiction free themselves of any need to show precedent for their exercise 
of jurisdiction. Should it happen that anyone objects, they would immediately point 
out that the burden is on the objector, because that is what was stated in Lotus. This 
seems not only wrong but also unfair. 
 
The fundamental problem with the Lotus Principle line of reasoning is that universal 
jurisdiction, especially when exercised over State leaders and high-ranking 
government officials, is an unusual and almost unprecedented procedure. This is 
proved by the lack of a sound historical basis for, and the few prosecutions of this 
kind that have actually been based on, this principle (Although this is exactly the 
opposite of what human rights activists and scores of writers on the subject hold.) But 
let us just for argument’s sake and for the moment assume that it is in fact a largely 
unprecedented procedure. Should a State then decide to prosecute the leaders of 
another State by means of universal jurisdiction for one of the core crimes they are 
forging ahead where few have gone before. And if they are honest enough to admit 
that they find themselves, by so doing, in unchartered territory perhaps they will be 
less confident in applying universal jurisdiction and so glibly declaring the burden to 
                                                        
106 Willard Cowles (Universality of Jurisdiction Over War Crimes) (supra) 177-218 in 1945 was the first 
person to employ this form of reasoning with reference to Lotus and the exercise of universal jurisdiction. In 
his article Cowles claimed to examine the right of ‘every State’ to exercise universal jurisdiction over war 
crimes. But all his examples, and his entire argument, deal only with the right of a ‘belligerent State’ to 
prosecute war crimes ‘by an enemy’ against the nationals of an Allied belligerent in one and the same war. 
But then he goes on to conclude, in reliance upon Lotus that ‘The States of the world have jurisdiction to try 
and punish any war criminals unless prohibited from so doing by international law.’ Cowles thus makes a 
quantum leap from belligerent nations being able to punish war criminals that fought against them to all 
nations having jurisdiction simply by invoking Lotus. 
107 See the Separate opinion of President of the ICJ Guillaume in the Arrest Warrant Case at paragraph 14 
where he labeled a similar argument by Belgium, in reliance upon the ‘Lotus principle’, as ‘hardly 
persuasive’. 
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be on anyone who challenges their exercise of universal jurisdiction. It then moves 
closer to a situation where a burden rests on the party wishing to change a settled 
system to show why doing things in a radically new way is a good idea.
108
 Luc 
Reydams proposes solving this problem as follows: 
 
‘In litigation the onus of proof lies on the plaintiff. In a dispute between States involving 
extraterritorial jurisdiction it is up to the State of nationality of the defendant to show that the 
criminal proceedings in the forum State are contrary to international law. The burden of proof 
in the Lotus case was accordingly cast on France, the challenger of jurisdiction. Turkey, the 
defendant State, had nothing to prove. It is important to remember, however, that the entire 
process complained of - the assumption of jurisdiction over a French national in respect of 
something done by him on the high seas - occurred in Turkish territory, ie in a Turkish court, 
in respect of a vessel and a person voluntarily present in Turkey. How does the issue of the 
burden of proof present itself when the dispute relates to an offence committed within the 
plaintiff State’s own territory? The onus of proof still lies on the on the plaintiff State but it 
would not be too difficult for the plaintiff State to cause the burden of proof to shift if the 
following analysis is correct. The sovereign equality of States constitutes the basic 
constitutional doctrine of the law of nations. A corollary of sovereign equality is the right of 
each State freely to choose and develop its political, social, economic and cultural systems, 
including its criminal justice policy, without interference in any form by another State. 
Couched in terms of international relations: a Sate may not interfere with another State’s 
internal or domestic affairs. An exercise of jurisdiction by any State other than the territorial 
State violates prima facie the non-interference principle, which functions as an important limit 
on jurisdiction over crime. The defendant State must then be prepared to show that it is 
pursuing its own legitimate interests or that the offence transcends the domestic affairs of the 
territorial State and falls in the sphere of international concern, and above all of international 
law.’109 
 
It is submitted that the two proposals are almost similar and will in practice have 
similar effects. The only difference is that, on the version proposed by Reydams, the 
burden starts on the plaintiff but as soon as proceedings commence it moves to the 
defendant. Reydams thus also contends that the exercise of jurisdiction by any State 
other than the territorial State is the exception and not the norm. 
                                                        
108 See Claus Kreß (Institut de Droit International) (supra) 571 ‘The classic Lotus presumption in favour of 
state’s jurisdiction title in the absence of a rule to the contrary no longer applies or does, at least, not apply 
to universal jurisdiction.’ See also JL Brierly ‘The Lotus Case’ (1928) 44 Law Quarterly Review 156 
‘International law did not start as the law of a society of States each of omnicompetent jurisdiction, but of 
States possessing a personal jurisdiction over their own nationals and later acquiring a territorial 
jurisdiction over resident non-nationals. If it is alleged that they have now acquired a measure of 
jurisdiction over non-resident non-nationals, a valid international custom to that effect should surely be 
established by those who allege it.’  
109 Luc Reydams (Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) 20-21 
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2.1.3 Presumption of freedom 
 
Because of the dictum in Lotus that restrictions on the freedom of States cannot be 
presumed, many argue that there is a presumption of freedom in favor of States 
wishing to extend their jurisdiction extra-territorially. But Reydams holds that this 
presumption of freedom should not be taken literally because in the same breath the 
judgment also refers to limits which international law places on jurisdiction and to 
principles that influence jurisdiction.
110
 Reydams explains that none of the extreme 
views often taken in the past applies any longer. Thus States don’t have an absolute 
discretion because then extraterritorial jurisdiction would simply not be an issue. On 
the other hand States are not forbidden from extending their criminal law and the 
jurisdiction of their courts to persons and acts outside their territory or else universal 
jurisdiction would be illegal and that would end the discussion.
111
 As Reydams points 
out:  
 
“The reality is that a co-operative international law based on a community of interests has 
developed in the field of crime prevention and punishment. States have developed elaborate 
multilateral treaties on many specific crimes. Almost all States have pledged to co-operate in 
suppression of all serious crimes by adopting bilateral and multilateral extradition treaties and 
treaties providing for mutual legal assistance in criminal matters.”112 
 
In discussing principles Reydams states the following: 
 
“The question will not be posed in terms of whether a State’s claim to jurisdiction is illegal 
per se, but whether it is a proper exercise of jurisdiction, given the conflicting interests of two 
or more States as well as the consequences for the individual defendant.”113 
 
This means that one will miss the point if you only seek to determine if universal 
jurisdiction is illegal or not. The answer to that question will only tell you what you 
may do but not what you should do. Would it not be better to shift the focus to a 
balancing of State interests and justice requirements rather than a rigid application of 
                                                        
110 Luc Reydams (Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) 15 
111 In the Arrest Warrant Case (supra) at paragraphs 44-45 Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal in 
their joint separate opinion found no basis for universal jurisdiction in absentia. But they continued by 
stating that ‘there is equally nothing in this case law which evidences an opinio juris on the illegality of such 
jurisdiction. In short, national legislation and case law, - that is, State practice is neutral as to the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction.’ 
112 Luc Reydams (Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) 17 
113 Luc Reydams (Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) 24 
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a specific principle? Applying a rigid legal principle runs the risk of paying no 
attention to the conflicting interests of different States. 
 
2.1.4 Prescriptive and Enforcement Jurisdiction  
 
In theory a distinction is often made between jurisdiction to prescribe and jurisdiction 
to enforce.
114
 Simply put jurisdiction to prescribe is the measure to which a State’s 
criminal law applies, or is asserted to apply, over certain conduct whether this conduct 
occurs within or outside of its territory under the acceptable heads of jurisdiction 
under international law.
115
 Jurisdiction to enforce is by way of contrast strictly 
territorial. A State may not enforce its criminal law in the territory of another State 
without that State’s consent.116 A State would enforce its jurisdiction by for instance 
arresting a suspect and trying him in its courts. O’ Keefe points out that a State’s 
jurisdiction to prescribe its criminal law and its jurisdiction to enforce it do not always 
go hand in hand.
117
 It can thus be seen and agreed that international law allows States 
nearly unlimited latitude in prescribing its criminal law over certain conduct. But 
merely declaring certain acts to be unlawful or prescribing jurisdiction over certain 
acts will almost never excite an adverse reaction from other States. It is only when a 
State attempts to enforce this legislation over foreigners, or acts occurring in foreign 
territories that problems arise.  These are the limits which international law places on 
the exercise of jurisdiction. 
 
2.1.5 Universal jurisdiction fundamentally a political problem? 
 
This distinction between prescription and enforcement seems very rigid and is usually 
of very little practical relevance because one would ‘hope’ that States wouldn’t 
prescribe rules without the expectation of future enforcement. I say ‘hope’ because it 
is not always the case. The distinction is at least helpful in understanding what States 
refer to when they celebrate their freedom to implement universal jurisdiction 
provisions. It usually means that they have implemented legislation making provision 
                                                        
114 Roger O’Keefe (Clarifying the Basic Concept) (supra) 735-760; Derek, W Bowett ‘Jurisdiction: Changing 
Patterns of Authority Over Activities and Resources’ (1982) 53 British Yearbook of International Law 1 
115 Paragraph 1.1 (supra) 
116 Roger O’Keefe (Clarifying the Basic Concept) (supra) 740 
117 Roger O’Keefe ‘Clarifying the Basic Concept) (supra) 740; It might be added that this is a very light way of 
putting it. 
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for universal jurisdiction over certain offences. Whether they have actually tried to 
enforce the legislation over nationals of other countries for acts committed abroad is 
another question and whether they actually intend to is yet another question. 
Implementing universal jurisdiction over core offences currently seems the 
fashionable thing to do and helps States to keep up international appearances.
118
 But 
as soon as the ideological heat subsides the political will to enforce such legislation 
often dwindles. To be fair, States are under considerable pressure from international 
and national human rights groups to implement this type of legislation making 
provision for universal jurisdiction.
119
 But it is important to realize that universal 
jurisdiction cannot be treated as an abstract legal question because it is by its nature a 
fundamentally political question.
120
 The fact that politics play such a large part in 
universal jurisdiction and that it places limits on the exercise of jurisdiction seems to 
be something lamented by many theorists on the subject and something other writers 
mention almost as an afterthought.
121
 Reydams attributes this phenomenon of a 
tension between legal theory and political reality to successful issue framing and 
lobbying on the part of transnational activists. He states the following: 
 
‘In the long history of transnational activism, the international criminal justice campaign 
stands out for its extraordinary successful issue framing. There are countless victims of gross 
human rights violations and impunity has been the norm. The juxtaposition of these facts 
suggests a causal relation; hence, fighting impunity through universal jurisdiction or an 
international criminal court becomes a moral imperative. While creating a legitimate 
international criminal court requires a substantial number of states, universal jurisdiction can 
be exercised by any state with the necessary courage and will, right now. The idea was so 
obvious, so simple, and so readily available that it appeared brilliant. What was demanded 
was a leap of faith, and if things did not work out as hoped, the flaws would be in the world 
                                                        
118 See David Scheffer Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues of the USA ‘Opening Address Symposium 
on Universal Jurisdiction’ (2001) 35 New England Law Review 233 where he says: ‘Everyone talks about 
universal jurisdiction, but almost no one practices it.’ 
119 See Luc Reydams (Rise and Fall) (supra) 336 where, with reference to an increase in international 
human rights NGO’S and their influence on universal jurisdiction development, he states: ‘AI and Human 
Rights Watch achieved superpower status with global reach. Like Greenpeace and Médecins Sans Frontiéres 
they grew into professional, media savvy organizations capable of waging strategic campaigns.  
120 Luc Reydams ‘The Rise and Fall of Universal Jurisdiction’, Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies, 
Working Paper No. 37 (2010) at 2 ‘I reject the tendency of legal scholars to reduce universal jurisdiction to 
an abstract legal question. On the contrary, it is hard to think of a more political question.’ 
121 Maximo Langer (The Diplomacy of Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) 4 ‘Within the universal jurisdiction 
debate and literature, the role of the political branches have received little to no attention. Supporters of 
universal jurisdiction have tended to dismiss political considerations as improper obstacles in the fight 
against impunity.’ 
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(self-interest, indifference, parochialism) and not in the doctrine. Once framed in such simple 
moral and practical terms it became politically difficult to question universal jurisdiction…’122 
 
In the Arrest Warrant Case
123
 Judge ad hoc Van Den Wyngaert speaking of universal 
jurisdiction in absentia remarked that: 
 
‘It may be politically inconvenient to have such a wide jurisdiction because it is not conducive 
to international relations and national public opinion may not approve of trials against 
foreigners for crimes committed abroad. This does not, however, make such trials illegal 
under international law.’ 
 
But only focusing on legality and writing off problematic international relations with 
other States, caused by universal jurisdiction, as a mere “political inconvenience” is, 
with respect, not a conducive or realistic approach to the problem. This approach tells 
you only what you may do, but not what you should do.
124
 While a practical answer as 
to what should be done is sorely needed most spend all their time theorizing about 
their “freedom” to implement universal jurisdiction. But to be sure a “political 
inconvenience” may very quickly develop into a “diplomatic catastrophe” or worse. A 
relevant and recent incident comes to mind showing the stark difference between 
prescribing universal jurisdiction and actually enforcing it. In 2013 US President 
Barack Obama paid an official visit to South Africa. Two South African groups tried 
to obtain arrest warrants for him for war crimes and crimes against humanity 
allegedly committed against Pakistan and Syria. The Muslim Lawyers’ Association 
even made an urgent application to the North Gauteng High Court for Obama’s arrest 
but the application was dismissed.
125
 The application was based on South Africa’s 
Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act
126
 (‘the 
ICC Act’). South Africa implemented this act in support of, and in an attempt, to give 
effect to the provisions of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court which 
affords the International Criminal Court (ICC) jurisdiction over acts of genocide, war 
                                                        
122 Luc Reydams (Rise and Fall) (supra) 336 
123 (supra) 172 
124 Derek Bowett (Jurisdiction: Changing Patterns of Authority) (supra) 15 ‘It is suggested, therefore, that 
rather than rely on the established principles or rules of jurisdiction, one has to go back to far more basic 
principles of law which govern relations between States.’ 
125  “Obama: SA groups want arrest warrants” City Press (2013/06/26) available at 
http://www.citpress.co.za/politics/obama-sa-groups-want-arrest-warrants/ (accessed 2013/11/06) 
126 Act 27 of 2002 and also see Jeanne-Marié Versluis “Obama wel in Soweto, maar húlle kla” Beeld 
(2013/06/22) available at http://www.beeld.com/nuus/2013-06-22-obama-wel-in-soweto-maar-hlle-kla 
(accessed 2013/11/06) 
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crimes, and crimes against humanity (‘the core crimes’)127 The ICC Act provides for 
universal jurisdiction for South Africa in Section 4(3).
128
 It was thus because Obama 
would be present (as the legitimizing link in terms of the act) in South Africa that his 
arrest was sought for the alleged commission of core crimes. The ICC Act will still be 
discussed in greater detail later on but this incident clearly shows what potential 
hazards and grave consequences its enforcement might entail. It is almost 
inconceivable that South African authorities would even try and lay hands on 
President Obama. Yet this did not deter the groups in question from ignoring the 
NPA’s discretion in the matter and asking a court to make a potentially devastating 
order.
129
 The United States of America is not a member of the ICC and is in fact its 
fiercest opponent.
130
 Just how fiercely it is opposed to the ICC can be seen by its 
implementation of the American Service Members’ Protection Act of August 2002.131 
This act authorizes the President of the United States of America to use all necessary 
and appropriate (even military) means to free United States or allied personnel 
detained by or on behalf of the ICC. If the President of the US may authorize any 
means to free his personnel; what would happen to South Africa if it held the 
President of the US is a thought too ghastly to contemplate. It will certainly not be a 
mere “political inconvenience.” The words of Georg Schwarzenberger, spoken long 
ago, but particularly apt in this situation come to mind: ‘In reality, however, any 
attempt to enforce an international criminal code against either the Soviet Union or 
the United States would be war under another name.’132 
 
 
 
                                                        
127 Max du Plessis ‘Bringing the International Criminal Court home – The implementation of the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court Act 2002’ 16 South African Journal of Criminal Justice 1 
128 ‘That person, after the commission of the crime, is present in the territory of the Republic’ 
129 See Max Du Plessis (Bringing the ICC home) (supra) at 5 points out that the question of immunity of a 
Head of State is one of the most interesting and difficult questions in international law. The ICC provides in 
article 27 that ‘official capacity as a Head of State or Government…shall in no case exempt a person from 
criminal responsibility under this Statute.’ Yet as Du Plessis points out the position before national courts is 
less clear and international jurisprudence leans toward recognizing immunity for sitting Heads of State. The 
ICC Act however boldly declares that South Africa also does not recognize immunity for sitting heads of 
State suspected of a core crime. This must have been an additional incentive for these groups to bring such 
an application for the arrest of President Obama and technically they were within their rights to bring such 
an application and the Court was wrong to dismiss it for lack of urgency. Of course it was urgent, the 
potential consequences were so devastating that the Court took the easy way out.  
130 Sascha-Dominik Bachmann ‘The quest for international criminal justice – the long road ahead’ (2007) 
Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 731 
131 Official title is the 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act for Further Recovery from and Response to 
Terrorist Attacks on the United States P L 107-206; 2 Aug 2002 
132 Georg Schwarzenberger ‘The Problem of an International Criminal Law’ (1950) 3 Current Legal Problems 
295 
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2.1.6 Concluding remarks 
 
In summary one may say that the ‘Lotus principle’ so often employed by supporters 
of universal jurisdiction means nothing more than that States are allowed by 
international law to prescribe laws prohibiting both internal and extraterritorial 
offences. But at the same time it must be kept in mind that a State may not enforce its 
criminal law in the territory of another State without that State’s consent. And when it 
tries to enforce its laws over foreigners for acts committed abroad, without another 
State’s consent, serious problems may be awaited which calls for wisdom, caution 
and restraint. The presumption of freedom to exercise universal jurisdiction so often 
proclaimed is neither an argument supporting universal jurisdiction nor a literal 
freedom to be gullibly accepted without considering political realities.  
 
The greatest war the world has ever known started not long after the Lotus case was 
decided. And at the end of WWII the victorious Allies set out to prosecute the Nazi 
war criminals. Many see in these prosecutions an exercise of universal jurisdiction. 
 
2.2 Universal jurisdiction in the aftermath of WWII 
 
2.2.1 Cowles, Lord Wright and the United Nations War Crimes Commission 
 
Many believe that universal jurisdiction over crimes under international law 
developed and gained acceptance through the prosecution of Nazi war criminals in the 
aftermath of WWII.
133
 This prosecution by the Allies of war criminals and the 
creation of the International Military Tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo is widely 
considered as a landmark in the development of international criminal law. The piracy 
analogy, explained above,
134
 is used by commentators to argue that the Allies 
extended universal jurisdiction over war crimes based on war crimes’ inherently 
‘heinous’ nature. The analogy between war crimes and piracy, which is so often relied 
upon, was first made formally by the UNWCC. As Matthew Garrod, who has done 
persuasive, and in-depth research on the origins of universal jurisdiction points out, 
the head of the UNWCC; Lord Wright ‘endorsed the principle of universal 
jurisdiction over war crimes, by invoking a supposedly analogous right of universality 
                                                        
133 See footnote 16 (supra) and the authorities quoted there. 
134 Paragraph 1.2 (supra) 
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over piracy as justification.’ 135  But as authority for this ‘generally recognized 
doctrine’ Lord Wright relied on no State practice but exclusively on academic 
commentary by Cowles.
136
 Cowles was a Lieutenant Colonel of the Judge Advocate 
General’s Department for the US and he is regarded as having coined the term 
‘universal jurisdiction’.137 Cowles admitted the influence he had on the UNWCC with 
regards to universal jurisdiction in a separate article published three years later: 
 
‘It was put forward first in the form of a memorandum made available to the United Nations 
War Crimes Commission in the autumn of 1944. At the suggestion and with the personal 
encouragement of Sir Cecil Hurst, then Chairman of the United Nations War Crimes 
Commission, that paper was expanded in London and Washington during the winter of 1944-
1945. The following spring, the ribbon copy of this larger paper was turned over to Mr Justice 
Jackson’s staff, and a carbon copy used for its publication in the June issue of the California 
Law Review.’138 
 
As Garrod points out it seems that the argument made by Cowles was accepted by the 
UNWCC, including its US representatives, as well as by the US prosecution 
department. Cowles’ argument, however, was not based on State practice and was not 
the official US government position. His argument rather proposed universal 
jurisdiction de lege ferenda as an attempt to justify the trial of war criminals in the 
aftermath of WWII.
139
  
 
Garrod severely criticizes Cowles’ argument calling it tenuous at best and at worst 
flawed.
140
 The most glaring problem with Cowles’ argument is that he claims to 
examine the right of ‘every’ State to exercise universal jurisdiction over war crimes. 
But in reality all his examples, and his entire argument, only concerns the question of 
whether ‘under international law, a belligerent State has jurisdiction to punish an 
                                                        
135 Matthew Garrod (The Protective Principle) (supra) at 768 quoting Lord Wright: ‘According to generally 
recognized doctrine […] the right to punish war crimes is not confined to the State whose nationals have 
suffered or on whose territory the act took place but is possessed by any independent State whatever, just 
as is the right to punish the offence of piracy…[E]very Independent State has in International Law 
jurisdiction to punish pirates and war criminals in its custody regardless of the nationality of the victims or 
the place where the offence was committed … from Law Reports of the Trials of War Criminals. Selected and 
Prepared by the United Nations War Crimes Commission, vols. I-XV (HMSO, London, 1947-1949) (hereafter 
Law Reports).  
136 Matthew Garrod (The Protective Principle) (supra) 768; Law Reports (supra) Vol. XV, p. 26; Willard 
Cowles (Universality of Jurisdiction Over War Crimes) (supra) 177  
137 Matthew Garrod (The Protective Principle) (supra) 768 
138 Willard B Cowles ‘Trials of War Criminals (Non-Nuremberg)’ (1948) 42 American Journal of International 
Law 312 
139 Matthew Garrod (The Protective Principle) (supra) 769 
140 Matthew Garrod (The Protective Principle) (supra) 769 
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enemy war criminal in its custody when the victim of the war crime was a national of 
another State and the offense took place outside of territory under control of the 
punishing State.’141 Garrod points out that the right under international law referred to 
by Cowles was that of a “belligerent State” to prosecute war crimes ‘by an enemy’ 
against the nationals of an Allied belligerent in the same war and that ‘this is not 
universal jurisdiction at all.’142 
 
As already alluded to above
143
 Cowles in his argument in support of universal 
jurisdiction over war crimes relied uncritically on the Lotus case in arguing that 
international law does not impose any limitation upon a State from exercising 
jurisdiction over foreigners abroad. Cowles further argued that war crimes are 
analogous to piracy on the high seas because, like the case was with piracy, during 
hostilities ordinary law enforcement is difficult and universal jurisdiction must be 
relied upon to prevent impunity.
144
 As Garrod points out Cowles’ entire argument 
hinges upon the assumption that universal jurisdiction, in the form that it historically 
developed over piracy, should similarly be applied over war crimes.
145
 But as has 
already been shown above; the comparing of piracy to war crimes is highly dubious 
and should not have been so readily relied upon by Cowles and subsequently by Lord 
Wright and the UNWCC.
146
 Garrod argues that the reliance by Lord Wright on the 
article by Cowles led him to misinterpret the basis of jurisdiction over war crimes. 
Lord Wright further sought to justify universal jurisdiction over war crimes by 
asserting that it had received the support of the UNWCC.
147
  
 
Allied military courts and tribunals involved in the prosecution of enemy war 
criminals however did not, as a rule, deliver reasoned judgments or specify the basis 
of their jurisdiction over the accused.
148
 The task of reporting on the cases was left to 
                                                        
141 Willard Cowles (Universality of Jurisdiction Over War Crimes) (supra) 178 
142 Matthew Garrod (The Protective Principle) (supra) 769 
143 Paragraph 2.1.1 and footnote 80 (supra) 
144 Willard Cowles (Universality of Jurisdiction Over War Crimes) (supra) 177-218 
145 Matthew Garrod (The Protective Principle) (supra) 770. 
146 Paragraph 1.2 (supra) and see also Matthew Garrod (The Protective Principle) (supra) 770-771 ‘Piracy 
was described as being ‘heinous’ because it constituted the waging of unlawful warfare against the colonial 
trade of sovereigns, which has nothing at all to do with the way in which war crimes, crimes against 
humanity and other human rights offences are described as being heinous by courts and commentators 
seeking to expand universality to include crimes other than piracy. Secondly, piracy could historically be 
committed by persons who were not sanctioned by any State; it is precisely for this reason that universal 
jurisdiction developed over piracy…’   
147 Matthew Garrod (The Protective Principle) (supra) 771 and Lord Wright (Law Reports) (supra) vol. XV at 
26 
148 Lord Wright (Law Reports) (supra) vol. XV at 20 
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the UNWCC. What is very interesting to note is that ‘in the handful of cases where 
universality is referred to as one of the possible bases of jurisdiction over war crimes, 
it is stated not in the actual judgments of these cases, but, rather, in the reports of 
these cases by the UNWCC.
149
 But Garrod aptly points out that the reasoning of the 
UNWCC for interpreting these cases as based on universality is not persuasive 
either.
150
 As an example regard can be had to the Almelo Trial. In that case, a British 
military court sitting in the Netherlands convicted German defendants for the murder 
of a British soldier and a Dutch civilian in the Netherlands. As regards the former 
crime, the report of the UNWCC stated that jurisdiction was based on the victim 
being a member of the “British Armed Forces”. As regards the latter crime, it was 
suggested in the subsequent reporting of the case: 
 
‘That under the general doctrine called Universality of Jurisdiction over War Crimes, every 
independent state has in International Law jurisdiction to punish pirates and war criminals in 
its custody regardless of the nationality of the victim or the place where the offence was 
committed.
151
 
 
UNWCC’s report of the case does not provide any evidence of this “general doctrine 
called Universality of Jurisdiction over War Crimes”; nor does it explain the 
relationship between war crimes and piracy. And there is nothing in the reasoning of 
the court to even suggest that it recognized the existence of universality.
152
 
Importantly it seems that, in the absence of State practice in support of universality, 
even the UNWCC was not wholly convinced that jurisdiction was based on 
universality. In all the cases reported by the UNWCC where universality was listed as 
one of the possible bases of jurisdiction over war crimes and crimes against humanity, 
the UNWCC also suggested the alternative ground that a State ‘has a direct interest in 
punishing the perpetrators of crimes if the victim was a national of an ally engaged in 
                                                        
149 Matthew Garrod (The Protective Principle) (supra) 771 and Lord Wright (Law Reports) (supra) vol. I at 
IX 
150 Matthew Garrod (The Protective Principle) (supra) 771 
151 (Law Reports) (supra) vol. I at 42 
152 Matthew Garrod (The Protective Principle) (supra) 772 ‘Moreover, the defendants in the Almelo Trial 
were tried under the British Royal Warrant … which does not provide for universal jurisdiction. Of 
importance to the exercise of jurisdiction over war crimes in The Almelo Trial was the status of the victims 
as ‘Allied’ nationals and of the accused as belonging to the ‘enemy’; also see for exactly the same reasoning 
as well as wording as The Almelo Trial; The Hadamar Trial (Law Reports) (supra) vol. I at 53 and The Zyklon 
B Case  (Law Reports) (supra) vol. I at 103 
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a common struggle against a common enemy’.153 So it was not actually the courts in 
these matters that expressly based their jurisdiction on universality or even voiced an 
opinion in support of it. It was only construed as a “possible” base of jurisdiction by 
the UNWCC in its subsequent reporting of the cases. 
 
Garrod argues that the UNWCC and Lord Wright accepted, uncritically and without 
any evidence, that universal jurisdiction applies over war crimes, by relying wholly 
upon the article by Cowles.
154
 There are important implications that follow; 
particularly because the UNWCC’s work was declared to have ‘great influence upon 
the moulding of international criminal law and the basis of jurisdictions over war 
crimes.’155 The result has been that courts and commentators have ever since, without 
further reflection, accepted that the reports and conclusions of the UNWCC provide 
precedent for the exercise of universal jurisdiction over war crimes and other crimes 
under international law.
156
 Garrod uses, as example of this, the often-quoted case on 
universal jurisdiction, of Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky
157
 where the court did not undertake 
primary research but merely cited the Restatement (Third) in its support of universal 
jurisdiction.
158
 But the Restatement also simply found, without giving evidence: ‘that 
genocide and war crimes were subject to universal jurisdiction was accepted after the 
Second World War, although apparently no state has exercised such jurisdiction in 
circumstances where no other basis of jurisdiction…was present.’ 
 
2.2.2 Prosecution of war criminals in the Tribunals and under Control Council 
Law No. 10 and the limiting of jurisdiction 
 
Proponents of universal jurisdiction often rely in support of the concept on a passage 
from the Nuremberg trial that ‘the Signatory powers created this Tribunal, defined the 
law it was to administer, and made regulations for the proper conduct of the trial. In 
                                                        
153 Matthew Garrod (The Protective Principle) (supra) 797; The Almelo Trial (Law Reports) (supra) vol. I at 
42; The Hadamar Trial (Law Reports) (supra) vol. I at 53; The Zyklon B Case  (Law Reports) (supra) vol. I at 
103 
154 Matthew Garrod (The Protective Principle) (supra) 772 where he points out that Willard Cowles 
admitted as much in his article (Trials of War Criminals) (supra) 312  
155 Matthew Garrod (The Protective Principle) (supra) 772; (Law Reports) (supra) vol. XV at 22 
156 Matthew Garrod (The Protective Principle) (supra) 773, 797 “But the alternative interpretation of 
jurisdiction, (that it ‘has a direct interest in punishing the perpetrators of crimes if the victim was a national 
of an ally engaged in a common struggle against a common enemy’) has generally been overlooked by 
subsequent courts and commentators.” 
157 776 F. 2d 571 (6th Cir. 1985) (supra) 177 
158 Matthew Garrod (The Protective Principle) (supra) 796; ‘Restatement of the Law (Third) of Foreign 
Relations Law of the United States’ (supra) par 404 
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doing so, they have done together what any of them might have done singly.’159 It has, 
however, always been doubtful whether this statement supports universal jurisdiction 
at all.
160
 But what is more important to realize is that the vast majority of war crimes 
trials at the end of WWII, which also happen to be cited most often by supporters of 
universal jurisdiction, were not undertaken by the Tribunals, but rather by domestic 
military tribunals set up by the Great Powers within their respective zones of occupied 
Germany, acting under Law No. 10 of the Allied Control Council for Germany.
161
 
Law No.10 was restricted to the punishment of persons belonging to the ‘enemy’ 
within delegated zones of authority and limited to the duration of WWII.
162
 Britain for 
instance was reluctant to expand jurisdiction over war crimes committed by foreign 
nationals outside of British territory, even where a crime was committed against a 
British subject and they accordingly construed jurisdiction of its military courts in 
narrow terms. The jurisdiction of British military courts was therefore not universal 
but was limited to “the trial and punishment of violations of the laws and usages of 
war” either in Britain or ‘any other place”, which are ‘committed during any war in 
which [Britain] may be engaged.” The British military courts would thus not have 
jurisdiction over crimes arising out of a war in which Britain was not engaged.
163
 The 
practice of the other Great Powers in their respective zones of occupied Germany was 
substantially similar and restricted their jurisdiction to the punishment of crimes by 
persons belonging to the enemy.
164
 
 
                                                        
159 Luc Reydams (Rise and Fall) (supra) 340; International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and 
Sentences (1947) 41 American Journal of International Law 172, 216; Kenneth Randall (Universal 
Jurisdiction) (supra) 806 ‘The IMT’s judgment includes only one vague reference to the universality 
principle.’ 
160 Madeline Morris (A Divided World) (supra) 344 ‘The Nuremberg tribunal, then, was likely not an 
instance of the exercise of universal jurisdiction in the post-war trials.’ 
161 Law relating to the punishment of persons guilty of war crimes, crimes against peace and crimes against 
humanity, enacted at Berlin on 20 December 1945. Matthew Garrod (The Protective Principle) (supra) 773 
‘Law No. 10 had as it’s purpose, according to its Preamble, first to “give effect” to the Moscow Declaration 
and the London Agreement, and, second, “to establish a uniform legal basis in German for the prosecution of 
war criminals … other than those dealt with by the International Military Tribunal.” As regards the scope of 
Law No. 10, Article III provided that “Each occupying authority, within its zone of occupation, shall have the 
right to cause such zone suspected of having committed a crime, including those charged with a crime by 
one of the United Nations, to be arrested.’ 
162 Matthew Garrod (The Protective Principle) (supra) 774 
163 Matthew Garrod (The Protective Principle) (supra) 775 
164 Matthew Garrod (The Protective Principle) (supra) 775, 777 ‘The Soviet Union prosecuted war crimes 
under a Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of 19 April 1943, which provided courts martial with 
jurisdiction over “German-Fascist criminals guilty of great crimes against Soviet citizens”; The jurisdiction 
of Military Government Tribunals in the French zone was provided for by French Ordinance and applied to 
“all war crimes defined by international agreements in force between the occupying Powers whenever the 
authors of such war crimes, committed after the 1st September, 1939, are of enemy nationality or are agents, 
other than Frenchmen, in the service of the enemy.” Ordinance No.7 was passed providing for the 
establishment in the American zone of Military Tribunals with jurisdiction to “try and punish persons 
charged with offences recognized as crimes in … Law No. 10”.’ 
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In light of the preceding Matthew Garrod argues as follows: 
  
‘Law. No. 10 and the municipal provisions of the Great Powers did not provide for universal 
jurisdiction. Instead the Great Powers, as the other Allied nations, were concerned first and 
foremost with the prosecution of war crimes committed by the ‘enemy’ in their own 
territories, where they had experienced firsthand enemy occupation, and against their own 
nationals. It is important to remember that, although the Great Powers declared to act “in the 
interests of the United Nations”, the trial of war criminals would not have occurred had their 
own nationals and national interests not been threatened or injured. There was even reluctance 
in some cases to prosecute war crimes which did not involve their own “direct interest”. 
Where the victims of the war crimes in German concentration camps belonged to more than 
one of the Allies, it was agreed that prosecutions would be undertaken by the Power which 
occupied the zone in which the camp was situated, and the “representatives of all Allied 
countries whose nationals were victims would be taken into consultation”. Allied commanders 
were also instructed to forward all evidence in their own zones “to the United Nations 
Government against whose national or nationals the crime was committed. In this regard, Law 
No. 10 provided for the exchange of accused war criminals among the four occupied zones 
and to other Allied nations, so that injured States could undertake their own prosecutions, 
although each zone had ultimate power to decide whether, and, if so, which, alleged war 
criminals would be handed over.’165 (Footnotes omitted) 
 
It seems that the Allies were only concerned with the punishment of crimes under 
international law committed by a common enemy and as part of a State policy of 
aggressive war, in which they were engaged.
166
 Jurisdiction was thus limited by 
various factors including being exercised over a common enemy, during the period of 
a war and when it had harmed the interests of the prosecuting States, such as crimes 
against their own or Allied nationals. In this regard even nationals of former enemy 
occupied countries could be “treated” as ‘Allied’ and jurisdiction could be exercised 
over war crimes, which had been committed against them by the enemy.
167
 One only 
has to consider the way Lord Wright defined universal jurisdiction in the Almelo Trial 
to understand how limited jurisdiction really was: 
 
‘Under the doctrine of the Universality of jurisdiction over war crimes, international law takes 
account of the crime itself rather than (a) the nationality of the victim (provided that he can be 
regarded as an Allied national or treated as such), or (b) the nationality of the accused 
                                                        
165 Matthew Garrod (The Protective Principle) (supra) 777-779 
166 Matthew Garrod (The Protective Principle) (supra) 780 
167 Matthew Garrod (The Protective Principle) (supra) 781 
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(provided that he can be regarded as having identified himself with the enemy), or (c) the 
place of the offence.’168 
 
Garrod aptly points out that despite Lord Wrights’ nomenclature this is not universal 
jurisdiction at all.
169
 This is apparent when the definition of universal jurisdiction 
given by Lord Wright is compared with the modern definition that it applies when ‘a 
State, without seeking to protect its security or credit, seeks to punish conduct 
irrespective of the place where it occurs, the nationality of the perpetrator, and the 
nationality of the victim.’170 
 
2.2.3 Crimes Against Humanity 
 
One may well then ask but what of the crimes against humanity committed by 
German authorities against German Jews on German territory? This was a very 
difficult issue faced by the Allies. These did not constitute war crimes under 
international law and the victims of these crimes could not be treated, for the purpose 
of jurisdiction as Allied nationals.
171
 The Allies did not exercise universal jurisdiction 
over these crimes either.
172
  The Nuremberg Charter provided that crimes against 
humanity had to be committed in the “interests of the European Axis countries” and, 
moreover, “in execution with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal”, 
namely crimes against peace or war crimes.
173
 Law No. 10 restricted jurisdiction over 
                                                        
168 Lord Wright (Law Reports) (supra) vol. XV at 43 (brackets original but emphasis added) 
169 Matthew Garrod (The Protective Principle) (supra) 779; Richard Baxter ‘The Municipal and International 
Law Basis of Jurisdiction over War Crimes’ (1951) 28 British Yearbook of International Law 391-392 ‘It must 
be conceded that true universality has not been attained by those countries which apply international law 
to enemy war criminals, for the victims of conventional war crimes were, almost without exception, 
nationals of states allied with the prosecuting state or of the prosecuting state itself and the accused were 
either enemy nationals or persons who had voluntarily associated themselves with the enemy forces or 
administration…What is referred to as universality of jurisdiction over war crimes falls considerably short 
of that goal as long as the jurisdiction is exercised by a belligerent only over persons associated with its 
enemies.’ 
170 Luc Reydams (Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) 5 
171 Matthew Garrod (The Protective Principle) (supra) 778 
172 Arieh, J Kochavi ‘The Response to Nazi Germany’s Crimes Against Axis Nationals: The American and 
British Positions’ (1994) 5(2) Diplomacy and Statecraft 352 ‘Germany’s crimes against German Jews and 
non-Jews were considered acts of violence, not war crimes, and therefore did not fall within the jurisdiction 
of these tribunals. The authority to try such cases was given by the British to German courts’; Priscilla D 
Jones ‘British Policy towards German Crimes Against German Jews, 1939-1945 (1991) 36 Leo Baeck 
Institute Year Book 364; Henry Friedlander ‘The Deportation of the German Jews Post-War German Trials of 
the Nazi Criminals (1984) 29 Leo Baeck Institute Year Book 201-202 
173  The Nuremberg Charter Article 6, Preamble and Article 2(c); ‘International Military Tribunal 
(Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences’, (1947) 41 American Journal of International Law 249 ‘With regard 
to Crimes against Humanity…The Tribunal is of the opinion that revolting and horrible as many of these 
crimes were, it has not been satisfactorily proved that they were done in execution of, or in connection with, 
any such crime. The Tribunal therefore cannot make a general declaration that the acts before 1939 were 
Crimes against Humanity within the meaning of the Charter, but from the beginning of the war in 1939 War 
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crimes against humanity even further to crimes committed within Germany “by 
persons of German citizenship or nationality, or stateless persons”.174 So again care 
was taken to restrict jurisdiction. It is not an easy fact to accept, but the Allies seem 
on the whole to not have been interested in the prosecution of crimes against 
humanity beyond, or unconnected to, the immediate wars in which they were engaged 
and during which they had been injured themselves by a common enemy.
175
 And by 
so restricting jurisdiction the Allies were trying to protect rather than to override 
sovereignty.
176
 This means that we have to consider that not even the biggest tragedy 
of modern history could persuade States to disregard traditional jurisdictional rules 
and act in terms of universal jurisdiction. Kochavi explains that crimes perpetrated by 
the Axis against their own nationals were treated as domestic acts by a sovereign state 
and remarks as follows: 
 
‘Both London and Washington wanted to avoid engaging in enormous numbers of war-
criminals trials after the war. The failure to punish German war criminals which followed the 
First World War acted as a constant warning against accepting far-reaching obligations. 
[…] 
The restriction deliberately imposed on the UNWCC’s jurisdiction, limiting it to the 
investigation of those crimes perpetrated against Allied nationals, clearly showed that both the 
Foreign Office and the State Department intended to limit as far as possible the cases with 
which their countries would have to deal. The objective of these government ministries was to 
entrust each Allied government with conducting the trial, and meting out the punishment, in 
all cases involving offences committed on its own territory or against their own nationals. 
Crimes perpetrated by the enemy against their own nationals, whether for political, racial or 
                                                                                                                                                              
Crimes were committed on a vast scale, which were also Crimes against Humanity; and insofar as the 
inhumane acts charged in the Indictment, and committed after the beginning of the war, did not constitute 
War Crimes, they were all committed in execution of, or in connection with, the aggressive war, and 
therefore constituted Crimes against Humanity.’ See also M. Cherif Bassiouni ‘From Versailles to Rwanda in 
Seventy-Five Years: The Need to Establish a Permanent International Court’ (1997) 10 Harvard Human 
Rights Journal 36 ‘Unlike proceedings in Germany under CCL 10, the Allied Military Prosecutions in the Far 
East were only for war crimes; they did not include “crimes against humanity.” 
174 Law No. 10 (supra) Article 3(1)(d) 
175 Matthew Garrod (The Protective Principle) (supra) 783; See also Kevin, Jon Heller ‘The Nuremberg 
Tribunals and the Origins of International Criminal Law’ (2011) Oxford University Press, New York 136-138 
‘The protective principle, by contrast, provides a more satisfying justification for the NMTs’ jurisdiction over 
the second category of crimes against humanity… no defendant was ever convicted of a crime against 
humanity that was not connected to war crimes or crimes against peace.’ 
176 Beth Van Schaak ‘The definition of Crimes Against Humanity: Resolving the Incoherence’ (1998-1999) 37 
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 791 ‘[T]he definition of crimes against humanity in the Charter of the 
International Military Tribunal contained a curious limiting principle: the Nuremberg Tribunal could assert 
jurisdiction only over those crimes against humanity committed “before or during the war” and “in 
execution of or in connection with any crimes within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal,” i.e., war crimes and 
crimes against the peace. This formulation became known as the “war nexus,” and it is apparent that the 
Charter’s drafters and the Nuremberg Tribunal itself considered the war nexus necessary to justify the 
extension of international jurisdiction into what would otherwise be acts within the domestic jurisdiction of 
a state. The war nexus allowed the drafters of the Charter to condemn specific inhumane acts of Nazi 
perpetrators committed within Germany without threatening the entire doctrine of state sovereignty.’  
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religious reasons, were to be tried by the successor governments of the ex-enemy countries, 
Germany included.’177 
 
The question of what to do with crimes against humanity committed by Germans 
against Germans and German Jews was a contentious question that generated severe 
debate. But it is wrong to say that the Allies prosecuted these crimes because they 
were so horrible that they could not go unpunished. That sentiment was certainly felt 
and strongly expressed, but respect for sovereignty, reluctance of getting involved in 
another country’s issues and a fear of setting a dangerous precedent prevailed in the 
end.
178
 There is still no specialized convention for crimes against humanity. Bassiouni 
argues that jurisprudence, regarding crimes against humanity, emanating from States 
like Canada, Israel, Germany, France, Belgium and Switzerland does not reflect the 
theory of universality but have rather been based on territorial, passive and active 
personality theories of jurisdiction.
179
 
 
2.2.4 Universal jurisdiction versus the protective principle 
 
Matthew Garrod argues throughout his article that what is often assumed to be 
universality was in fact an expanded principle of protection between Allies in one and 
                                                        
177 Arieh Kochavi (The Response to Nazi Germany’s Crimes Against Axis Nationals) (supra) 352-353 and 
also Arieh J Kochavi ‘The British Foreign Office versus the United Nations War Crimes Commission during 
the Second World War’ Spring (1994) 8(1) Holocaust and Genocide Studies 43-44 ‘Both foreign ministries 
had indeed striven to limit the number of cases with which their countries would have to deal. The objective 
was to entrust each Allied government with conducting trials against defendants who had perpetrated 
offences against its own nationals or on its own territory, whereas crimes committed by the enemy against 
its won nationals were to be tried by the successor governments of the respective ex-enemy territories. 
London and Washington based their legal position on the then-prevailing international law, which regarded 
such crimes as the domestic acts of a sovereign state…The goal, as the Foreign Office saw it, was that each 
Allied government would be entrusted with the trial of cases involving offenses that had been committed on 
its own territory or against its own nationals. In such a procedure, Britain would have to deal only with a 
small number of war criminals.’  
178 Arieh Kochavi (The Response to Nazi Germany’s Crimes Against Axis Nationals) (supra) 334-357; 
Priscilla Jones ‘British Policy towards German Crimes (supra) 339-366 and also William A Schabas An 
Introduction to the International Criminal Court 4th edition (2011) Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
108 ‘Yet, when Allied lawyers met in 1943 and 1944 to prepare the post-war prosecutions, many of them 
considered it legally unsound to hold the Nazis responsible for crimes committed against Germans within 
the borders of Germany. Not without considerable pressure from Jewish non-governmental organizations, 
there was an important change in thinking and it was agreed to extend the criminal responsibility of the 
Nazis to internal atrocities under the rubric ‘crimes against humanity’. But the Allies were uncomfortable 
with the ramifications that this might have with respect to the treatment of minorities within their own 
countries, not to mention their colonies. For this reason, they insisted that crimes against humanity could 
only be committed if they were associated with one of the other crimes within the Nuremberg Tribunal’s 
jurisdiction, that is, war crimes and crimes against peace. In effect, they had imposed a requirement or 
nexus, as it is known, between crimes against humanity and international armed conflict.’ 
179 M. Cherif Bassiouni (History of Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) 52 
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the same war.
180
 He contends that protection is an old and established principle born 
of the right to self-defence under international law and that this principle is built-in to 
the law of war.
181
 Garrod points out that the fact that the injured belligerent 
traditionally had the right to punish individuals belonging to its enemy is simply 
because international law had always recognized the right of a State to protect its 
sovereignty, security and certain vital interests.
182
 His argument is persuasive and 
supported by solid research. Significantly, for purposes, of this thesis it casts severe 
doubt on the widely held belief that universal jurisdiction developed and gained 
acceptance as a result of the prosecution of war criminals in the aftermath of WWII. 
KC Randall’s interpretation of the List Case183 provides a good illustration of this 
contemporary distortion of facts. Randall construes the exercise by the American 
Tribunal in the List Case of jurisdiction over German war criminals accused of killing 
civilians in Greece, Yugoslavia and Albania as an exercise of universal jurisdiction. 
The tribunal stated that: 
 
‘An international crime is such an act universally recognized as criminal, which is considered 
a grave matter of international concern and for some valid reason cannot be left within the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the state that would have control over it under ordinary 
circumstances. The inherent nature of a war crime is ordinarily itself sufficient justification for 
jurisdiction to attach in the courts of the belligerent into whose hands the alleged criminal has 
fallen…Such crimes are punishable by the country where the crime was committed or by the 
belligerent into whose hands the criminal has fallen, the jurisdiction being concurrent’ 
 
Randall, in his influential article on universal jurisdiction, places the emphasis on 
universal crimes and casually replaces ‘belligerent’ with ‘state’ and so argues that any 
‘state’ is entitled to exercise jurisdiction once it captures a war criminal. But this is 
not what the tribunal said. Obviously the tribunal differentiated between any random 
State and a belligerent when it comes to punishing a war criminal. This vividly 
                                                        
180 See also Roger O’Keefe ‘The Grave Breaches Regime and Universal Jurisdiction’ (2009) 7 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 822 and also ED Dickinson, EA Finch & CC Hyde ‘Report of the Subcommittee 
[of the International and Comparative Law section of the American Bar Association] on the Trial and 
Punishment of War Criminals’ (1943) 37 American Journal of International Law 665 ‘It has long been an 
accepted principle of international law that a belligerent may punish with appropriate penalties members of 
the enemy forces within its custody who have violated the laws and customs of war.’      
181 Matthew Garrod (The Protective Principle) (supra) 799, 802, 783 & 785-786 ‘The right to try and punish 
persons for violating the laws of war has long been accepted as a principle under international law and in 
customary practice to belong to a belligerent over its enemy, wherever such individual should fall into its 
power.’ Garrod inter alia quotes Vittoria, Grotius and De Vattel to support his argument that ‘The sovereign 
has a right under the law of nations to wage war in order to avenge injury done by the enemy and to teach 
the enemy a lesson by punishing them for the damage they have done.’ 
182 Matthew Garrod (The Protective Principle) (supra) 785 
183 Also known as the Hostages Trial (Law Reports) (supra) vol. VIII at 54 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 61 
illustrates how the subtle supplanting of even one word with another can have 
extensive effects and cause widespread confusion. Others have also quoted this 
decision, out of context, as an instance of universal jurisdiction.
184
 The ‘valid reason 
that war crimes could not be left within the exclusive territory of Germany was 
because it could not be trusted to fulfill its duties under international law.
185
 The 
mistake these commentators make is to assume that because the tribunal asserted that 
war crimes, as violations of international law, are “universally recognized as 
criminal” this meant that anyone could punish their perpetrators.186 But they miss the 
fact that the tribunal was careful to point out that although war crimes were 
universally recognized as criminal the right to punish such crimes was restricted to the 
‘belligerent into whose hands the accused has fallen’.187 In the trial of Josef Altstötter 
this distinction, so often overlooked, by subsequent commentators, was eloquently 
explained: 
 
‘At this point, in connection with cherished notions of national sovereignty, it is important to 
distinguish between the rules of common international law which are of universal and superior 
authority on the one hand, and the provisions for enforcement of those rules which are by no 
means universal on the other.’188    
  
There is thus a distinction to be made between crimes under international law, which 
are applicable to all States, and the right to punish its violations by the injured State 
under the protective principle.
189
 It thus seems that for the Allies the primary 
consideration lied in protecting their sovereignty and in so doing prevent impunity, so 
that threats and injuries to their vital state interests did not go unpunished. This is 
however at odds with the proponents of universal jurisdiction, who maintain that 
universality is based solely on preventing the impunity of perpetrators of international 
                                                        
184 AR Carnegie ‘Jurisdiction over Violations of the Laws and Customs of War’ (1963) 39 British Yearbook of 
International Law 421; Claus Kreß (Institut de Droit International) (supra) 575; Kevin, Jon Heller (The 
Nuremberg Tribunals) (supra) 136-138 also quotes this decision as an instance of universal jurisdiction but 
seems to have missed the reference to ‘the belligerent into whose hands the criminal has fallen’ and that this 
does not mean into any State’s hands. 
185 Matthew Garrod (The Protective Principle) (supra) 804 
186 Matthew Garrod (The Protective Principle) (supra) 804; See also Derek Bowett (Jurisdiction: Changing 
Patterns of Authority) (supra) 12 ‘War crimes are certainly crimes against international law, but it is by no 
means clear that they are subject to universal jurisdiction. The jurisdiction has traditionally been that of a 
belligerent Power,’ In addition one may as well argue that serious offenses like murder or rape of a baby are 
recognized as criminal by all nations (or universally) and therefore any nation may punish a person who 
commits such an offense, but we know that this is not the law. 
187 Matthew Garrod (The Protective Principle) (supra) 804 
188 (Law Reports) (supra) vol. VI at 38 
189 Matthew Garrod (The Protective Principle) (supra) 801 
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crimes because of these crimes’ ‘heinous’ nature. 190  The result of this 
misinterpretation is further that the prevention of impunity, as an end in itself, is 
elevated to a position of superior consideration in international criminal law.
191
  
 
We can thus agree that if jurisdiction over WWII war crimes was in fact based on the 
protective principle, then there is no substance to the popular argument that 
universality emerged in the aftermath of WWII, so as to prevent impunity, and for the 
lack of any other accepted base of jurisdiction.
192
 One could see this same principle of 
protection applied in the Eichmann trial
193
 of 1961, which was the first case after 
WWII to consider universal jurisdiction over war crimes. 
 
2.3 Universal jurisdiction and the Eichmann case 
 
Adolf Eichmann was born in Germany in 1906. In 1933 he joined the Nazi Socialist 
Party. At the peak of his career in the Gestapo he was head of ‘Jewish Affairs’ 
responsible for the ‘final solution’ or the mass deportation of Jews to concentration 
camps, which led to their subsequent mistreatment and almost inevitable death. He 
hid in Germany after the war and later found refuge in Argentina. In May 1960 he 
was abducted by Israeli agents and flown to Israel. Then Israeli Prime Minister David 
                                                        
190 Matthew Garrod (The Protective Principle) (supra) 798 & 806 ‘However, war crimes trials do not give 
rise to any indication that the prevention of impunity had anything to do with crimes under international 
law as being ‘heinous’, or that jurisdiction was exercised over such crimes solely on the basis that they were 
‘heinous’.  Accordingly, the prevention of impunity of the perpetrators of ‘heinous’ crimes is incapable of 
providing a theoretical basis for universality over war crimes…The prevention of impunity for perpetrators 
of crimes under international law was undoubtedly important but only by reason that States were also 
punishing injuries to their own, or that of their Allies, sovereignty and security and certain other vital 
interests by persons belonging to the ‘enemy’.’ 
191 Chris C Joyner ‘Arresting Impunity: The Case for Universal Jurisdiction in Bringing War Criminals to 
Accountability’ (1996) 59 Law and Contemporary Problems 153-172; and Christopher K Hall ‘The Role of 
Universal Jurisdiction in the International Criminal Court Complementarity System’ in Morten Bergsmo 
(ed.) ‘Complementarity and the Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction for Core International Crimes’ Forum for 
International Criminal and Humanitarian Law (2010) Torkel Opsahl Academic E Publisher, Oslo at 220 
‘National courts exercising universal jurisdiction can help to fill a small part of the current enormous global 
impunity gap, or, rather abyss.’ 
192 AR Carnegie (Laws and Customs of War) (supra) 422 ‘The view has been expressed that the passive 
personality principle justifies the trial by a belligerent of enemy nationals for war crimes committed against 
nationals of a belligerent’s ally. If this extension is accepted-and there does not seem to be any convincing 
reason why it should not be-the doctrine of universality of jurisdiction would be superfluous as an 
explanation of most of the reported cases.’ Kenneth Randall (Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) 807 ‘While 
many sources view the IMT’s proceedings as being partly based in the universality principle, the IMT’s 
judgment and records actually evidence little or no explicit reliance on universal jurisdiction.’ See also 
Matthew Garrod (The Protective Principle) (supra) 802 ‘once it is realized that war crimes are injurious in 
and of themselves…the passive personality principle of jurisdiction over war crimes immediately becomes 
unsatisfactory and irrelevant.’ 
193 Eichmann v Attorney-General of Israel (Supreme Court of Israel) (supra) 277, 304 
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Ben-Gurion announced the capture of the ‘greatest war criminal of all times’. Thus 
began the Eichmann trial.
194
 
 
The defence argued inter alia that the exercise of extra-territorial jurisdiction by 
Israel, a State with no connection to the victims, is a violation of the territoriality 
principle. The Supreme Court rejected this argument on various grounds. The first 
ground relied upon by the Supreme Court agreed with, and upheld, the view 
expressed in the District Court
195
 where it found jurisdiction to be valid under the 
protective principle; as crimes against the Jewish people ‘very deeply concerns the 
“vital interests” of the State of Israel.’ 196  Despite the Supreme Court giving as 
justification this valid ground of jurisdiction
197
 it went further in a manner reminiscent 
of the procedure followed by the UNWCC to also mention universal jurisdiction as a 
possible extra base of jurisdiction. In a passage, frequently relied upon by proponents 
of universal jurisdiction, the Supreme Court found that: 
 
Not only do all the crimes attributed to the Appellant bear an international character, but their 
harmful and murderous effects were so embracing and widespread as to shake the 
international community to its very foundations. The State of Israel was entitled, pursuant to 
the principle of universal jurisdiction and in the capacity of a guardian of international law 
and an agent for its enforcement, to try the Appellant. 
 
Matthew Garrod argues that the Supreme Court erred by finding that because the 
crimes were of “universal character” they were logically subject to universal 
jurisdiction. He also wonders whether this additional justification of jurisdiction and 
the claim to act on behalf of the international community by the Supreme Court was 
not influenced mainly by the way in which Israel had abducted Eichmann from 
                                                        
194 Adapted from Orna Ben-Naftali ‘Eichmann’ in (Cassese, The Oxford Companion) (supra) 653  
195 Attorney General for Israel v Eichmann 36 ILR 5 (District Court) 49-57 
196 Orna Ben-Naftali (Eichmann) (supra) 654 ‘Assertion of the link between the Jewish people and Israel, the 
legitimate heir and representative of the victims; the state the very establishment of which was 
internationally recognized as manifesting its historical nexus with the Jewish people and the latter’s natural 
right to be the masters of their own fate like all other nations. This nexus provides a legal basis of 
jurisdiction (the protective and passive personality principles).’ See also Ilias Bantekas and Susan Nash 
‘International Criminal Law’ 3rd edition, Routledge & Cavendish, Abingdon, 84 who under their discussion of 
the protective principle mention that: ‘the District Court of Jerusalem upheld, inter alia, protective 
jurisdiction in the Eichmann case…[this] was subsequently affirmed by the Israeli Supreme Court [when it] 
held that a country whose ‘vital interests’ and ultimately its existence are threatened, such as in the case of 
the extermination of the Jewish people, has a right to assume jurisdiction to try the offenders.’  
197 See Judge ad hoc Van den Wyngaert in the Arrest Warrant Case (supra) 167 ‘Although there are many 
examples of States exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction for international crimes such as war crimes and 
crimes against humanity and torture, it may often be on other jurisdictional grounds such as the nationality 
of the victim. A prominent example was the Eichmann case which was in fact based, not on universal 
jurisdiction but on passive personality.’   
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Argentina and the resultant scrutiny of the trial by the international community.
198
 
Most important is the fact that Israel was representing Jews who had been the hardest 
hit of all victims by Nazi atrocities and that this provided a tangible and vivid link 
between Israel and Eichmann. The Nazi and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment Act) of 
1951, which conferred upon Israeli municipal courts extraterritorial jurisdiction over 
war crimes, crimes against the Jewish people and crimes against humanity also 
restricted jurisdiction. This legislation did not provide for universal jurisdiction but 
provided that war crimes had to be “done, during the period of the Second World 
War, in an enemy country”, while the other crimes listed within the act had to be 
“done, during the period of the Nazi regime, in an enemy country”. The national law 
of Israel was thus subject to the same limitations as that of the other Allies.
199
 
 
Cassese
200
 makes much of the fact that no State protested at the time against the 
principle enunciated by the Supreme Court of Israel whereby ‘the peculiarly universal 
character of these crimes [against humanity] vests in every state the authority to try 
and punish anyone who participated in their commission’. Garrod however argues 
that the reason that no State questioned Israel’s right to assert jurisdiction was because 
the accused had belonged to a ‘common enemy’, also that his name had been added in 
a list of war criminals sought by the UNWCC and that he was even mentioned in the 
judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal.
201
 It might be added that as much as no State 
protested against Israel’s exercise of jurisdiction, neither did any other State attempt 
to arrest nor prosecute Eichmann for his horrible crimes against humanity. Does the 
fact that his main crime was against Jews and the only State willing to prosecute him 
was Israel not undermine a claim to universality in this case? Is it any wonder that it is 
still very unclear whether Eichmann provides precedent for crimes against Jews or 
crimes against everyone?
202
 What does seem clear though is that, despite, the 
Supreme Court’s proclamation that they were trying Eichmann in their capacity as the 
agent of the international community; the reality was that it was in Israel’s own 
interest to punish him because he was their enemy and he tried to destroy the Jews.  
                                                        
198 Matthew Garrod (The Protective Principle) (supra) 810 
199 Matthew Garrod (The Protective Principle) (supra) 809 
200 Antonio Cassese ‘International Criminal Law’ Oxford University Press, Oxford (2003) 293 
201 Matthew Garrod (The Protective Principle) (supra) 810 
202 Orna Ben-Naftali (Eichmann) (supra) 656 ‘The question that remains a bone of contention is whether 
that story is a particular story decreeing that Jews should never allow that to happen to Jews again, or a 
universal story enjoining that this should never happen to any people again. This tension between the 
unique and the universal can be detected already in the judicial texts of the Eichmann trial.’  
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Lastly Reydams
203
 argues that the ‘State practice’ so often referred to by NGO’s and 
supporters of universal jurisdiction is more of a reference to obligatory lofty 
declarations in multi-lateral conventions than to actual ‘deeds’. He says that NGO’s 
tend to ‘cherry-pick’ evidence and leave out critical context. Yet Reydams maintains 
that upon closer examination, in nearly all ‘hard’ cases, also known as actual trials, 
there appear to be significant links between offender and forum. Reydams mentions 
how the cases of Eichmann and Demjanjuk
204
 are used in such a way as precedents for 
universal jurisdiction. Yet in the process supporters of universal jurisdiction ignore 
the fact that neither Israel nor the US currently would, even for a moment, accept the 
use of universal jurisdiction against their own officials. 
 
2.4 Synopsis and predictions 
 
None of the tribunals after WWII endorsed universal jurisdiction or the analogy of 
war crimes with piracy.
205
 This was done by the UNWCC relying only on Cowles and 
not on any State practice. And even in all the cases reported by the UNWCC where 
universality was listed as one of the possible bases of jurisdiction the alternative 
ground of protective jurisdiction was given, namely that a State ‘has a direct interest 
in punishing the perpetrators of crimes if the victim was a national of an ally engaged 
in a common struggle against a common enemy’. This alternate basis of jurisdiction 
has been almost completely ignored by subsequent writers.
206
 It might simply be that 
writers don’t find the protective principle nearly as exciting and sensational a topic for 
theorizing and speculating over as they do universal jurisdiction.  
 
If piracy does not provide a basis for analogy over modern human rights offences and 
universal jurisdiction did not develop over war crimes and crimes against humanity in 
the aftermath of WWII, then history provides no backing for the concept and this robs 
it of much of its rhetorical appeal. In the absence of a solid historical and theoretical 
basis it is futile to invoke the Lotus Principle to argue that nothing prevents States 
                                                        
203 Luc Reydams (Rise and Fall) (supra) 345 
204 Demjanjuk v Petrovsky 776 F 2d 571 (6th Cir 1985) at 544 Where the US Federal Court stated; ‘Israel’s 
assertion of jurisdiction over the respondent based on the Nazi statute conforms with the international law 
principle of ‘universal jurisdiction’. […] The power to try and punish an offense agaisnt the common law of 
nations, such as the law and customs of war, stems from the sovereign character of each independent State, 
not from the State’s relationship with the perpetrator, victim or act. 
205 Matthew Garrod (The Protective Principle) (supra) 790 ‘At the Tokyo Tribunal the right to try Japanese 
war criminals was expressly restricted to any of the nations with which Japan had been at war.’  
206 Matthew Garrod (The Protective Principle) (supra) 797 
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from exercising universal jurisdiction. Supporters might still show why universal 
jurisdiction is a good idea today but they can no longer say that it has always been 
considered a good idea. Saying that something is a certain way when, in actual fact, 
you only believe that it ought to be can only take you so far and it doesn’t change a 
thing. This is not simply a realist argument for the sake of it, or even for the sake of 
being correct. The staggering amount of literature available on the topic makes it very 
hard to separate fact from fiction. A responsible official, for example, a prosecutor 
who is required to apply universal jurisdiction, may read as much as he is able to 
about it and set out enthusiastically to enforce it, but end up severely disillusioned, 
and in serious trouble, if he does not know how deeply the international system has 
actually been wired against it. A realistic understanding and approach from the outset 
is vital.  
 
The mistaken idea that universal jurisdiction has developed over war crimes and other 
crimes under international law in the aftermath of WWII not only ignores the 
protective principle but also blurs the distinction between the values shared by the 
international community and who may enforce these values. It has led to the idea that 
States act as “agents of the international community” to protect the “values” of the 
international community.
207
 But in reality the prosecutions of Nazi War Criminals in 
the aftermath of WWII were much more selective and were based on a limited 
protective jurisdiction involving State interests that had been threatened by a common 
enemy. The Eichmann case, so heavily relied upon by proponents of universal 
jurisdiction, was similarly not based on universal jurisdiction and came about because 
of the determination of the State of Israel to avenge the horrible wrongs done against 
the Jews during WWII. 
 
Because the protective principle provides a much more cogent justification for the 
prosecution of war criminals in the aftermath of WWII, Garrod contends for a 
reconceptualization of jurisdiction over war crimes where the crucial distinction 
between the protection of vital State interests, which are shared by the international 
community, and universality, is maintained.
208
 Garrod mentions that very soon after 
the Nuremberg proceedings the error of conflating the protective principle by States 
of their own interests and the right of any State to protect certain interests crept in and 
                                                        
207 Matthew Garrod (The Protective Principle) (supra) 807-808 
208 Matthew Garrod (The Protective Principle) (supra) 808 
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the distinction was even overlooked by the General Assembly in it unanimous 
“affirmation” of the principles of international law recognized by the Nuremberg 
Charter and Judgment.
209
 However “correct” Garrod’s argument is in pointing out the 
error, his plea for a reconceptualization of international criminal law sounds a bit like 
a nostalgic desire for things of old. If Garrod meant that history is condemned to 
repeat itself and we can do nothing but accept it, I cannot agree. But if he meant that 
we should learn from history and better anticipate the challenges universal jurisdiction 
will face in future I agree.  If things have changed and moved on, even as a result of a 
serious error, it will be futile to only point out the mistake and then hope it disappears. 
An accurate view of history should not merely be used as a blue print for the future 
but rather to gain a deeper understanding of the challenges that modern international 
criminal law faces. In so doing we have our best chance of finding workable solutions 
for the future, but these solutions might very well include abandoning the idea of 
universal jurisdiction as it is often propagated if we realize that the effort, never has 
and simply will never match the results. 
 
Luc Reydams quotes Travers, who wrote in 1920 that: ‘The [theory] that the right to 
punish does not belong to a particular country but to all nations whose positive laws 
criminalize the conduct…has to be rejected. It goes against the nature of the penal law 
and against the very conception of State. Every State has, in principle, no other 
mission than to defend its own interests.’210  This is politics.211 But although this is an 
honest description of politics it is certainly no longer such a popular one. There is 
immense pressure on nations today to not simply be concerned with their own 
interests but also with human rights and a broader concept of humanity. It might even 
be said that the notion of interests has been widened to the extent that a State actually 
protects its own interests by concerning itself with the interests of other States. One 
thinks here of UN and EU sanctions and incentives, Security Council mandated 
interventions and duties on members States of the ICC. If Garrod is right and the 
protective principle is mostly the main consideration for a nation when it comes to 
extra-territorial jurisdiction then it will also be the main consideration when it comes 
                                                        
209 Matthew Garrod (The Protective Principle) (supra) 808 
210 Luc Reydams (Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) 32 quoting M Travers Le droit pénal international et sa mise 
en oeuvre en temps de paix et en temps de gurre. Tome I. Principes.-Régles generals de competence des lois 
répressives (1920) 130. 
211 Hans J Morgenthau ‘Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace’  (4th edition) Alfred A 
Knopf Publisher, New York (1967) 5 ‘We assume that statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as 
power, and the evidence of history bears that assumption out.’ 
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to exercising universal jurisdiction or not. We might expect that exercising universal 
jurisdiction will sometimes be the politically expedient thing to do. This does nothing 
for legal certainty on the principled exercise of universal jurisdiction but at least it 
doesn’t fool us into believing that universal jurisdiction is purely a legal concept free 
from political considerations and complications. 
 
To understand what moves or discourages countries to exercise universal jurisdiction 
it is helpful to consider the study Maximo Langer did of every single universal 
jurisdiction complaint ever lodged.
212
 His conclusion was that by simply comparing 
the political benefits to the costs it would be possible to predict when a State will 
exercise universal jurisdiction. He found that the main incentive for political branches 
of States to enact universal jurisdiction laws, and use these to prosecute is provided by 
domestic and international human rights groups, the media and domestic 
constituencies that value foreign human rights. Should the media and human rights 
groups’ efforts resonate with the sentiments of constituencies the politicians take 
action. At the same time politicians don’t take action because it is often State officials 
who commit international crimes and this other State’s diplomats then lobby and 
threaten reprisals against the prosecuting State. Other disincentives include substantial 
economic costs, difficulties in proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in these cases 
and constituencies being averse to using their funds to prosecute foreigners without a 
link to their State. One may thus predict that universal jurisdiction prosecutions would 
only happen if the expected benefits were higher than the expected costs. He then 
argues that there usually are very few benefits to acting on the incentives because 
even when a State’s domestic constituency values human rights in other countries, 
they are not likely to consider these interests before their own. The disincentives may 
also be immense and include pressures or sanctions from powerful nations like China, 
Russia and the US. Even less powerful States may lever considerable pressure 
through companies investing in the prosecuting State or by joining forces with other 
like-minded States. Langer predicts that the incentives for the political branches 
                                                        
212 Maximo Langer (The Diplomacy of Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) 7-9 ‘This survey has identified 1051 
complaints or cases considered by public authorities on their own motion…the largest group of complaints 
are against Nazi, former Yugoslav, Argentine, Rwandan, U.S., Chinese and Israeli possible defendants… Of 
the 32 defendants who have been brought to trial, 24 – have been Rwandans, former Yugoslavs and Nazis. 
These are defendants about whom the international community has broadly agreed that they may be 
prosecuted and punished, and whose state of nationality has not defended them. This broad agreement 
creates incentives for political branches to concentrate on this type of defendants… The data on the 
universal jurisdiction cases that were actually tried thus conform with the results one would expect from 
the posited incentive structure for political branches.’ 
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would only outweigh the disincentives when low-ranking, low-cost defendants are 
brought to trial and especially those on whom there is broad agreement in the 
international community.
213
 
 
It seems that one may then expect that lower ranking government officials will 
increasingly be prosecuted for international crimes in terms of universal jurisdiction. 
It is not that simple however. Luc Reydams mentions, what he calls, a ‘small fry – big 
fish’ dimension evident in universal jurisdiction discourse. To explain this he makes 
the distinction between virtual and hard cases. Virtual cases he classifies as high 
profile matters mostly against State leaders like Pinochet or of powerful countries like 
the United States, Israel or China also known as the ‘big fish’. According to Reydams 
these cases usually generate an immense amount of hype but go nowhere. The hard 
cases, on the other hand, usually consist of ‘small fry swept ashore in Europe’.  The 
problem is that NGO’s judges and countries are usually not willing to spend their 
‘time, resources and political capital on virtual case[s] against minor player[s].’214 If 
Reydams is right it is likely that we might not even expect many universal jurisdiction 
cases against low ranking defendants in future. 
 
After WWII and the prosecutions of the main war criminals States drafted important 
international conventions from which we can also establish their intention as regards 
universal jurisdiction. In the next chapter we will look at three of the most important 
ones especially as these pertain to the core crimes. The first one to follow the war was 
the Genocide Convention, a year later the Geneva Conventions came into being and 
quite a bit later the Torture Convention. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
213 Maximo Langer (The Diplomacy of Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) 6-7 & 41. 
214 Luc Reydams (Rise and Fall) (supra) 348 ‘Also worthy of note is that none of the countries jostling for 
indicting inaccessible foreign ‘war criminals’ was willing to try a dozen ragtag Somali pirates captured by 
the Dutch navy. No one seemed to be outraged by the release of these hostis humanis generum.’  
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Chapter 3 
 
The Genocide, Geneva and Torture Conventions 
 
 3.1 The Genocide Convention
215
 
 
Genocide is referred to as the ‘crime of crimes.’216 Genocide involves the intentional 
mass destruction of entire groups, or members of a group.
217
 But through history 
genocide has almost always escaped prosecution because it was virtually always 
committed at the behest and with the complicity of those in power.
218
 The Convention 
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
219
 was the first human 
rights convention adopted by the United Nations and was an immediate response to 
Nuremberg, which had dealt with genocide not as a separate crime but as a crime 
against humanity and in connection with war.
220
 If there ever was a crime so heinous 
that everyone should be able to prosecute those who commit it, it must be genocide. 
Yet the genocide convention does not provide for universal jurisdiction. South Africa 
became a party to the Genocide Convention on 10 December 1998. Following its 
affirmation of the Principles of International Law recognized by the Charter of the 
Nuremberg Tribunal
221
 the UN General Assembly adopted on 11 December 1946 
resolution 96(1) on the crime of genocide.
222
 The resolution affirms that genocide is a 
crime under international law, invites member States to enact the necessary legislation 
for the prevention and punishment of genocide, recommends international co-
operation with a view to facilitate the prevention and punishment of the crime, and 
requests the Economic and Social Council to undertake studies with a view to 
                                                        
215 This section draws heavily from the books by William A Schabas ‘Genocide in International Law’ 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2000); William A Schabas ‘Genocide in International Law’ 2nd 
edition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2009) and on the book by Luc Reydams ‘Universal 
Jurisdiction, International and Municipal Legal Perspectives’ (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press) 
(2003) and their respective discussions of this aspect 
216 William A Schabas ‘National Courts Finally Begin to Prosecute Genocide, the ‘Crime of Crimes’ (2003) 1 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 39-63 
217 John Dugard (International Law: A South African Perspective) (supra) 175 ‘The crime of genocide has 
been committed throughout history, the pre-eminent example being the mass killings of Jews by the Nazis 
during World War II, and more recently, the slaughter of Tutsis by Hutus in Rwanda. The term ‘genocide’ is 
a combination of the Latin word genus (kind, type, race) and cide (to kill),’ 
218 William A Schabas ‘Genocide in International Law’ Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2000) 14-15 
& 20-22: ‘The wartime atrocities committed against the Armenian population in the Ottoman Empire and 
the failure to prosecute any of the offenders serves as a sad example’ 
219 New York, 9 December 1948; 78 UNTS 277 
220 Luc Reydams (Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) 47 
221 UNGA Res 95(1) (1946); 188 UN Doc A/64/Add.1(1946) 
222 The resolution can be found reprinted in William Schabas (Genocide)(supra) 45 
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drawing up a draft convention on the crime of genocide. The drafting was completed 
within two years. Three principal drafts (including the final text) were produced 
during this process, each with a different jurisdictional clause.
223
 The first draft by the 
Secretariat
224
 set out the rule of universal punishment in article VII: ‘The High 
Contracting Parties pledge themselves to punish any offender under this Convention 
within any territory under their jurisdiction, irrespective of the nationality of the 
offender or of the place where the offence has been committed.’ In Article IX States 
also agreed to commit persons suspected of genocide for trial by an international court 
in cases where they were themselves unwilling to try the offenders or grant 
extradition, or where the acts were committed by individuals acting as organs of the 
State or with its support or tolerance. It was the opinion of the Secretary-General and 
the experts involved that inasmuch as genocide is by its nature an offence under 
international law the Convention would fail its purpose if acts of genocide could not 
be prosecuted outside of the territories of the Parties of the Convention.
225
 They also 
noted that universality of repression seemed to have been the intention of General-
Assembly resolution 96(1).
226
 Of the twelve countries that replied to the Secretary-
General’s appeal for comments four commented on article VII specifically.227 The 
United States of America was the first dissenting voice and proposed prosecution for 
crimes committed outside the territory of a State only with the consent of the States 
upon whose territory genocide was committed.
228
 The Soviet Union was equally 
negative about universal jurisdiction.
229
 Views in support of confining the Convention 
to territorial jurisdiction were also expressed by the Netherlands.
230
 In comments on 
the Secretariat draft only Siam (Thailand) endorsed universal jurisdiction.
231
 The 
Secretariat’s draft, together with the comments, was submitted to an Ad Hoc drafting 
committee composed of China, France, Lebanon, Poland, the Soviet Union, the 
United States of America, and Venezuela. 
                                                        
223 Luc Reydams (Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) 48 
224 See Luc Reydams (Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) 48 footnote 19 Draft prepared by the Secretariat’s 
Human Rights Division with the expert advice of Raphael Lemkin, author of Axis Rule in Occupied Europe 
(1944) who coined the phrase ‘genocide’, and Professors H Donnedieu de Vabres and V Pella. See also the 
Draft reprinted in William Schabas (Genocide) (supra) 552-559 
225 Luc Reydams (Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) 48 
226 Luc Reydams (Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) 48 and footnote 21 where Reydams refers to William 
Schabas (Genocide) (supra) 355 who points out that this is an exaggerated reading. The initial draft of the 
resolution recommended universal jurisdiction, but any reference to it was eliminated in the final version.  
227 William Schabas (Genocide) (supra) 56-57 
228 William Schabas (Genocide) (supra) 355 
229 William Schabas (Genocide) (supra) 355 
230 William Schabas (Genocide) (supra) 355 
231 William Schabas (Genocide) (supra) 355 
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The Ad Hoc Committee abandoned the principle of universal repression. The new 
draft held that: Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in 
Article IV shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which 
the act was committed or by a competent international tribunal.
232
 The discussion
233
 
of the members of the Ad Hoc Committee showed that those in favor of universal 
repression held that State authorities would mostly commit genocide themselves and 
that national courts of that State would not enforce repression of genocide. These 
supporters held that, since genocide was a crime under international law, it was 
natural to apply the principle of universal repression. They quoted conventions on the 
repression of international offences such as traffic in women and children, 
counterfeiting currency, etc. The opposite view held that universal jurisdiction was 
against the principles of international law and that permitting the courts of one State 
to punish crimes committed abroad by foreigners was against the sovereignty of the 
State. They also added that, as genocide generally implied the responsibility of the 
State, on the territory of which it was committed, the principle of universal repression 
would lead national courts to judge the acts of foreign governments. Dangerous 
international tension might result. Another member of the Committee was also 
concerned about different standards exercised by different courts in different 
nationalities. He was afraid that national courts might exercise a biased and arbitrary 
authority over foreigners. The member suggested that jurisdiction should be given to 
an international court. 
 
The Ad Hoc Committee draft was then referred to the Sixth Committee of the General 
Assembly for an article-by-article consideration.
234
 Iran proposed incorporating the 
concept of universal jurisdiction in article VI by adding the following paragraph: 
‘They [persons charged with genocide or one of the other acts enumerated in Article 
IV] may also be tried by tribunals other than those of the States in the territories of 
which the act was committed, if they have been arrested by the authorities of such 
States, and provided no request has been made for their extradition’.235 The sponsor 
                                                        
232 The draft has been reprinted in William Schabas (Genocide) (supra) 559-564 
233 See for a summary of this discussion the Study on the Question of the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide, MR N Ruhashyankiko, Special Rapporteur, UN Doc E/CN.4/sub.2/416 (1978); also 
printed in Luc Reydams (Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) 49 
234 Official Records of the General Assembly, Third Session, Sixth Committee, Part 1, 97th, 98th and 100th 
Meetings. The discussion of the jurisdiction clause can be found at 360-407; See also William Schabas 
(Genocide) (supra) 357-360 and Luc Reydams (Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) 50 
235 Luc Reydams (Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) 50 
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stressed that the application of universal jurisdiction was envisaged only as a 
subsidiary measure, according to the principle of aut dedere aut punire.
236
 The 
premise was that any offence against international law involves subsidiary universal 
punishment. Subsidiary universal jurisdiction, according to the delegate, had to be 
distinguished from primary universal jurisdiction, which applies to offences such as 
piracy and allows the State of arrest to try an offender whether or not a request for 
extradition from the territorial State has been received. By contrast, under the 
principle of subsidiary universal jurisdiction, the State was bound to extradite 
offenders and not to put them on trial unless extradition was not requested or was 
impossible.
237
 Australia, Brazil, Denmark, Haiti, India, the Philippines, and 
Venezuela endorsed the premise and the substance of the Iranian amendment.
238
 India 
however noted that analogies with other universal jurisdiction crimes, such as piracy, 
were not helpful.
239
 The countries in support of Iran’s proposal argued that the 
amendment would make it possible to ensure the punishment of the guilty party when 
he took refuge in a country other than that in which he committed the offence.
240
 They 
further argued that the application of the principle of universal punishment was not 
inconsistent with the sovereignty of States because if the State on whose territory the 
offence had been committed wished to try the offender itself, it would request his 
extradition; but if it expressed no such desire, it thereby tacitly renounced its right to 
try him.
241
 With six in favor, twenty-nine against and ten abstentions Iran’s proposal 
was decisively defeated.
242
 The great Powers were the main opponents. The delegate 
from the United States called the principle of universal punishment ‘one of the most 
dangerous and unacceptable of principles’, adding that the United States government, 
which had also wished to limit the jurisdiction of the proposed international tribunal, 
‘would a fortiori vigorously oppose the adoption of the principle of universal 
repression’.243 The representative of the Soviet Union argued that ‘the principle of 
universal punishment was even more incompatible with the sovereignty of States than 
international punishment.’244 France was hardly keener about universal jurisdiction.245 
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The representative of the United Kingdom cited municipal law reasons against 
universal jurisdiction noting that British criminal courts did not punish British citizens 
for crimes committed abroad. And except in time of war, those courts could not 
punish aliens for crimes which they had committed outside of the territory of the 
United Kingdom.
246
  
 
The Convention was adopted unanimously and without abstention by the General 
Assembly on 9 December 1948. Article VI provides the that ‘[p]ersons charged with 
genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article III shall be tried by a 
competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by 
such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those 
Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction’. To give effect to the 
second option provided for in article VI the General Assembly, immediately after the 
adoption of the Convention invited the International Law Commission to study the 
desirability of establishing an international judicial organ for the trial of persons 
charged with genocide and other crimes.
247
 This happened on 1 July 2002 when the 
ICC statute
248
 entered into force. But Schabas argues that it is difficult to contend that 
a customary legal norm already existed in 1948, recognizing universal jurisdiction 
over genocide, given the widespread opposition to the concept in the Sixth 
Committee. And he states further that while the situation may have evolved since then 
he points to the equivalent debate that took place fifty years later, in June 1998, at the 
Rome Diplomatic Conference on the International Criminal Court. At the conference 
States again argued that universal jurisdiction for genocide already existed in 
customary law, and that they were entitled to delegate this universal jurisdiction to the 
new international court. But the idea was resisted by many delegations and the result 
was a compromise recognizing only territorial and active personal jurisdiction.
249
  
 
The Eichmann case was discussed above.
250
 Eichmann relied on the Sixth Committee 
debate and on the text of article VI of the Convention when he challenged the 
Jerusalem court’s jurisdiction: ‘If the United Nations had failed to support universal 
                                                        
246 Luc Reydams (Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) 51 
247 Luc Reydams (Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) 51 
248 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome, 17 July 1998; UN Doc A/Conf.183/10) 
249 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, UN Doc, A/CONF.183/9. Article 12(2) and William 
Schabas (Genocide) (supra) 362 
250 Paragraph 2.3 (supra) 
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jurisdiction for each country to try the crime of genocide committed outside its 
boundaries, but has expressly provided that, in the absence of an international 
criminal tribunal, those accused of this crime shall be tried by a competent tribunal of 
the State in the territory of which the act was committed’, how, it is asked, may Israel 
try the accused for a crime that constitutes “genocide”?’ 251  The District Court 
attempted to demonstrate that article VI’s drafters did not intend to confine 
prosecution of genocide to the territorial State.
252
 The Court said that territorial 
jurisdiction was nothing more than a ‘compulsory minimum’, a conservative 
compromise that could be contrasted with the more exigent provisions of the Geneva 
Conventions, which imposed a rule of compulsory universal jurisdiction.
253
This 
interpretation of article VI of the Genocide Convention has been called flimsy and 
this writer must agree that it appears quite strained.
254
  
 
The issue was also addressed, before the International Court of Justice, by the two ad 
hoc judges in Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide.
255
 Judge Kreca recalled that the Convention ‘does not contain the 
principle of universal repression. It has firmly opted for the territorial principle of the 
obligation of prevention.’256 His colleague Judge Lauterpacht took a diametrically 
opposed view; the purpose of article 1 of the Convention, which states that genocide 
is a crime under international law, is ‘to permit parties, within the domestic legislation 
that they adopt, to assume universal jurisdiction over the crime of genocide.
257
 
 
Christopher Joyner, citing General Assembly Resolution 96(I), has written that: 
 
‘Every state has a customary legal right to exercise universal jurisdiction to exercise universal 
jurisdiction to prosecute offenders for committing genocide, wherever and by whomever 
committed. The Genocide Convention does not derogate from that obligation. Parties to the 
anti-genocide instrument have merely obligated themselves to prosecute offences specifically 
committed within their territory.’258 
                                                        
251 Attorney General for Israel v Eichmann 36 ILR 5 (District Court) (supra) at paragraph 20 
252 William Schabas (Genocide) (supra) 360 
253 Attorney General for Israel v Eichmann 36 ILR 5 (District Court) (supra) at paragraphs 24-25 
254 William Schabas (Genocide) (supra) 367; Luc Reydams (Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) 162 
255 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide ICJ Reports 1993, 
325 
256 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (supra) 464 
257 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (supra) 443 
258 Joyner, Chris C ‘Arresting Impunity: The Case for Universal Jurisdiction in Bringing War Criminals to 
Accountability’ (1996) 59 Law and Contemporary Problems 159-160 
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But in the 1996 version of its draft Code of Crimes, the International Law 
Commission endorsed universal jurisdiction for the crime of genocide. Article 8 of the 
draft Code says a state party ‘shall take such measures as may be necessary to 
establish its jurisdiction’ over the crime of genocide, irrespective of where and by 
whom the crime was committed.
259
 Schabas points out that according to the 
commentary this ‘extension’ was justified because universal jurisdiction obtained on 
the basis of customary law ‘for those States that were not parties to the Convention 
and therefore not subject to the restrictions contained therein’.260 Schabas points out 
that the Commission has admitted that universal jurisdiction cannot be read into the 
Convention, contrary to what many have suggested. Moreover the commission seems 
to suggest that universal jurisdiction exists for States that are not party to the 
Genocide Convention, but not for those that are. This Schabas rightly calls a ‘bizarre 
conclusion’.261 This is in effect the same conclusion at which the District Court in 
Eichmann arrived at. Schabas asks whether it can really be argued that ‘States may 
reduce their international human rights obligations that exist at customary law by 
means of multilateral conventions that impose less stringent norms?’ Schabas 
suggests that a more logical result would be that ‘widely ratified multilateral treaties 
tend to confirm the real content of customary international law, which will inevitably 
be less expansive than conventional obligations.’262 
 
Schabas points out that the view that universal jurisdiction exists in the case of 
genocide is widely held within United Nations human rights institutions but that the 
case law of domestic courts is inconsistent.
263
 Schabas in his later edition on 
Genocide however mentions that there has been an increasing number of prosecutions 
for genocide by States using universal jurisdiction but that the ‘largest number by far 
have taken place in Rwanda’.264 A much smaller number have taken place in the 
                                                        
259 Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Eighth Session, 6 May-26 July 
1996’, UN Doc. A/51/10, 42 
260 William Schabas (Genocide) (supra) 365 
261 William Schabas (Genocide) (supra) 365 
262 William Schabas (Genocide) (supra) 365; Luc Reydams (Rise and Fall) (supra) 342 ‘Despite the 
unambiguous phrasing of the Genocide Convention, some argue that the Convention, much like the ICC 
Statute, does not exclude universal jurisdiction. States parties to these conventions somehow reserved 
themselves the right to act unilaterally.’ 
263 William Schabas (Genocide) (supra) 365; Luc Reydams (Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) 52 ‘The 
controversy over universal jurisdiction continues today…domestic courts also remain divided’; and also 
William Schabas (National Courts Finally Begin to Prosecute Genocide) (supra) 60 ‘Universal jurisdiction 
has been held out as the answer to the alleged shortcomings of Article VI. But despite all the attention it has 
received in academic writing, universal jurisdiction has given off more heat than light in terms of genocide 
prosecutions.’ 
264 William Schabas (Genocide 2nd edition) (supra) 416-417 
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former Yugoslavia.
265
 The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda has stated that 
universal jurisdiction exists for the crime of genocide.
266
 Schabas remarks that ‘where 
there was political will, prosecutions on this basis have proceeded. Indeed, the main 
explanation for the relatively small number of universal jurisdiction prosecution trails 
for genocide is political rather than legal’.267 Schabas has changed his view from 
skepticism in his first edition on genocide to stating nine years later that ‘there is 
simply too much State practice and judicial authority to support a credible challenge 
to the principle of universal jurisdiction where genocide is concerned’.268 Most of the 
examples provided in support of this conclusion are however cases stemming from 
the atrocities committed in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia.
269
 There were several 
efforts to hold trials for genocide with respect to the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda 
in European States, including Austria, Germany, Denmark, France, Belgium and 
Switzerland.
270
 In the opinion of this writer the situation has not significantly changed 
and it is suggested that it might be that these States, with the backing of the ICTY and 
ICTR, were more willing to exercise universal jurisdiction because there was no 
controversy as to whether genocide was committed and there was no prospect of a 
negative political backlash. It is a good example of States working together with each 
other and international institutions in the fight against genocide. It must also be kept 
in mind that in some of these examples States, although providing for universal 
jurisdiction, have only extended it to certain times and certain places. France for 
example geographically limited their universal jurisdiction over genocide and crimes 
against humanity. Articles 211(1) and 212(1) of the French Penal Code of 1994 
prohibit genocide and crimes against humanity but neither provision provides for 
universal jurisdiction over these crimes. Universal jurisdiction only exists over 
genocide and crimes against humanity if the crimes were committed in Rwanda or the 
former Yugoslavia. Hays Butler mentions that extreme limitations like these mean 
that these statutes ‘contribute very little to the international effort to deter and 
prosecute international crimes’.271 It seems that the main reason for Schabas’ change 
of mind is that States’ enacting legislation catering for universal jurisdiction in their 
                                                        
265 William Schabas (Genocide 2nd edition) (supra) 417 
266 Prosecutor v. Ntuyahaga (Case No. ICTR-90-40-T), Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion to Withdraw the 
Indictment, 18 March 1999. 
267 William Schabas (Genocide 2nd edition) (supra) 426  
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national systems and the conducting of such trails did not meet with ‘apparent 
opposition or challenge’.272 But this is easily ascribable to the fact that the States 
involved that might have raised an objection, namely Rwanda and the former 
Yugoslavia, were in no position politically to protest. Malcolm Shaw mentions that 
the ICC, unlike the two international tribunals (for the former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda) was not founded by a binding Security Council resolution but by an 
international treaty. The reason he gives for this is that ‘States, while being prepared 
to accept geographically limited and temporally constrained (in Rwanda’s case) 
tribunals by Security Council action, were not willing to be so bound by the 
establishment of a permanent international criminal court with much more extensive 
jurisdiction without express consent’.273 It is submitted that opposition may still be 
expected from most nations should others attempt to exercise universal jurisdiction 
over their nationals even if it is for genocide. States will also not go out of their way 
to implement it over others without the existence of some sort of link between them 
and the offence or the offender. What may be expected is, like we have seen in the 
cases of Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, that States will be increasingly willing to 
work together with each other (not against each other) and with the backing of 
international courts and institutions, to exercise universal jurisdiction. But this will 
only happen of it suits them and the political repercussions will be minimal. 
 
We can conclude that universal jurisdiction is firmly rejected by the Genocide 
Convention.
274
 Reydams attributes this rejection to the fact that genocide usually 
implies the responsibility of the territorial State. The Convention obliges parties to 
punish all persons having committed genocide, ‘whether they are constitutionally 
responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals (article VI).
275
 Reydams 
believes that: ‘Exclusion of State immunity-a novelty-and universal jurisdiction in 
one and the same instrument probably went too far.’ 276  Inazumi attributes this 
dismissal of universal jurisdiction to a ‘deep-rooted mistrust of the judicial systems 
and proceedings within other States.’277 I agree with Reydams that the main reason 
                                                        
272 William Schabas (Genocide 2nd edition) (supra) 434-435 
273 Malcolm, N Shaw ‘International Law’ 6th edition (2008) Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 411 
274 William Schabas (Genocide) (supra) 367; See also the Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, 
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275 Luc Reydams (Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) 53 
276 Luc Reydams (Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) 53 
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was probably that the great Powers were simply not interested in universal 
jurisdiction.
278
 
 
South Africa became a party to the Genocide Convention on 10 December 1998. No 
prosecutions for genocide have since occurred in South Africa. South Africa also did 
not enact specific implementing legislation in order to enforce the Convention 
nationally. The first step in this direction was the implementation of the ICC Act (as 
discussed above) to give effect to the provisions of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, which affords the ICC jurisdiction over acts of 
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. We will discuss the ICC Act in 
more detail below but first we turn to a Convention adopted just after the Genocide 
Convention. 
 
3.2 The Geneva Conventions 
 
Less than a year after the Genocide Convention four other important post-Nuremberg 
instruments came into being: The Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition 
of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field,
279
 the Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of 
the Armed Forces at Sea,
280
 the Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of 
War,
281
 the Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War
282
 (hereinafter referred to as the Geneva Conventions). Two Additional Protocols 
supplemented the Conventions in 1977.
283
 Together they make up the core of 
international humanitarian law.
284
 But for the exception of Additional Protocol II, the 
Conventions deal with international armed conflict.
285
 Articles 49, 50, 129 and 146 of 
the four Geneva Conventions contain the obligation to prosecute certain war 
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crimes.
286
 A jurisdiction clause common to the Conventions and Additional Protocol I 
reads, in part, as follows: 
 
‘The High Contracting Parties undertake to enact any legislation necessary to provide 
effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed, any of the 
grave breaches of the present Convention defined in the following Article. Each High 
Contracting Party shall be under an obligation to search for persons alleged to have 
committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring such 
persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own courts. It may also, if it prefers, and in 
accordance with the provisions of its own legislation, hand such persons over for trial to 
another High Contracting Party concerned, provided such High Contracting Party has made 
out a prima facie case.’ 
 
But for a few exceptions the general consensus is that this common jurisdiction clause 
provides an example of universal jurisdiction.
287
  Pictet’s authoritative commentary 
on the Geneva Conventions refers to the ‘universality of jurisdiction for grave 
breaches.’ 288  Hersch Lauterpacht stated in this regard that ‘no more emphatic 
affirmation of the principle of universality of jurisdiction with regard to the 
punishment of war crimes could be desired.’ 289  The Geneva Conventions indeed 
provide for universal jurisdiction. But as many as hail, endlessly theorize over and 
continuously prove this fact simultaneously rue how States just never seem to use this 
“promising opportunity” in practice.290 Reydams and Garrod cannot accept that the 
same States that rejected universal jurisdiction over genocide could, less than a year 
                                                        
286 See Richard van Elst ‘Implementing Universal Jurisdiction Over Grave Breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions’ (2000) 13 Leiden Journal of International Law 818 ‘The obligation to prosecute does not 
extend to all war crimes but is limited to a certain category referred to as grave breaches. The precise 
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torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, and willfully causing great suffering or 
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287 See Luc Reydams (Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) 55, Richard van Elst (Universal Jurisdiction over Grave 
Breaches) (supra) 819-820; AR Carnegie (Laws and Customs of War) (supra) 408; Roger O’Keefe (The Grave 
Breaches Regime) (supra) 811; Contra Matthew Garrod (The Protective Principle) (supra) 811; Alfred Rubin 
(Actio Popularis) (supra) 265, 269-71; Derek Bowett  (Jurisdiction: Changing Patterns of Authority) (supra) 
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288 Jean, S Pictet ‘The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. Commentary. IV. Geneva Convention relative to 
the Protection of Civilian People in Time of War’ (1958) 587  
289 Hersch Lauterpacht ‘The Problem of the Revision of War’ 29 British Yearbook of International Law 
(1952) 362 
290 See for example Richard van Elst (Implementing Universal Jurisdiction over Grave Breaches) (supra) 
850, 853 ‘The Geneva Conventions contain an obligation to prosecute which is unmatched in any other 
Convention relating to crimes against international law…Notwithstanding this lofty encouragement, hardly 
any prosecutions have been brought based on universal jurisdiction over grave breaches’; See also Ward 
Ferdinadusse ‘The Prosecution of Grave breaches in National Courts’ 7 Journal of International Criminal 
Justice (2009) 741 ‘It appears that there are many more grave breaches left unprosecuted than actual 
prosecutions’ 
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later, have a complete change of heart and implement it over grave breaches.
291
 We 
must ask why there is still uncertainty over the matter. 
 
Röling, the Dutch Professor and former judge of the International Military Tribunal 
for the Far East emphatically argued that the right to try non-nationals in the Geneva 
Conventions was limited to belligerent States and did not extend to neutral States 
parties.
292
 Mouton
293
, himself involved in the drafting of the Conventions, showed 
that Röling’s interpretation was wrong by pointing to the travaux préparatoires in 
which he himself played an instrumental part. When the final draft provision to either 
prosecute or extradite was under discussion, at the Diplomatic Conference, an Italian 
delegate proposed to impose this obligation only on the “Parties to the Conflict” 
instead of “Each Contracting Party”. It was however Mouton himself, as the Dutch 
Delegate, who rejected this proposal.
294
  One must agree with Mouton, because he 
was there, as to what transpired during the drafting and that universal jurisdiction was 
in fact provided for. It is however very interesting to ponder why a distinguished jurist 
like Röling would argue for a narrow reading of the jurisdiction clause when the 
opposite reading is so obvious.  
 
It is not too hard to understand where Röling was coming from if one remembers that 
universality had no foundation in State practice at the time and that the right to try 
war criminals had up to then belonged only to belligerents. O’Keefe, for instance, 
admits as much when he says ‘in terms of historical influence, the existence of the 
grave breaches provisions catalyzed a re-conceptualization of the basis under 
customary international law for national jurisdiction over the laws and customs of 
war, as well as over crimes against humanity and genocide’.295 Röling, I believe, 
pointed us in the right direction when he explained the extraordinary jurisdiction 
clause with reference to the peculiar circumstances prevalent after WWII.
296
 And this 
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296 B.V.A Röling ‘Enkele Aantekeningen’ (supra) 265-266 ‘Het gaat inderdaad ver, maar dat berust nu 
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also explains why even Mouton said at the Diplomatic Conference that: ‘But if, what 
God forbid, these Conventions should ever have to be applied, they must be 
obeyed.’297 This writer is not persuaded that States intended a ‘re-conceptualization of 
jurisdiction over the laws and customs of war.’ The crucial question seems to be 
whether the fact that jurisdiction was not limited to belligerents was because States 
intended do away with the traditional system by ridding it of all restraint over 
jurisdiction and replacing it by a ‘free-for-all’ or whether they wanted to find a way to 
improve the existing system to meet the challenges presented by WWII and make it as 
easy as possible for those injured to punish those who harmed them?  I believe the 
latter position is true. 
 
To my mind the intention of the drafters, because of the circumstances they found 
themselves in at the time, seems vital and will indicate what may be expected when 
universal jurisdiction over grave breaches is attempted. This is in any case the most 
important consideration as it involves not simply a textual reading but actually 
considers what the States Parties intended to achieve. If they meant something 
different to the current interpretation it will benefit nothing to point unwilling States 
to the text and tell them what they actually committed to. They, I dare to say, will still 
do what they want to and what they always intended to. Indeed, we may ask, what 
were these States thinking by implementing universal jurisdiction for grave breaches 
only a year after rejecting it for genocide? They were definitely not thinking that they 
might one day be the war criminals. They were also not thinking that war criminals 
were such heinous criminals that every State should be allowed to punish them.
298
 
They were most probably only thinking of how to find an effective way to prevent the 
war criminals, that had only recently harmed them, from fleeing to neutral countries 
and escape their just desert.
299
 
  
The provision for aut dedere aut judicare was meant to function as a mechanism for 
ensuring that a State injured by an offence would be able to have the offender sent 
                                                                                                                                                              
misdadiger zo min mogelijk zijn verdiende straf zal ontgaan, waar ter wereld hij zich ook bevinden zou…In 
de Tweede Wereldoorlog waren zoveel staten bij het conflict betrokken, dat men gemakkelijk bereid werd 
en universaliteits-beginsel voor oorlogsmisdrijven te aanvaarden’ 
297 Quoted by Richard van Elst (Universal Jurisdiction over Grave Breaches) (supra) 815 
298 Pictet’s commentary and writers on the topic mention nothing of this. 
299 This is what happened after WWI when the German Kaiser found save haven in the neutral Netherlands 
and it might not have been coincidence that it was the Dutch Delegate who made sure history does not 
repeat itself. 
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back for trial, or have the offender tried on its behalf.
300
 Garrod argues that ‘the use of 
this principle in the Geneva Conventions has to be read in the light of the quickly 
deteriorating political alliances in the aftermath of the war, in particular, between 
Western Allies and the Soviet bloc with the emergence of the Cold War, and the 
resultant practical difficulties faced by injured States in obtaining custody of accused 
‘enemy’ war criminals seeking refuge “in the territories of certain States”’.301  A 
statement of the time, namely the UN General Assembly 3(I) of 13 February 1946 
“Extradition and Punishment of War Criminals” clearly confirms this reading and 
provides crucial context. It recommended as follows: 
 
That Members of the United Nations forthwith take all the necessary measures to cause the 
arrest of […] war criminals […], and to cause them to be sent back to the countries in which 
their abominable deeds were done, in order that they may be judged and punished according 
to the laws of those countries; and calls upon the governments of States which are not 
Members of the United Nations also to take all the necessary measures for the apprehension 
of such criminal in their respective territories with a view to their immediate removal to the 
countries where the crimes were committed for the purpose of trial and punishment according 
to the laws of those countries’. 
 
Luc Reydams argues that ‘the obligation for all countries, including neutral ones, to 
search for persons suspected of grave breaches of the Conventions ‘regardless of their 
nationality’ is a reference to displacement and migration of millions and the 
redrawing of national borders at the end of World War II’.302 Reydams points out that 
the alternative to the obligation to prosecute a suspect found within one’s own 
territory is handing him over to another High Contracting Party concerned, which has 
made out a prima facie case. This undergirds the idea of States intending to create a 
system where they could cooperate in bringing those offenders who had harmed them 
to justice. The fact that here was a war that involved numerous nations spanning the 
                                                        
300 Matthew Garrod (The Protective Principle) (supra) 812 ‘It is for this reason that Grotius first developed 
the principle; thus, he argued that the unwillingness of Portugal to punish its own nationals for crimes 
committed against the Dutch justified the waging of war by the Dutch against Portugal in order to punish 
the offenders.’ 
301 Matthew Garrod (The Protective Principle) (supra) 812; LC Green ‘Canadian Law, War Crimes and 
Crimes Against Humanity’ 59 British Yearbook of International Law 218 
302 Luc Reydams (Rise and Fall) (supra) 17 
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globe makes it illogical to read into this secondary sentence an unqualified right for 
neutral countries to prosecute grave breaches.
303
  
 
The Pictet commentary confirms this interpretation and explains that prior to the 
Geneva Conventions ‘States were left completely free to punish, or not, acts 
committed by their own troops against the enemy, or, again, acts committed by enemy 
troops, in violation of the laws and customs of war.’304 ‘It was thought necessary to 
establish what these grave breaches were to ensure universality of treatment in their 
repression.’305 Hence, there was ‘the obligation to enact special legislation on the 
subject’ in order to create a ‘certain uniformity of legislation.’ 306  The second 
obligation was to ‘search for any person accused of violation of the Convention’ and 
lastly ‘to try such person or if the Contracting Party prefers, to hand them over for 
trial to another State concerned.’307  Reading the commentary on this aspect as a 
whole, and in context, one can see that prior to WWII there was no uniformity of 
practice among States in punishing acts committed by their own troops or committed 
by the enemy against them. The ‘very numerous violations committed during’ WWII 
created a problem of punishing war criminals.
308
 The main goal was to ‘be able to rely 
on already existing rules without having been obliged to have recourse to special 
measures.’309 The idea was that from then on Parties to the Convention would have to 
punish their own troops for grave breaches committed and punish their enemies for 
grave breaches committed against them. This was nothing new or revolutionary.
310
 
What was new was that everyone would now be under a duty to implement legislation 
‘within two years’ and this legislation, that all Parties should implement, was what 
was meant when it was stated that the ‘universality of jurisdiction for grave breaches 
is some basis for the hope that that they will not remain unpunished and the obligation 
to extradite ensures the universality of punishment’311 There would, in other words, 
                                                        
303 Luc Reydams (Rise and Fall) (supra) 17-18; Jean Pictet Geneva Conventions IV (supra) 585 note an 
earlier draft Article 40 that did not contain the requirements that it must be another High Contracting Party 
concerned that had made out a prima facie case and also Alfred Rubin (Ethics and Authority) (supra) 172 
304 Jean S Pictet ‘The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. Commentary. I. Geneva Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and the Sick in Armed Forces in the Field’ 352 
305 Jean Pictet (Commentary I) (supra) 370 
306 Jean Pictet (Commentary IV) (supra) 591 
307 Jean Pictet (Commentary I) (supra) 370 
308 Jean Pictet (Commentary IV) (supra) 584 
309 Jean Pictet (Commentary IV) (supra) 584 
310 See paragraph 2.2.4 (supra) and also Jean Pictet (Commentary IV) (supra) 584 ‘The absence of any 
international regulation of this matter and the small number of national laws concerned with it led most 
States to pass special legislation to punish the war crimes committed by the enemy against their people and 
troops.’ 
311 Jean Pictet (Commentary IV) (supra) 587 
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hopefully be more States ready and willing to comply with this obligation. States 
would now have to punish their own troops for grave breaches and also be able to 
ensure punishment of those who injured them by asking for their extradition or having 
them punished on their behalf. This is not the same as the contemporary meaning of 
universality and there was never any discussion of theories of universal jurisdiction to 
adjudicate based on moral reprehension of war crimes. It is not fair for writers to latch 
onto the phrase ‘universality of punishment’ such a contemporary meaning of 
universal jurisdiction.
312
 It is submitted that the solution sought was merely practical 
because it was simply not feasible to limit the duty to prosecute or extradite to the 
belligerents alone considering the logistical nightmare that WWII had created.  
 
Alfred Rubin provides a similar view and points out that the Geneva Conventions take 
a dualist view of the international legal order by obliging parties to the conflict to take 
action against individual violators of the substantive rules but leaving open the 
possibility that an international tribunal might yet be established to exercise 
adjudicatory functions. Rubin explains that the positive law of armed conflict 
provided for in the Geneva Conventions solves potential problems without the need to 
have recourse to complicated and unfounded natural law concepts such as universal 
jurisdiction. He argues that because the four Conventions are very widely ratified and 
are usually regarded as substantive law binding as a matter of general practice 
accepted as law even if a State has not expressly accepted them through ratification. 
He explains that the Conventions require Parties to search for and try or hand over 
war criminals to another party concerned in the struggle if the other Party has 
established a prima facie case. Should no Party to the Convention have made out a 
prima facie case then an absolute obligation to seek out those who had committed a 
grave breach would obviously have no result and only lead to embarrassment. Rubin 
makes an excellent point. When will a State ever search for an alleged war criminal if 
there is no concerned State that considers him a war criminal and can actually make 
out a prima facie case against him? If there is no such State concerned how will the 
territorial State even know that someone is a war criminal and where would they find 
the proof for this? International relations are sensitive issues and States will be very 
                                                        
312 See for confirmation in this regard Derek Bowett (Jurisdiction: Changing Patterns of Authority) (supra) 
12 ‘the obligation imposed on all contracting Parties to enact municipal legislation so as to make grave 
breaches of the Convention punishable is not the assertion of a universal jurisdiction but merely the 
provision of the legislative basis for jurisdiction in the event that the contracting Party is involved in the 
hostilities as a belligerent.’  
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loath to launch out on rumors and unfounded allegations. Rubin further points out that 
the problem of the reluctance to cooperate of a Party having legal control over the 
evidence of the crime can be overcome by use of the positive legal order. There 
would be no need for a third party, lacking the necessary jurisdiction to adjudicate or 
access the evidence to intervene. The accused may simply be handed over to his own 
command with a public commitment to apply the rules to which that Party was bound 
by treaty. And if not by treaty then ‘by general international law developed by the 
practice of States accepted as law in diplomatic correspondence and other actions, and 
codified by the Conventions. If that “solution” is not trusted…the accused could 
properly be handed over to the opposing side for trail and punishment under 
international safeguards set out in the Conventions…’313 
 
It is submitted that such a reading is also the most logical explanation for third States 
apparent current lack of enthusiasm for applying universal jurisdiction over grave 
breaches. Yet someone like Van Elst, chooses to rather believe that States Parties 
intended an unrestricted jurisdiction over everybody.
314
 But his own interpretation 
forces him to then label America’s process of negotiation that led to their refusal to 
establish universal jurisdiction over grave breaches as “self-interest-centered 
arguments”. 315  And Canada he calls “the archetype of a State which shirks its 
responsibility on this basis under false pretenses.”316  Are these States really self-
interested fraudsters or is it possible that Van Elst misconstrued the Geneva 
Conventions? But even more alarming is that by this sort of reasoning he is led to call 
the rescheduling of flights abroad by erstwhile U.K Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher, for fear of being arrested, as a result of the Falklands war, a “promising 
development”. 317  If we pause for a moment we may ask why exactly this is a 
promising development? And who decides? This seems to me the clearest indication 
that States Parties to the Geneva Convention could never have had the intention Van 
Elst and others presently ascribe to them. Would the U.K. at the time of drafting the 
Geneva Conventions have agreed to an unqualified right for neutral countries to 
prosecute grave breaches if it meant that one of their most accomplished Prime 
Ministers would someday become the random target of such prosecutions, and that 
                                                        
313 Alfred Rubin (Ethics and Authority) (supra) 171-172 
314 Richard van Elst (Universal Jurisdiction over Grave Breaches) (supra) 821 
315 Richard van Elst (Universal Jurisdiction over Grave Breaches) (supra) 837 
316 Richard van Elst (Universal Jurisdiction over Grave Breaches) (supra) 851 
317 Richard van Elst (Universal Jurisdiction over Grave Breaches) (supra) 852 
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only because she had won a war?
318
 Obviously the answer is no. States Parties wanted 
all the help they could get to make sure that war criminals that had harmed them 
would not escape. They didn’t want to make it as hard as possible for their own 
leaders to conduct their duties. Israel, for example, constantly complains of this 
‘lawfare’ waged against them.319 In South Africa the so-called ‘Gaza Docket’ have 
presented prosecutors with similar problems. In this case activists have asked South 
African authorities to investigate a dual Israeli/South African citizen for his part in 
alleged war crimes committed during what was known as Operation Cast Lead.
320
 
The reference to lawfare is basically a complaint that some groups attempt to use law, 
and specifically universal jurisdiction, as a tool or a weapon to interfere in intricate 
political problems. The point is simply that States Parties to the drafting of the 
Geneva Conventions most likely never imagined a scenario where their well-
respected leaders can scarcely travel anymore and national prosecutors get involved in 
international political problems. No, they only intended to provide for an effective 
mechanism that allowed for war criminals that had injured them to be punished or 
sent back to them for punishment. This is as much a sturdy argument that any neutral 
and unconcerned State may not ask for the extradition of any war criminal as it is that 
this will almost never happen in practice because it was never intended to.   
 
Almost never, yet it has happened before. Van Elst points to the Belgian 1993 Act 
Relative to the Punishment of Grave Breaches of the International Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949 and the Additional Protocols I and II of 8 June 1977 
as a model example of unlimited universal jurisdiction over grave breaches.
321
 But 
Van Elst wrote this in 2000 and with the benefit of hindsight we can see what 
happened to his example. Steven Ratner’s summary is superb:  
 
‘The life and death of Belgium’s universal jurisdiction law is a textbook case of the 
intersection of law and power in the international arena. A government, its consciousness 
                                                        
318 The same may be asked of others like Tony Blair, of George Bush Senior and Junior and Ariel Sharon. 
319 Diane Morrison and Justus Reid Weiner ‘Curbing Enthusiasm for Universal Jurisdiction’ (2010) 4 
Berkeley Journal of International Law Publicist 1 ‘Advocates of the Jewish State have coined the term 
“lawfare” to describe this situation-“a strategy of using or misusing law as a substitute for traditional 
military means to achieve military objectives.”’ 
320 Gevers C “Gaza docket: SA must tighten policies on international criminal justice” Business Day 
(2009/08/20), available at http://www.businessday.co.za/Articles/Content.aspx?id=79073 (accessed 
2014/01/25).   
321 Richard van Elst (Universal Jurisdiction over Grave Breaches) (supra) 826; Article 7 of this Act states the 
following: ‘The Belgian Courts shall be competent to deal with the breaches provided for in the present Act, 
irrespective of where they were committed…’ 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 88 
raised by the increased global attention to individual responsibility for human rights atrocities, 
enacts a broad statute opening its courts to prosecutions of suspected murderers, torturers and 
war criminals around the world. Stung by its peacekeeper’s failure to prevent genocide in 
Rwanda, a former colony, Belgium eventually utilizes the law to try and convict a handful of 
accomplices to those atrocities. But, politically troublesome cases trickle in, as opposing sides 
in the Middle East seek to have their day in Brussels; and another State, the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC), successfully brings an action in the World Court challenging 
arrest warrants against a former DRC official. The United States government eventually 
signals opposition to the statute, leading to its nearly instantaneous modification; when the 
United States says it is still too broad, the government guts the idea entirely.’322 
 
3.2.1 The Arrest Warrant Case 
 
Relevant to this particular discussion is the ICJ Arrest Warrant Case.
323
 The facts 
were as follows. An examining magistrate in Brussels, seized by the public prosecutor 
and private parties, issued an arrest warrant on 11 April 2000 against the then acting 
Congolese minister of Foreign Affairs, Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi (Yerodia). The 
basis of the warrant was the Belgian Act on Grave Breaches (mentioned above). 
There were no links between Belgium and the alleged crime or suspect. The 
proceedings were thus an exercise of universal jurisdiction in absentia. The DRC, in 
its application, relied on two legal grounds: 
 
(i) The universal jurisdiction that Belgium attributes to itself under Article 7 
of the Belgian Statute constituted a violation of the DRC’s sovereignty and 
the principle of sovereign equality provided for in Article 2(1) of the 
United Nations Charter. No State may exercise its authority on the 
territory of another State. 
(ii) The non-recognition by the Belgian Statute of the immunity of a Minister 
for Foreign Affairs in office constituted a violation of the diplomatic 
                                                        
322 Steven, R Ratner ‘Belgium’s War Crimes Statute: A Postmortem’ 97 American Journal of International Law 
(2003) 888-889; also see Max Du Plessis & Shannon Bosch ‘Immunities and universal jurisdiction – the 
Wolrd Court steps in (or on?) (2003) 28 South African Yearbook of International Law 246 ‘The controversy 
regarding th legislation has reached a crescendo after the war on Iraq. A case was brought recently against 
General Tommy Franks, the US Commander in Iraq, by a left wing lawyer representing 19 Iraqis. The 
complaint was lodged on 14 May 2003 and dismissed a week later (under the latest amendment to the law 
which allows for the disposal of politically motivated or ‘propoganda’ cases). Nonetheless, the case caused a 
‘major crisis’ in relations between the US and Belgium, and nearly led to a boycott by the US of Nato’s 
Brussels headquarters. At the time of writing Belgium seems to have capitulated under US pressure to limit 
the scope of the controversial law, and the latest limitations make the law applicable only to cases where 
Belgians or Belgian residents are directly involved’ 
323 Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium (supra) 
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immunity of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of a sovereign State, as 
recognized by the jurisprudence of the ICJ and following from Article 
14(2) of the Vienna Convention of 1961 on Diplomatic Relations. 
 
Belgium, in its defense to the first claim, relied essentially on international customary 
law. A subsidiary argument was that in the absence of any treaty or custom 
prohibiting universal jurisdiction in absentia it was free to act as it deemed fit.
324
 This 
was of course a reliance on the ‘Lotus principle’ that States have a right to do 
whatever is not prohibited by international convention or custom.
325
 In their final 
submissions the DRC, for some reason, proceeded only on the issue of immunity and 
abandoned the excessive universal jurisdiction argument. Belgium approved and 
asked the Court to rule only on the immunity issue. The Court agreed but reserved 
itself the right to deal with certain aspects of the universal jurisdiction question if it 
deemed it necessary or desirable. It never did and completely sidestepped the issue by 
only deciding the immunity question, several judges, however, addressed the issue in 
separate opinions or declarations.
326
 
 
President Guillaume found that universal jurisdiction in absentia is unknown to 
international conventional law.
327
 He also found that international customary law does 
not allow for universal jurisdiction in absentia.
328
 He was not impressed by Belgium’s 
subsidiary argument based on the ‘Lotus principle’ because he noted that the situation 
was ‘totally different’ today.329 It was different because ‘[t]he adoption of the United 
Nations Charter proclaiming the sovereign equality of States, and the appearance on 
the international scene of new States, born of decolonization, have strengthened the 
territorial principle.’330 He then found as follows: 
 
‘But at no time has it been envisaged that jurisdiction should be conferred upon courts of 
every State in the world to prosecute such crimes, whoever their authors and victims and 
irrespective of the place where the offender is to be found. To do this would moreover risk 
judicial chaos. It would also be to encourage the arbitrary for the benefit of the powerful, 
                                                        
324 Luc Reydams (Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) 228 
325 Luc Reydams (Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) 228 and discussion in Chapter 2 (supra) 
326 Not all these opinions and declarations will be discussed here, and only those relevant to universal 
jurisdiction, but for a neat summary of the various opinions and declarations see Luc Reydams (Universal 
Jurisdiction) (supra) 228-230 
327 Separate opinion of Judge Guillaume paragraph 9 
328 Separate opinion of Judge Guillaume paragraph 13 
329 Separate opinion of Judge Guillaume paragraph 15 
330 Separate opinion of Judge Guillaume paragraph 15 
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purportedly acting as agents for an ill-defined “international community”. Contrary to what is 
advocated by certain publicists, such a development would represent not an advance in the 
law but a step backward.’331  
 
On the other end of the spectrum, appearing for Belgium as Judge Ad Hoc was the 
well-known and respected international law Professor Christine Van den Wyngaert. 
She wrote a detailed dissenting opinion dealing first with immunity and then universal 
jurisdiction. She found that examples of ‘extraterritorial jurisdiction for international 
crimes such as war crimes, crimes against humanity and torture…may often be on 
other jurisdictional grounds such as the nationality of the victim.’332 The examples she 
gave were those of Eichmann, which she said was in fact not based on universal 
jurisdiction, but on passive personality, and Pinochet where the link was the Spanish 
nationality of the victims. She found that the raison d’étre for universal jurisdiction is 
the prevention of impunity.
333
 With reference to the Lotus case she found that it leaves 
States a wide measure of discretion and she made the distinction between prescriptive 
and enforcement jurisdiction. She explained that with regard to prescriptive 
jurisdiction States are free to investigate and prosecute crimes committed abroad on 
their own territory. But, without permission, a State would have no enforcement 
jurisdiction to exercise its power on the territory of another State.
334
 She found that in 
the absence of a prohibition international law ‘clearly permits States to provide 
extraterritorial jurisdiction’.335 She also found that ‘[t]here is no rule of conventional 
international law to the effect that universal jurisdiction in absentia is prohibited.’336 
As an example that it is not prohibited she uses the jurisdictional provisions of the 
Geneva Conventions. She then says that ‘[i]t may be politically inconvenient to have 
such a wide jurisdiction because it is not conducive to international relations and 
national public opinion may not approve of trials against foreigners for crimes 
committed abroad. This does not, however, make such trials illegal under 
international law.’337 
                                                        
331 Separate opinion of Judge Guillaume paragraph 15; See also Separate opinion of Judge Rezek at 
paragraph 10 ‘[if] the application of the universality principle would not presuppose the presence of the 
accused person on the territory of the forum State, all co-ordination becomes impossible and the very 
international system of co-operation in the repression of crime would collapse’. He also wonders ‘how 
certain European countries would react if a judge from Congo had indicted their officials for crimes 
supposedly committed on their orders in Africa’. 
332 Dissenting opinion of Judge Van den Wyngaert paragraph 44 
333 Dissenting opinion of Judge Van den Wyngaert paragraph 46 
334 Dissenting opinion of Judge Van den Wyngaert paragraph 49 
335 Dissenting opinion of Judge Van den Wyngaert paragraph 51 
336 Dissenting opinion of Judge Van den Wyngaert paragraph 54 
337 Dissenting opinion of Judge Van den Wyngaert paragraph 56 
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In between these two divergent views we find the joint separate opinion of Judges 
Higgins, Kooijmans, and Buergenthal. They conceded that neither international 
conventional law nor international customary law provides a basis for universal 
jurisdiction in absentia and that the writings of publicists although ‘suggesting 
profound differences of opinion…cannot of themselves and without reference to the 
other sources of international law, evidence the existence of a jurisdictional norm’.338 
The opinion found it undeniable ‘[t]hat there is no established practice in which States 
exercise universal jurisdiction, properly so called…[v]irtually all national legislation 
envisages links of some sort to the forum State, and no case law exists in which pure 
universal jurisdiction has formed the basis of jurisdiction. This does not necessarily 
indicate, however, that such an exercise would be unlawful.’ But, the opinion 
continues, ‘Moreover, while none of the national case law to which we have been 
referred happens to be based on the exercise of a universal jurisdiction properly so 
called, there is equally nothing in this case law which evidences an opinio juris on the 
illegality of such jurisdiction. In short, national legislation and case law - that is, State 
practice - is neutral as to the exercise of universal jurisdiction.’339 About the Lotus 
case, as relied upon by Belgium, the opinion found that it leaves States with ‘a wide 
measure of discretion which is only limited in certain cases by prohibitive rules’. The 
opinion agrees in this regard that certain States may act unilaterally as ‘agents for the 
international community’ to assert a universal jurisdiction over international crimes. 
This finding, the opinion attributes to a ‘vertical notion of authority’, which, they 
believe, was significantly different from ‘the horizontal system of international law 
envisaged in the “Lotus” case.’340 As to the question whether the presence of the 
accused is a precondition for the assertion of universal jurisdiction, the opinion states 
that the treaty obligation to extradite or try a suspect who is present, although 
‘definitionally envisage[ing] presence on the territory’, ‘cannot be interpreted a 
contrario so as to exclude a voluntary exercise of universal jurisdiction.’341 Their 
conclusion was that ‘[i]f the underlying purpose of designating certain acts as 
international crimes is to authorize a wide jurisdiction to be asserted over persons 
committing them, there is no rule of international law (and certainly not the aut 
                                                        
338 Joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal paragraph 44 
339 Joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal paragraph 45, 50, 51, 57, 58 
340 Joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal paragraphs 50-51 
341 Joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal paragraph 57 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 92 
dedere principle) which makes illegal co-operative overt acts designed to secure their 
presence within a State wishing to exercise jurisdiction’.342 
 
It is clear, from these opinions and the sharp divisions between them, that universal 
jurisdiction when exercised unilaterally in absentia as Belgium tried to do in this case 
is controversial. It is interesting to note that out of those Judges that actually discussed 
the Geneva Conventions Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal only found that 
the Geneva Conventions might ‘perhaps’ provide for a treaty-based universal 
jurisdiction but that it presupposed per definition the presence of an offender on their 
territory. They were not sure, and asked if ‘the obligation to search impl[ied] a 
permission to prosecute in absentia, if the search had no results?
343
 President 
Guillame unequivocally stated that ‘universal jurisdiction in absentia is unknown to 
international conventional law’ and that ‘the Geneva Conventions…do not create any 
obligation of search, arrest or prosecution in cases where the offenders are not present 
on the territory of the State concerned. They accordingly cannot in any event found 
universal jurisdiction in absentia’.344 Judge Van den Wyngaert for Belgium argued 
that ‘[r]eading into Article 146 of the IV Geneva Convention a limitation on a State’s 
right to exercise universal jurisdiction would fly in the face of a teleological 
interpretation of the Geneva Conventions.’ She found that the purpose of these 
Conventions, obviously, is not to restrict the jurisdiction of States for crimes under 
international law.’345  Judge Van den Wyngaert was the only one interpreting the 
Geneva Conventions in view of the purpose they were meant to serve when they were 
created.
346
 Yet, as was pointed out above, States Parties to the Geneva Conventions 
most probably did not intend to open the floodgates of jurisdiction. It is thus not a 
matter of saying that they obviously were not intended to restrict jurisdiction, of 
course they were not intended to restrict jurisdiction, but rather of understanding that, 
because of the extraordinary circumstances prevalent at the time, they were intended 
                                                        
342 Joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal paragraph 58 also see Separate 
opinion of Judge Koroma paragraph 8 who found without giving reasons that ‘Belgium is entitled to invoke 
its criminal jurisdiction against anyone, save for a Foreign Minister in office. It is unfortunate that the wrong 
case would appear to have been chosen in attempting to carry out what Belgium considers its international 
obligation.’ 
343 Joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal paragraphs 61, 57, 72 & 31 
344 Separate opinion of Judge Guillaume paragraphs 9 and 17; See also the declaration of Judge Ranjeva 
along similar lines at paragraph 7 
345 Dissenting opinion of Judge Van den Wyngaert paragraph 54; See also Judge ad hoc Bula-Bula who 
agreed with her at paragraph 65 
346 The definition of teleology in ‘The Concise Oxford English Dictionary’ (10th ed.) Oxford University Press, 
Oxford (2002) ‘the explanation of phenomena by the purpose they serve rather than by postulated causes’ 
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to regulate jurisdiction in very specific way. The circumstances were the vast scale, 
and the changing world in the aftermath, of WWII. The goal was to make it as easy as 
possible for injured nations to exact punishment, or cooperate with other States to 
have it exacted on their behalf, on the war criminals that had so recently harmed their 
interests. Luc Reydams, after his thorough study of State practice disagrees with 
Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal and says that State practice on universal 
jurisdiction in absentia is not as neutral as they claim it to be.
347
 He points out that in 
the few precedents there are of Sharon, Yerodia and Pinochet the States of nationality 
of the suspects ‘protested vigorously, and not merely on immunity grounds.’ 348 
Reydams also doesn’t agree with their contention that the aut dedere aut judicare 
clauses in treaties cannot be interpreted a contrario so as to exclude a voluntary 
exercise of universal jurisdiction in cases where a suspect is not present. Reydams 
says that the three Judges ‘suggestion that the parties to the numerous aut dedere aut 
judicare treaties and to the ICC Statute silently reserved themselves a supposed right 
to exercise universal jurisdiction in absentia is unpersuasive, especially with regard to 
the ICC.’ Reydams did not discuss the dissenting opinion of Judge Van den Wyngaert 
but she makes the same point and it may thus be criticized for the same reason. 
Reydams agrees with President Guilliuame that such an approach would ‘encourage 
the arbitrary for the benefit of the powerful.’ Reydams concludes his study by 
remarking that what the conclusion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal 
does not rule out is a co-operative exercise of universal jurisdiction in absentia. But 
that this ‘implies the consent of the State(s) involved, on a case-by-case basis. 
Without such consent any exercise of universal jurisdiction in absentia is doomed to 
be unilateral and risks weakening the very international order that it pretends to 
guard.’349 This writer agrees that universal jurisdiction can be a function of a treaty 
provision but that cooperation between States has been the foundation of, and the 
rationale behind, the Geneva Conventions and should be in the future. 
 
Du Plessis and Bosch believe that if the court had actually decided the universal 
jurisdiction issue, the moderate approach of Judges Higgins et al would have 
prevailed over the ‘stilted’ approach of President Guillaume.350 But the very opposite 
                                                        
347 Luc Reydams (Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) 230 
348 Luc Reydams (Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) 230 
349 Luc Reydams (Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) 230 
350 Max du Plessis and Shannon Bosch (The World Court steps in (or on?) (supra) 254 
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seems, to this writer, to be true. For a start, as this study has pointed out, President 
Guillaume’s finding that ‘at no time has it been envisaged that jurisdiction should be 
conferred upon courts of every State in the world to prosecute such crimes, whoever 
their authors and victims and irrespective of the place where the offender is to be 
found’ is absolutely correct. In their article Du Plessis and Bosch start their discussion 
of universal jurisdiction off by saying that it ‘is a concept firmly rooted in the minds 
of international lawyers’351 But it is not enough for the concept to be accepted by 
international lawyers. Judges Higgins et al made this point when they found that 
neither international conventional law nor international customary law provides a 
basis for universal jurisdiction in absentia and that the writings of publicists ‘cannot 
of themselves and without reference to the other sources of international law, 
evidence the existence of a jurisdictional norm’. 352  Proponents of universal 
jurisdiction advocate it as the evidence of a deep-rooted and age-old tradition of 
international abhorrence of impunity for perpetrators of certain serious crimes.
353
 It 
seems from so many writings on the subject to be the most obvious concept in the 
world. But the fact that the majority did not even deal with universal jurisdiction 
seems to indicate that they don’t hold the view that it forms such an indispensable and 
self-evident part of international criminal law.
354
 If they held the same view, and it 
was such an important matter to them, surely they would have mentioned it? They 
could easily have done so, put it beyond dispute, and still have reached the same 
conclusion that Yerodia possessed immunity from this jurisdiction. If nothing else, 
their complete silence on the issue seems to indicate, not that they were in favor of it, 
but that universal jurisdiction was not as obvious and important a consideration for 
the majority of Judges as it is for many international lawyers.
355 
                                                        
351 Max du Plessis and Shannon Bosch (The World Court steps in (or on?) (supra) 251 They continue as 
follows ‘As a jurisdictional basis, the idea of universal jurisdiction xamplifies a concern regarding crimes, so 
egregious in their nature, that they warrant the attention of all nations, irrespective of where the offence 
was committed, or the nationality of the offender or victim.’ 
352 Joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal paragraph 44 
353 See Du Plessis and Bosch (The World Court steps in(or on?) (supra) 252 
354 Assuming of course, what is not hard to believe, that they, being distinguished international judges, were 
not blind to the logic of considering jurisdiction before immunity 
355 Max du Plessis and Shannon Bosch (The World Court steps in (or on?) (supra) 262 ‘The International 
Court of Justice appears to have set in place a presumption in favour of immunity, and in the process the 
exercise of universal jurisdiction by national courts has come off second best. This is an unfortunate 
reversal of a trend towards greater accountability of individuals, whatever their status, who are responsible 
for the worst crimes.’ See also Antonio Cassese (Is the Bell Tolling for Universality?) (supra) 589 ‘It would 
seem that the principle of universal jurisdiction over international crimes is on its last legs, if not already in 
its death throes. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) delivered the first blow to universality in 2002 in its 
judgment in the Arrest Warrant case.’ And Sascha-Dominik Bachmann (The quest for international criminal 
justice) (supra) 733 ‘With the DRC v Belgium decision of the international court of justice, the evolving 
attempts to prosecute international crimes before domestic criminal courts have been severely impaired for 
the sake of upholding an outdated principle of state sovereignty.’ 
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3.2.2 The Belgian example 
 
We may now consider the Belgian War Crimes Act mentioned briefly earlier. The 
first thing Belgium did after the Arrest Warrant Case was to rescind the illegal arrest 
warrant. Soon after this the whole matter received an odd twist when a pre-trial 
appeals court in Brussels ruled that the proceedings against Yerodia were 
inadmissible from the beginning because the accused was not present in Belgium as 
required by their law.
356
 The history of the Act was that in 1993 the Belgian 
Government, in response to a proposal by military judges and academics, amended 
the penal code to include certain violations of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and 1977 
Additional Protocols, regardless of where such crimes were committed. In 1999 upon 
the request of various human rights NGO’s, the law was amended to include genocide 
and crimes against humanity as defined in the Statute of the International Criminal 
Court. The official immunity of a person would also not prevent the application of the 
law. It was at the time the world’s broadest domestic statute on universal jurisdiction 
for human rights abuses. It required no link between the suspect, victim or events, on 
the one hand, and Belgium on the other.
357
 The new legislation thus provided Belgium 
courts with comprehensive and unconditional universal jurisdiction over war crimes, 
genocide and crimes against humanity.
358
 Belgium’s criminal procedure allows for a 
system of plaintiff prosecutors, whereby victims may initiate cases before an 
investigating judge. It was not long before Palestinians, survivors from the 1982 
massacre of Palestinian refugees, brought charges against Ariel Sharon, the then 
Prime Minister of Israel who was also their former Defense Minister and Amos Yaron 
who had been the Israeli general in charge of the Beirut section in 1982.
359
 In addition 
the court also faced complaints from Israelis against Yasir Arafat and others against 
Fidel Castro, Sadam Hussein and Yerodia Ndombasi.
360
 The matter against Sharon 
and Yaron led to vehement protest by Israel and they withdrew their ambassador to 
Belgium.
361
 In March 2003, seven Iraqi families requested an investigation of former 
US President George Bush Snr, Vice President (and former Secretary of Defense) 
Dick Cheney, Secretary of State (and former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) 
                                                        
356 Luc Reydams (Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) 116 
357 This is a summary adapted from Steven Ratner (Postmortem) (supra) 889 
358 A Hays Butler ‘The Growing Support for Universal Jurisdiction’ in Stephen Macedo (Universal Jurisdiction) 
(supra) 69 
359 Steven Ratner (Postmortem) (supra) 890 
360 Steven Ratner (Postmortem) (supra) 890 
361 Steven Ratner (Postmortem) (supra) 890 
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Colin Powell and retired general Norman Schwarzkopf for allegedly committing war 
crimes during the 1991 Gulf war.
362
 In response, Secretary Powell warned the 
Belgium Government that it was risking its status as a diplomatic capital and host 
State of NATO by allowing investigations of those who might visit Belgium.
363
 The 
Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt quickly proposed amendments to the statute 
to limit its scope.
364
 In April 2003 parliament amended the law so that only the federal 
prosecutor could initiate cases if the violation was overseas, the offender was not 
Belgian or located in Belgium, and the victim was not Belgian or had not lived in 
Belgium for three years. The prosecutor could also refuse to proceed if the complaint 
was manifestly unfounded or it was in the interest of administration of justice that the 
case be heard before international tribunals, or before a tribunal where the offence 
was committed or the tribunal of a State in which the offender is a national or where 
he is found as long as this tribunal is competent, independent, impartial and fair.
365
 
After the amendments Israel sent back its ambassador to Belgium.
366
 But the US 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld still announced that the United States would 
refuse to fund a new NATO headquarters building in Belgium and would consider 
barring its officials from travelling to meetings there unless Belgium rescinded its law 
because it disregards the sovereignty of other nations.  Once more the law was 
promptly amended and now stated that Belgian courts can hear cases regarding the 
three sets of crimes when committed outside Belgium only if the defendants or victim 
is a citizen or resident of Belgium.
367
 The law also precludes cases against chiefs of 
state, heads of government, and foreign ministers while they are in office, others 
whose immunity is recognized by international law and persons whose immunity is 
recognized by a treaty to which Belgium is a party.
368
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
362 Steven Ratner (Postmortem) (supra) 890 
363 Steven Ratner (Postmortem) (supra) 890 
364 Steven Ratner (Postmortem) (supra) 890 
365 Steven Ratner (Postmortem) (supra) 891 and law of 23 April 2003, published in Moniteur Belge, 7 May 
2003, at 24846-24853. Available online at www.moniteur.be 
366 Steven Ratner (Postmortem) (supra) 891 
367 Steven Ratner (Postmortem) (supra) 891 
368 Steven Ratner (Postmortem) (supra) 891 and law of 5 August 2003, published in Moniteur Belge, 7 
August 2003, at 40506-40515, Articles 13-16. Online at www.moniteur.be 
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3.2.3 The Spanish example 
 
Spain had similarly wide ranging legislation
369
 that established jurisdiction over acts 
committed abroad by Spaniards and foreigners for genocide; terrorism; sea or air 
piracy; counterfeiting; offences in connection with prostitution and corruption of 
minors and incompetents; drug trafficking or any other offence that Spain is obliged 
to prosecute under an international treaty or convention.
370
 ‘All the listed offences are 
the subject of an international convention but in the case of genocide, terrorism, and 
offences in connection with prostitution, the Spanish legislature…has gone further 
than is required by the terms of the relevant convention. LOPJ article 23.4 does not 
expressly require the presence of the foreign offender for the initiation of 
proceedings.’371 Like in Belgium the investigation of extraterritorial offences is the 
responsibility of a central examining magistrate who can be seized by the public 
prosecutor, the victim or by any private citizen or organization exercising the acción 
popular.
372
 Despite this wide jurisdiction provided for, the Spanish High Court 
(Tribunal Supremo) in the Guatemalan Generals
373
 case placed a restrictive 
interpretation on universality. It found that universal jurisdiction may only be 
exercised as a subsidiary principle, namely if another relevant State fails to act upon 
an offence and could not operate where ‘no point of connection exists between 
national interests.’ The requirement was thus for a link between the foreign offence 
and Spain. The Court in deciding if it should intervene in Guatemala by prosecuting 
certain offences found that ‘basing such a decision on either real or apparent inactivity 
on the part of the courts of another sovereign State implies judgment by one sovereign 
State on the judicial capacity of similar judicial bodies in another sovereign State.’374 
                                                        
369 Because of this act Spanish Tribunals have had to deal with cases involving allegations of international 
crimes committed in Afghanistan, Argentina, Austria, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Equatorial Guinea, El 
Salvador, Gaza, Germany, Guatemala, Iraq, Israel, Mexico, Morocco, Myanmar, Pakistan, Peru, Rwanda, 
Spain, Tibet, Venezuela, Western Sahara and international waters close to Israel, Kenya and Somalia. – See 
Enrique C Rojo ‘National Legislation Providing for the Prosecution and Punishment of International Crimes 
in Spain’ 9 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2011) 709 
370 Luc Reydams (Universal jurisdiction) (supra) 183 ‘The scope of Spanish criminal law follows from the 
jurisdiction of the courts as spelled out in Book I, Title I (‘De la extension y limites de la jurisdicción) of the 
1985 Organic Law of the Judicial Power (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judical, or LOPJ)’ in force since I July 1985, 
see LOPJ article 23.4 
371 Luc Reydams (Universal jurisdiction) (supra) 184 
372 Luc Reydams (Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) 184 
373 This case involved acts of Genocide committed between 1981 and 1983 against Mayan people by the 
State of Guatemala under the leadership of General Ríos Montt 
374 Incidentally Ríos Montt has since ceased to hold public office in Guatemala and has been prosecuted and 
after conviction in a lower court the Constitutional Court threw out the charges, as there were problems 
between Judges before a certain date. The matter is however still pending and active and is set to continue 
in 2015; ‘Guatemala Ríos Montt genocide trial to resume in 2015’ BBC News (2013/11/06) available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-24833642 (accessed  2014/02/06)  
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The Supreme Court further found that ‘today there is significant support in doctrine 
for the idea that no State may unilaterally establish order through criminal law, 
against everyone and the entire world.’375 The Spanish Constitutional Court differed 
and interpreted Article 23(4) as providing for universal jurisdiction over a range of 
international crimes, including war crimes, to protect the interests that ‘affect the 
international community as a whole.’376 Matthew Garrod however points out that the 
Spanish Constitutional Court’s interpretation of universal jurisdiction was really 
based on the protective principle, ‘given that the relevant case involved crimes against 
Spanish civilians and an attack against a Spanish embassy and its employees and a 
Spanish ambassador.’ 377  Spanish law 378  however backtracked and subsequently 
codified the interpretation given by the Supreme Court so that it is now required that 
Spaniards be the victims, the suspect be in Spain or there be a link of relevant 
connection with Spain before extra-territorial jurisdiction for international crimes 
committed abroad may be exercised.
379
 
 
Luc Reydams calls headline-making NGO–driven cases against senior officials, 
including, Fidel Castro, Yerodia Ndombasi, George Bush Snr, Ariel Sharon, Amos 
Yaron and others ‘virtual’ cases. This is because, he says, ‘with the exception of 
Pinochet, they produced little more than headlines and diplomatic headaches as well 
as fame for a Spanish Judge.’380 This famous Spanish Judge is examining magistrate 
Baltazar Garzón, responsible for the initiation of the Pinochet case and who has since 
become rather infamous after being acquitted in Spain of charges of abuse of power
381
 
but convicted of wire-tapping.
382
 Yee argues that Spain dismantled its own strong 
                                                        
375 Guatemalan Generals case, S.T.C. No. 327/2003 Judgment of 25 February 2003, available online at 
www.derechos.org/nizkor/guatemala/doc/gtmsent.html and also see, for a brief discussion, Antonio 
Cassese (Is the Bell Tolling for Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) 590 
376 Guatemalan Generals case, No.237/2005 Judgment of 26 September 2005  
377 Matthew Garrod (The Protective Principle) (supra) 814 
378 Organic Law 1/2009 of 3 November 2009 
379 See Matthew Garrod (The Protective Principle) (supra) 814 and also Enrique Rojo (Prosecution and 
Punishment of International Crimes in Spain) (supra) 710 ‘While these approaches were overruled by the 
Spanish Constitutional Tribunal in 2005 and 2007, the re-establishment of 'absolute universal jurisdiction' 
in Spain was short-lived. Eventually, the economic and diplomatic impact of the extraterritorial 
investigation, prosecution and adjudication of international crimes led to a limitation in the universal 
jurisdiction of Spanish courts.’ 
380 Luc Reydams (Rise and Fall) (supra) 347 
381 Fiona Govan ‘Spanish Judge Baltasar Garzon acquitted in Franco-era crime probe’ The Telegraph 
(2012/02/27) available at www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/spain/9108427/Spanish-
judge-Baltasar-Garzon-acquitted-in-Franco-era-crime-probe.html ‘But the verdict of not guilty, passed by 6-
1 on the seven judge panel, appeared to be based on a technicality of the law – that the judge had committed 
an error when he opened the investigation but that it did not constitute a crime.’ (accessed 2014/02/06) 
382 ‘Spanish Judge Baltasar Garzón found guilty in wiretapping case’ The Guardian (2012/02/09) available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/feb/09/baltasar-garzon-guilty-wiretapping-spain ‘The Spanish 
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universal jurisdiction authorization because Judge Garzón had begun to dig into 
Spain’s old dirty laundry stemming from the Spanish Civil War.383  
 
Essays, like the one by A. Hays Butler in the book by Macedo called ‘Universal 
Jurisdiction’ hails the legislative reforms in countries like Belgium and Spain to show 
support for universal jurisdiction. But it was not long after the implementation of this 
legislation, and the publication of the book, that these same countries drastically 
narrowed the scope of their legislation. This must cause one to seriously question the 
hype surrounding universal jurisdiction and whether it is really the solution to 
problems in international criminal law that it professes to be.
384
 Reydams after his 
national case studies, on universal jurisdiction over war crimes, concludes that: 
 
‘All in all some two dozen individuals have been tried by courts in Austria, Canada, Germany, 
Denmark, Belgium, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Finland, France, Spain, and 
Switzerland for “war crimes” committed abroad. Without exception the defendants had taken 
up permanent residence in the forum state – as refugee, exile, fugitive, or immigrant – and 
resisted being ‘sent back to the countries in which their abominable deeds were done’. In most 
cases the other states concerned acquiesced in or even supported prosecution. Not to overlook 
also is the fact that the majority of these cases concerned atrocities committed in the former 
Yugoslavia and in Rwanda; the prosecutor of the ad hoc international criminal tribunals for 
these countries and the UN Security Council had encouraged all states to search for and try 
suspects on their territory (cf. the obligations under the Geneva Conventions). Finally, 
extradition often was impossible, if not legally then practically.’385 
 
We may now turn to the position in South Africa and the approach followed here. 
    
 
3.2.4 South Africa’s Geneva Conventions Act386 
 
Despite the benefit of the two examples discussed above, South Africa has 
implemented a similarly wide form of universal jurisdiction in its Geneva 
                                                                                                                                                              
judge celebrated for pursuing international human rights cases was convicted of overstepping his 
jurisdiction in a domestic corruption investigation on Thursday, the culmination of a spectacular fall from 
grace… Garzón enjoyed rock-star status among human rights groups but had made a lot of enemies at home, 
in particular among judicial colleagues uncomfortable with his celebrity.’ (accessed 2014/02/06) 
383 Sienho Yee (Concept, Logic and Reality) (supra) 511 
384 A Hays Butler ‘The Growing Support for Universal Jurisdiction’ in Stephen Macedo (Universal Jurisdiction) 
(supra) 69-73 
385 Luc Reydams (Rise and Fall) (supra) 22 
386 The Implementation of the Geneva Conventions Act 8 of 2012 (24 July 2012) 
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Conventions Act. Article 7 of the Geneva Conventions Act deals with jurisdiction and 
section 1 reads as follows: ‘Any court in the Republic may try a person for any 
offence under this Act in the same manner as if the offence had been committed in the 
area of jurisdiction of that court, notwithstanding that the act or omission to which the 
charge relates was committed outside the Republic.’ Section 4 reads that ‘Nothing in 
this Act must be construed as precluding the prosecution of any person accused of 
having committed a breach under customary international law before this Act took 
effect.’ This Act does not require the presence of a suspect and introduces ‘for the 
first time in South Africa, the principle of unlimited universal jurisdiction.’387 The Act 
ends by stating that ‘the provisions of this Act must not be construed as limiting, 
amending, repealing or otherwise altering any provision of the Implementation of the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act, 2002 (Act 27 of 2002), or as 
exempting any person from any duty or obligation imposed by that Act or prohibiting 
any person from complying with any provision of that Act.’ As discussed above388 
South Africa’s Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court Act provides South Africa with universal jurisdiction over acts of genocide, war 
crimes, and crimes against humanity. But in terms of Section 4(3) of the ICC Act only 
if ‘that person, after the commission of the crime, is present in the territory of the 
Republic’. It is thus clear that the Geneva Conventions Act goes further even than the 
ICC Act in its purported “obligation” for South Africa to exercise universal 
jurisdiction. It is submitted that this is a serious mistake and calls for urgent 
reassessment. Considering the large amount of cases and complainants that flooded 
the systems in Belgium and Spain we might well have cause for concern. The system 
in South Africa does not provide for plaintiff complainants to approach an 
investigating magistrate in order to launch investigations. The decision rests with 
special units in the South African Police Services and the National Prosecuting 
Authority. Their decision not to investigate is however not the end of the matter. The 
complainants may approach a Court to review their decisions. This immediately turns 
into a full-scale intricate trial that might very well go all the way to appeal and even 
the Constitutional Court. The SALC case is an example. The problem is obvious. The 
Geneva Conventions Act requires investigation into grave breaches irrespective of 
                                                        
387 ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross ‘South Africa: law against war crimes adopted’ ICRC 
Website available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/news-release/2012/south-africa-
news-2 (accessed 2014/01/23) 
388 Paragraph 2.1.5 (supra) 
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where or by whom they were committed. It is submitted that even acts committed 
before the Act came into being might come to be considered because of the provisions 
of Section 7(4) that provides for breaches under customary international law to be 
investigated. The vast scope of potential requests for investigations created by the Act 
is staggering.  The SAPS or the NPA may have very good reasons for not launching 
such investigations. Experience shows however that complainants and particularly 
activists are not so easily dissuaded. Inevitably this burdens an already 
overburdened
389
 criminal justice system. A more serious problem is that prosecutors 
are by definition called to enforce the law, and to enforce it on a principled basis. 
What the Act however asks of them might simply not be within their ability to enforce 
consistently or at all.
390
 It is submitted that this is not a good thing and that the wide 
jurisdiction in the Act goes too far and creates more problems than it solves. It is 
further submitted that it is based on a deep misunderstanding of universal jurisdiction 
over war crimes. In the next Chapter we will discuss South Africa’s duties as far as 
exercising jurisdiction with regards to the International Criminal Court are concerned. 
We will then make certain recommendations for a viable way forward that will limit 
jurisdiction without detracting from (and probably even enhancing) South Africa’s 
duty to fulfill its international obligations. 
 
3.2.5 Concluding remarks 
 
In summary it may be stated the main reason universality is mentioned in the Geneva 
Conventions in 1949 when it was omitted in the Genocide Convention in 1948 seems 
to be that in question in the Geneva Conventions, were recent war crimes committed 
by a common enemy against many of the States Party to the Geneva Conventions. 
The war crimes were committed against them. A constitutive element of a grave 
breach is that there is a diversity of nationality between the offender and the victim.
391
 
                                                        
389 A leading author calls it ‘dysfunctional’ – See Chris R Snyman ‘Criminal Law’ (5th ed.) (2008) Lexis Nexis, 
Interpak Books Pietermaritzburg 21-29 ‘The South African criminal justice system, with the best will in the 
world, cannot be described as other than dysfunctional.’ 
390 See for just one example of many the way Jann Kleffner phrases the ‘problem’ of prosecutorial discretion 
in his book under the heading of ‘Obstacles during Criminal Proceedings’ in Jann, K Kleffner 
‘Complementarity in the Rome Statute and National Criminal Jurisdictions’ (2008) Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 50 ‘Another obstacle hampering domestic criminal proceedings emanates from the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion. All criminal justice systems establish various degrees of such discretion, which 
allows national authorities to decline to conduct or to discontinue proceedings on a number of grounds. 
Prosecutorial discretion can be (ab)used in order to abstain from bringing charges or to enforce the 
prohibitions of the core crimes selectively.’ 
391 Luc Reydams (Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) 56 
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Nations wanted to cooperate with each other to create an effective system to ensure 
the punishment of enemy war criminals that had harmed them. This is a far cry from 
jointly deciding that war criminals are particularly heinous offenders and that all 
States would henceforth be agents of the international community to ensure that war 
criminals are punished.
392
 Genocide, on the other hand, as we have said, nearly 
always presupposes State sanction and is committed against a State’s own nationals. 
States simply were not willing to allow other States to exercise jurisdiction over them 
and become involved in their internal affairs and this position remains largely the 
same today.
393
  
 
3.3 The Torture Convention
394
 
 
The Torture Convention outlaws the intentional infliction of severe pain and suffering 
‘by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or 
other person acting in an official capacity.’395 Because no international element is 
required the Convention in effect protects the right of citizens to be free from torture 
by their own officials.
396
 ‘From a sovereignty perspective the situation differs totally 
from piracy and ‘law and order’ conventions. Nonetheless, the UN Torture 
Convention copies with minor differences the aut dedere aut judicare formula as it 
                                                        
392 The failed attempts of Belgium and Spain in this regard prove this argument and the original intent of the 
drafters of the Geneva Conventions; See also M. Cherif Bassiouni (History of Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) 
51 ‘Customary international law as reflected by the practice of states does not, in the judgment of this 
writer, mean that universal jurisdiction has been applied in national prosecutions. There are a few cases 
that are relied upon by some scholars to assert the opposite, but such cases are so few and far between that 
it would be incorrect to conclude that they constitute customary law practice the recognition of universal 
jurisdiction for war crimes is essentially driven by academics and experts’ writings. These confuse the 
universal reach of war crimes with the universality of jurisdiction over such crimes.’   
393 Luc Reydams (Rise and Fall) (supra) 17 says it well: ‘two important post-Nuremberg instruments 
[meaning the Genocide and Geneva Conventions] shows that states were far less enthusiastic than scholars 
about universal jurisdiction over “human rights offences”.’ brackets inserted my own; See also M. Cherif 
Bassiouni (History of Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) 40 ‘[W]hile universal jurisdiction is attaining an 
important place in international law, it is not as well established in conventional and customary 
international law as its ardent proponents, including major human rights organizations, profess it to be. 
These organizations have listed countries, which they claim rely on universal jurisdiction; in fact, the legal 
provisions they cite do not stand for that proposition, or at least not as unequivocally as represented.’ 
394 The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment New 
York, 10 December 1984; 1465 UNTS 85. My comments are based on Manfred Nowak and Elizabeth 
McArthur’s Oxford Commentaries on International Law, The United Nations Convention Against Torture: A 
Commentary (2008); J. Herman Burgers and Hans Danelius The United Nations Convention against Torture: 
A Handbook on the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of 
Punishment (1998) and Luc Reydams (Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) 64-68 
395 See Article 1 
396 Luc Reydams (Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) 65 
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appeared in The Hague Hijacking Convention.’397 The relevant provisions read as 
follows: 
 
Article 5 [Obligation to establish jurisdiction] 
 
1. Each State Party shall take such measure as may be necessary to establish its 
jurisdiction over the offences referred to in Art. 4 in the following cases: 
1. When the offences are committed in any territory under its jurisdiction or 
on board a ship or aircraft registered in that State; 
2. When the alleged offender is a national of that State; 
3. When the victim is a national of that State if that State considers it 
appropriate. 
2. Each State Party shall likewise take such measures as may be necessary to 
establish its jurisdiction over such offences in cases where that alleged 
offender is present in any territory under its jurisdiction and it does not 
extradite him pursuant to Art. 8 to any of the States mentioned in Paragraph 1 
of this Article. 
3. This Convention does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in 
accordance with internal law. 
 
Article 7 [Obligation to extradite or prosecute] 
 
1. The State Party in territory under whose jurisdiction a person alleged to have 
committed any offence referred to in Art. 4 is found, shall in cases 
contemplated in Art. 5, if it does not extradite him, submit the case to its 
competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution. 
2. These authorities shall take their decision in the same manner as in the case of 
any ordinary offence of a serious nature under the law of that State. In the 
cases referred to in Art. 5, paragraph 2, the standards of evidence required for 
prosecution and conviction shall in no way be less stringent than those which 
apply in the cases referred to in Art. 5, paragraph 1. 
3. Any person regarding whom proceedings are brought in connection with any 
of the offences referred to in Art.4 shall be guaranteed at all stages of the 
proceedings. 
 
Article 8 [Extradition] 
 
1. The offences referred to in Art. F shall be deemed to be included as 
extraditable offences in any extradition treaty existing between States Parties. 
States Parties undertake to include such offences as extraditable offences in 
every extradition treaty to be concluded between them. 
2. If a State Party which makes extradition conditional on the existence of a 
treaty receives a request for extradition from another State Party with which it 
has no extradition treaty, it may consider this Convention as the legal basis for 
extradition in respect of such offences. Extradition shall be subject to the other 
condition provided by the law of the requested State. 
3. States Parties which do not make extradition conditional on the existence of a 
treaty shall recognize such offences as extraditable offences between 
                                                        
397 Luc Reydams (Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) 65 
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themselves subject to the conditions provided by the law of the requested 
State. 
4. Such offences shall be treated, for the purpose of extradition between States 
Parties, as if they had been committed not only in the place in which they 
occurred but also in the territories of the States required to establish their 
jurisdiction in accordance with Art. 5, paragraph 1.     
 
 
These provisions constitute ‘a cornerstone of the Convention’. 398  Nowak and 
McArthur, in their comprehensive commentary, describe the Torture Convention, 
with the exception of the Apartheid Convention, as the ‘first human rights treaty 
incorporating the principle of universal jurisdiction as an international obligation of 
all States parties without any precondition other than the presence of the alleged 
torturer’.399 They contrast the provision on jurisdiction with that of the Genocide 
Convention, which does not explicitly authorize or oblige States to exercise universal 
jurisdiction.
400
 They point out that universal jurisdiction gradually developed in the 
context of international humanitarian law over ‘truly international crimes’ like piracy, 
hijacking, hostage taking and similar terrorist crimes.
401
 But they point out that these 
treaties differ from human rights treaties (including the Torture and Genocide 
Conventions) because ‘the perpetrators of terrorist crimes usually are non-nationals 
and combating terrorism is clearly in the national security interests of States. Torture, 
on the other hand, is according to its definition in Article 1 primarily committed by 
State officials, and the respective governments usually have no interest in bringing 
their own officials to justice’.402  This is so markedly different from the position 
States had taken before and currently take in practice that Luc Reydams concludes 
that it must have been an ‘accident’.403 As with grave breaches the dirge of the writers 
is repeated in the case of torture. ‘In practice, States parties are extremely reluctant to 
exercise universal jurisdiction in torture cases’.404 Perhaps Reydams is right and it 
was simply an accident? It would benefit us to see exactly what transpired during the 
drafting process. 
 
                                                        
398JH Burgers & H Danelius (Handbook on the Convention against Torture) (supra) 131 
399 Manfred Nowak and Elizabeth McArthur (Torture Commentary) (supra) 316 
400 Manfred Nowak and Elizabeth McArthur (Torture Commentary) (supra) 316 
401 Manfred Nowak and Elizabeth McArthur (Torture Commentary) (supra) 316 
402 Manfred Nowak and Elizabeth McArthur (Torture Commentary) (supra) 316 
403 Luc Reydams  (Rise and Fall) (supra) 344 
404 Manfred Nowak and Elizabeth McArthur (Torture Commentary) (supra) 256 Emphasis original 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 105 
Sweden proposed the insertion of an aut dedere aut judicare formula.
405
 Severe 
opposition came, unsurprisingly, from Argentina and Uruguay who were under 
military dictatorship at the time and systematically practiced torture.
406
 These two 
countries eventually found themselves isolated in their stance and eventually even 
Argentina lent its support to universal jurisdiction as it was by then under a new 
government.
407
 The United Kingdom however argued that ‘such exceptionally wide 
extraterritorial jurisdiction in respect of torture, which was different to piracy, 
hijacking of aircrafts and similar offences with a more obvious international character 
went beyond what is practicable’.408 France with the support of the Netherlands and 
other countries wanted the entire paragraph 5(2) deleted.
409
 The USSR was also 
skeptic ‘notwithstanding the fact that they had already agreed on universal jurisdiction 
in another human rights convention, namely Article V of the Apartheid Convention of 
1973’. 410  Nowak and McArthur note that there were such strong objections to 
universal jurisdiction from countries in all regions of the world that it ‘seems almost a 
miracle’ that universal jurisdiction was accepted.411 
 
What drove the acceptance of universal jurisdiction over torture in this instance was 
the strong US support of it. This was ‘remarkable in view of the opposition of the US 
Government to the inclusion of universal jurisdiction in the Genocide Convention’.412 
Reydams comments that it also astonishing in the ‘light of allegations of torture 
against the United States in the prosecution of its war on terror after 11 September 
2001’. 413  What then happened in-between 1948 and 1984? During the drafting 
process the US remarked that ‘torture is an offence of special international concern 
which means that it should have a broad jurisdictional basis in the same way as the 
international community had agreed upon in earlier conventions against hijacking, 
sabotage and the protection of diplomats’.414  The US delegation even considered 
‘torture, like piracy, as an offence against the law of nations, for which the exception 
of universal jurisdiction was appropriate’.415 In reply to an objection by Argentina the 
                                                        
405 JH Burgers & H Danelius (Handbook on the Convention against Torture) (supra) 57-58 
406 JH Burgers & H Danelius (Handbook on the Convention against Torture) (supra) 78 
407 Manfred Nowak and Elizabeth McArthur (Torture Commentary) (supra) 315 
408 Manfred Nowak and Elizabeth McArthur (Torture Commentary) (supra) 314 & 262 
409 Manfred Nowak and Elizabeth McArthur (Torture Commentary) (supra) 314 
410 Manfred Nowak and Elizabeth McArthur (Torture Commentary) (supra) 314 
411 Manfred Nowak and Elizabeth McArthur (Torture Commentary) (supra) 314 
412 Manfred Nowak and Elizabeth McArthur (Torture Commentary) (supra) 314 
413 Luc Reydams (Rise and Fall) (supra) 344 
414 Manfred Nowak and Elizabeth McArthur (Torture Commentary) (supra) 314 
415 Manfred Nowak and Elizabeth McArthur (Torture Commentary) (supra) 314 
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US delegate stated that; ‘such jurisdiction was intended primarily to deal with 
situations where torture is a State policy and, therefore, the State in question does not, 
by definition, prosecute its officials for torture. For the international community to 
leave enforcement of the convention to such a State would be essentially a formula 
for doing nothing. Therefore in such cases universal jurisdiction would be the most 
effective weapon against torture which could be brought to bear. It could be utilized 
against official torturers who travel to other States, a situation that was not at all 
hypothetical. It could also be used against torturers fleeing from a change in 
government in their States if, for legal or other reasons, extradition was not 
possible’.416 
 
It is interesting to note that the US delegate even likened torture to piracy in its zeal to 
implement universal jurisdiction in the Torture Convention. This analogy was not 
mentioned during the drafting of the Genocide or Geneva Conventions. Nobody else 
mentioned it during the drafting of the Torture Convention. The UK, as we have seen, 
was at pains to point out the fundamental difference between torture and piracy. Yet 
the US delegate argued for torture to have a broad jurisdictional basis because it was a 
crime of special international concern. This thesis has attempted to show how 
mistaken these views of the American delegate in this matter was. It seems so out of 
place, and sounds so very similar to current NGO-created and driven rhetorical 
arguments in favor of universal jurisdiction, that one wonders where the influence 
came from. The fact that the US was opposed to universal jurisdiction in the years 
before the Torture Convention and again in the years after it forces one to wonder 
whether this was not just simply a fluke? Nowak and McArthur suggest that it was the 
US President of the time, Jimmy Carter, a supporter of universal jurisdiction, who 
was responsible for this drastic change in foreign policy.
417
 Jimmy Carter only served 
one term as President of the US and is well known for his human rights activism. He 
is also still vocal about his opposition to torture.
418
 It is submitted that his stance on 
the matter was the exception and not the rule and had a massive influence on the 
jurisdiction clause in the Torture Convention. And that this explains why the Torture 
                                                        
416 JH Burgers & H Danelius (Handbook on the Convention against Torture) (supra) 78-79 
417 Manfred Nowak and Elizabeth McArthur (Torture Commentary) (supra) 316 
418 See Jimmy Carter available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jimmy_Carter (accessed 2014/02/13) ‘In a 
2008 interview with Amnesty International, Carter criticized the alleged use of torture at Guantanamo Bay, 
saying that it contravenes the basic principles in which this nation was founded. He stated that the next 
President should publicly apologize upon his inauguration, and state that the United States will never again 
torture prisoners.’ 
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Convention differs so markedly from other human rights conventions as far as its 
jurisdictional provisions go.  
 
It is also not hard to imagine that once the US had put its weight behind a proposal for 
implementing universal jurisdiction over torture, using high moral sounding 
arguments, it would be nigh impossible for a State like the UK, or others for that 
matter, to maintain its opposition to it. Even if the UK’s intention were simply not to 
widen their jurisdiction, as they said, beyond what was practicable, the perception 
created would forever be that they care less about, and in reality, condone torture. It 
seems further to have been a case of ‘someone else’s problem’ because the focus at 
the time was on Argentina and Uruguay. It was easy to single them out, as the 
American delegate did, and thus harder to consider whether the situation might 
boomerang on them one day, as it recently has.  
 
Reydams emphasizes this selectivity by countries when it comes to implementing 
universal jurisdiction by reference to the Apartheid Convention.
419
 It was mainly the 
Soviet Union that had proposed a convention to deal with the suppression and 
punishment of apartheid.
420
 The Convention provides for universal jurisdiction in 
Article 5.
421
 Reydams points out that universal jurisdiction was acceptable for a 
majority over apartheid but not for genocide because, among other reasons, it was 
aimed only at the white minority regimes of South Africa, Namibia and Rhodesia. 
There was therefore little reason for States Parties to fear reciprocity.
422
 Reydams 
considers it telling that none of the countries now at the forefront of universal 
jurisdiction signed the Apartheid Convention or even ratified it and they, among other 
things, took issue with the jurisdiction clause contained therein.
423
 Nowak and 
McArthur also provide another reason for the change in attitude of States Parties to 
the Torture Convention being the fact that the prospects for an International Criminal 
Court to be established in the near future seemed much smaller in the 1980’s than in 
                                                        
419 International Convention for the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, New York, 30 
November 1973; 1015 UNTS 243. 
420 Luc Reydams (Rise and Fall) (supra) 343 
421 ‘Persons charged with the acts enumerated in Article II of the present Convention may be tried by a 
competent tribunal of any State Party to the Convention which may acquire jurisdiction over the person of 
the accused or by an international penal tribunal having jurisdiction with respect to those States Parties 
which shall have accepted its jurisdiction.’  
422 Luc Reydams (Rise and Fall) (supra) 343 
423 Luc Reydams (Rise and Fall) (supra) 343-344 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 108 
1948 when the Genocide Convention was adopted. ‘In the absence of an International 
Criminal Court, universal jurisdiction appeared the second best option.’424  
 
The jurisdictional provisions over torture seem truly to have been an exception. It 
must be quite an embarrassing exception for the US given their current stance on the 
matter.
 425
 It would however at present probably take more than intense lobbying to 
get the US to honor the universal jurisdiction they brought about in the Torture 
Convention. The point is not that torture should ever be allowed, it is evil and of 
course it should not, but that States are not thrilled by the thought of policing all the 
worlds’ torturers. They are even less thrilled about being policed by other States 
accusing them of torture. This explains why States ‘are extremely reluctant to 
exercise universal jurisdiction in torture cases’. The Torture Convention did not and 
cannot change this fact no matter how innovative or revolutionary it is often 
proclaimed to be. It was a rare exception. It would therefore be totally wrong to use 
this Convention to argue that other human rights conventions should be similarly 
interpreted as encouraging universal jurisdiction because such an approach reflects 
the true intention, and a growing support, of most States. 
 
It is submitted that this is also why Reydams argues that the extradite or try principle 
has been incorporated into the Torture and Geneva Conventions but not the more 
‘radical’ view that any State may request arrest and extradition in cases involving 
serious crimes under international law. This position was also confirmed by the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). In Prosecutor v 
Furundzija where the prohibition against torture was held to have acquired the status 
of jus cogens and that this meant, amongst other things, that ‘every State is entitled to 
investigate, prosecute and punish or extradite individuals accused of torture, who are 
present in a territory under its jurisdiction’ (emphasis added).426 One must agree with 
Reydams that ‘[h]uman rights and ‘law and order’ treaties alike require a meaningful 
link for the exercise of jurisdiction.’427 
                                                        
424 Manfred Nowak and Elizabeth McArthur (Torture Commentary) (supra) 316 
425 William A Schabas (Introduction to the ICC) (supra) 186 ‘In 2004, the United States found itself 
dreadfully embarrassed by reports of torture carried out in its prisons in Iraq and its base in Guantanamo 
Bay, Cuba.’  
426 Prosecutor v Furundzija (IT-95-17/1-T) 10 December 1998, paragraphs 153 and 156. The decision has 
been reprinted in 38 ILM (1999) 317.  
427 Luc Reydams (The Rise and Fall) in William Schabas and Nadia Bernaz  Routledge Handbook of 
International Criminal Law 345 
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But even in the absence of universal jurisdiction in absentia, the Torture Convention 
still leaves States with more than enough work to do in combatting torture. Article 
5(2) constrains States Parties to establish their jurisdiction over a suspected torturer 
when he is present in any territory under its jurisdiction and where it does not 
extradite him. We will therefore now consider, as example, how the UK has sought to 
exercise this duty. We start with a brief discussion of the famous Pinochet case 
because it dealt with torture and because it is so often referred in relation to universal 
jurisdiction. After this we will look at the more recent Zardad Case. We then consider 
the position in Senegal and an interesting decision of the International Court of Justice 
in this regard. 
 
3.3.1 Pinochet
428
 
 
These cases arose in the context of extradition proceedings in the UK upon a request 
from Spain. Pinochet was the well known as the leader of the Chilean junta that 
overthrew Salvatore Allende on 11 September 1973 and then became President of 
Chile until 1990. Pinochet remained head of the armed forces after 1990 and was 
made a senator for life in 1998 and so remained active in the political and legislative 
life of Chile. In 1998 Pinochet travelled to the UK for medical treatment. News of his 
presence led to a Spanish arrest warrant, issued by Judge Baltasar Garzón, which was 
circulated in the UK. The warrant related to charges of hostage taking, torture and 
genocide committed during an operation of repression aimed against opponents of the 
Pinochet regime where loss of life exceeded 3000 people. Judge Garzón had declared 
himself competent to examine the charges regardless of the nationality of the victims. 
The chief public prosecutor appealed this decision to the Audienca Nacional whose 
panel of eleven judges upheld universal jurisdiction.
429
 The Audienca also stated that 
‘Spain has jurisdiction to hear the facts, derived from the principle of universal 
prosecution of certain offences-categorized in international law-which has been 
incorporated into our domestic law. Moreover, Spain has a legitimate interest in the 
                                                        
428 R v. Bow Street Stipendiary Magistrate ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (Amnesty International and Others 
Intervening) [1999] 4 All ER 897; R v. Bow Street Stipendiary Magistrate (Bartle) ex parte Pinochet Ugarte 
(Amnesty International and Others Intervening) (No.2) [1999] 1 All ER 577; R v. Bow Street Stipendiary 
Magistrate (Bartle) ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (Amnesty International and Others Intervening) (No.3) [1999] 2;  
All ER 97, UK House of Lords, applying the law of England and Wales, and international law. The decisions 
are reproduced in 38 ILM (1998) 1302; 38 ILM (1999) 430; and 38 ILM (1999) 581. For an excellent 
summary of the case see Robert Cryer ‘Pinochet’ in (Cassese, The Oxford Companion) (supra) 872-875 
429 Luc Reydams (Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) 185 
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exercise of jurisdiction, as more than fifty Spaniards were killed or disappeared in 
Chile, victims of the repression denounced in the record.’430 All the victims were 
originally Spanish. It was only later when non-Spanish citizens were added that that 
the issue moved onto the terrain of universal jurisdiction.
431
  
 
In the UK Magistrate Ronald Bartle issued an arrest warrant. Pinochet was arrested 
and this led to this matter eventually being appealed to the House of Lords. This was a 
highly complex case that only ended after the third decision by the House of Lords. 
The General claimed immunity from arrest and extradition proceedings as a former 
head of State in respect of acts committed when he was head of State. Second, he 
argued that the warrants disclosed no ‘extradition crimes’ as required by the 
Extradition Act 1989 and the relevant international agreement, the European 
Convention on Extradition.
432
  The majority of Lords found against Pinochet and 
agreed upon his extradition to Spain for torture. A week after the judgment it was 
determined by a team of Doctors that General Pinochet was too ill to be extradited 
and he was subsequently returned to Chile and a warm welcome from his many 
supporters.
433
  The main question in the case was whether Pinochet, who was no 
longer head of State (and no longer had personal immunity), still retained material 
immunity for the crimes contained in the warrant. Could torture be considered 
‘official’ for the purposes of immunity before foreign domestic courts and the 
determination of this issue formed the substance of the Court’s decision?434  The 
determination of this issue is not the theme of this study, but various Lords 
commented in passing on universal jurisdiction. We will therefore consider some of 
these comments and what may be learnt from them as far as universal jurisdiction 
over torture is concerned. Lord Browne-Wilkinson, speaking for the majority, stated 
that ‘the jus cogens nature of the international crime of torture justifies States in 
taking universal jurisdiction over torture wherever committed. International law 
provides that offences jus cogens may be punished by any State because the offenders 
are “common enemies of all mankind and all nations have an equal interest in their 
apprehension and prosecution.”’435 The quote was from the Demjanjuk case.436 The 
                                                        
430 Quoted in Luc Reydams (Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) 186 
431 Luc Reydams (Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) 185 
432 Paris, 13 December 1957; ETS No 24; and Luc Reydams (Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) 207 
433 Manfred Nowak and Elizabeth McArthur (Torture Commentary) (supra) 294 
434 Robert Cryer ‘Pinochet’ in (Cassese, The Oxford Companion) (supra) 875 
435 R v. Bow Street Stipendiary Magistrate (Bartle) ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (Amnesty International and 
Others Intervening) (No.3) [1999] at 38 ILM (1999) (supra) at 589 
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only other authority for this view was, predictably, the case of Eichmann. On the 
other end of the spectrum was the dissenting opinion by Lord Slynn. Although he 
recognized that there had been developments in relation to international crimes, he 
found that ‘at this stage of the development of international law…it does not seem to 
me that it has been shown that there is any state practice or general consensus let 
alone a widely supported convention that all crimes against international law should 
be justiciable in national courts on the basis of the universality of jurisdiction.’437 
Apart from these obiter references to universal jurisdiction it is held by authoritative 
commentators that many of the Law Lords had incorrectly analyzed the universal 
jurisdiction provisions of the Torture Convention.
438
 As Reydams points out the 
Convention provides for the jurisdiction of the territorial State, the State of nationality 
of the offender, the State of nationality of the victim and as a last resort the custodial 
State.
439
 Reydams argues that jurisdiction is universal in terms of the Torture 
Convention as far as any custodial State may prosecute a suspect, but that there can be 
only one custodial State.
440
 Reydams argues that because Pinochet was in London 
only the UK could base its jurisdiction on article 5(2) and that Spain’s claim was 
therefore ultra vires under the Torture Convention.
441
 The UK was therefore entitled 
to accede to the extradition request but Spain could not legally enforce Pinochet’s 
extradition under the Convention.
442
 This view, it is submitted, is correct and best 
corresponds to the intention of State Parties to the Convention and to current State 
practice on the issue. Lastly it is also interesting to note that Lord Slynn in his 
dissenting opinion mentions that Spain had a ‘legitimate interest in the exercise of 
such jurisdiction’ because more than 50 Spanish nationals had been among the 
victims 
443
 Garrod refers to this as an example of States proclaiming an ‘all-
encompassing and expansive right’ of universal jurisdiction when there is actually a 
                                                                                                                                                              
436 Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F. 2d 571 (6th Cir. 1985) (supra) 
437 R v. Bow Street Stipendiary Magistrate ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (Amnesty International and Others 
Intervening) [1999] 4 All ER 897 available at 38 ILM (1998) (supra) at 1312 
438 Manfred Nowak and Elizabeth McArthur (Torture Commentary) (supra) 294; Luc Reydams (Universal 
Jurisdiction) (supra) 209; MC Bassiouni (Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes) (supra) 83 ‘there is 
a misconception that the Pinochet case was predicated on universal jurisdiction, when, in fact, the decision 
of the House of Lords was based upon the construction of English Law and the torture Convention, which 
the United Kingdom had ratified.’ 
439 Luc Reydams (Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) 209 
440 Luc Reydams (Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) 209 
441 Luc Reydams (Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) 209 
442 Luc Reydams (Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) 209 
443 R v. Bow Street Stipendiary Magistrate ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (Amnesty International and Others 
Intervening) [1999] 4 All ER 897 available at 38 ILM (1998) (supra) at 1305 
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strong link with the prosecuting State.
444
 We can learn from Pinochet how the UK 
seeks to exercise its extradition obligations under the Torture Convention but we 
don’t find it to support universal jurisdiction.445 
 
3.3.2 The Zardad Case
446
 
 
On 18 July 2005, Faryadi Sarwar Zardad, an Afghan National, living in Britain as an 
asylum seeker, was convicted in the London Central Criminal Court (Old Bailey) for 
conspiring to torture, and take hostages, in Afghanistan between 1991 and 1996. 
Zardad had been a warlord in Afghanistan, running a checkpoint between Jalalabad 
and Kabul, at which travelers were frequently abducted and subjected to torture. After 
his crimes came to light in the British media he was prosecuted. Zardad’s crimes, 
which took place between 1991 and 1996, were found to be within the temporal 
jurisdiction of the Criminal Justice Act 1998.
447
 Afghanistan and the United 
Kingdom, both being parties to the Torture Convention, were bound by the 
obligations that flow from it. Given that the UK had an obligation under the Torture 
Convention either to ‘extradite or prosecute’, and given that no request for extradition 
had been received from the Afghan authorities, it fell to the UK to investigate and, if 
the test for prosecution was met, to prosecute Zardad. He was prosecuted, convicted 
and sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment.448 
 
Nowak and McArthur cite this case as ‘a best practice example of a State willing to 
overcome the jurisdictional challenges involved in a universal jurisdiction 
prosecution’.449 It however also shows the enormous amount of commitment, money 
and logistical arrangements necessary to prosecute just one torturer. Investigators 
within the Anti-Terrorism branch of the Metropolitan Police had to coordinate the 
                                                        
444 Matthew Garrod (The Protective Principle) (supra) 818; See also Judge ad hoc Van den Wyngaert in the 
Arrest Warrant Case (supra) 165 ‘In the Spanish Pinochet case, an important connecting factor was the 
Spanish nationality of some of the victims.’ 
445 Also see MC Bassiouni (Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes) (supra) 125 ‘Thus the Pinochet 
case, in the opinion of this writer, does not stand for universal jurisdiction, nor for that matter is the 
extradition request from Spain for torture based on universal jurisdiction.’ 
446 R v. Zardad, High Court Judgment of 19 July 2005, no written judgment could be obtained but for a 
thorough summary of the facts of the case, on which this discussion relies, see Manfred Nowak and 
Elizabeth McArthur (Torture Commentary) (supra) 305-308. 
447 Criminal Justice Act 1988, Section 134 which states that ‘a public official or person acting in an official 
capacity, whatever his nationality, commits the offence of torture if in the United Kingdom or elsewhere he 
or she intentionally inflicts severe pain or suffering on another person in the performance of purported 
performance of official duties’. 
448 Manfred Nowak and Elizabeth McArthur (Torture Commentary) (supra) 307 
449 Manfred Nowak and Elizabeth McArthur (Torture Commentary) (supra) 307 (emphasis original) 
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investigation from London while sending delegates from the Branch to Afghanistan. 
The responsibility for prosecution lay with two prosecutors within the Counter-
Terrorism Department of the Crown Prosecution Service. British officials had to go to 
Afghanistan on nine occasions. The prosecution went to Afghanistan together with 
the police on three occasions to ensure that statements taken from the witnesses were 
sufficiently detailed. The prosecution also travelled with the investigators to gain an 
understanding of the living circumstances of the witnesses and victims in Afghanistan 
to better understand challenges witnesses might face in court. To overcome logistical 
and security challenges in locating witnesses, television and radio broadcasts were 
used to encourage witnesses to come forward. In the UK, cooperation between the 
police, Crown Prosecutors and the Home Office was necessary to facilitate the 
bringing of witnesses to testify. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office referred the 
investigators’ initial request for assistance to relevant authorities in the Afghan 
Government, which subsequently contacted the British embassy in Kabul. From that 
time, all further requests for assistance were dealt with by the British embassy 
directly.  In addition, British authorities cooperated with US military personnel 
because of the need to conduct investigations in an area of Afghanistan under the 
effective control of US military forces. Prior to the investigation, the permission of 
armed forces was obtained, and during the investigation in these areas US military 
personnel provided protection. The police relied on Interpol contact points from the 
Netherlands and Denmark because of their experience in dealing with international 
crimes committed in Afghanistan. In total, the trial was estimated to have cost over £3 
million. 
 
A few observations are in order and might prove insightful. Firstly, Zardad was 
present in the UK. This seems obvious, but it is essential to note that the UK did not 
ask for his extradition from somewhere else in order to found its jurisdiction over 
him. His presence was further not just for a fleeting moment. He had actually been 
living in the UK since 1998. This makes it much easier to institute proceedings 
against him and also vastly reduces the potential number of cases over which Britain 
needs concern itself. In the UK jurisdiction has always been and is overwhelmingly 
territorial.
450
 The UK’s preference for territorial prosecutions means that they will 
                                                        
450 Luc Reydams (Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) 202 ‘The territorial extent of English criminal jurisdiction 
is a subject that has evoked more attention from international lawyers than from domestic lawyers. 
Territoriality of criminal jurisdiction is so self-evident for British jurists (and by extension for most other 
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extradite anyone, including its own nationals, to stand trial abroad for an 
extraterritorial offence, even where there is no extradition treaty.
451
 In the UK’s War 
Crimes Act of 1991
452
 and the International Criminal Court Act of 2001
453
 universal 
jurisdiction over (genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes) is limited to 
foreigners who are either resident at the time of the offence or who become resident at 
the time of the offence or who become resident after the crime and still reside in the 
UK when the proceedings are brought.
454
 The Zardad situation was unique because 
Britain had at the time been involved in a war effort against the Taliban in 
Afghanistan as a result of the 11 September 2001 attacks. It was relatively easy for 
them to make use of TV and radio to find witnesses as they had the facilities, 
resources and troops at hand. Problems of evidence collection were not what they 
usually are, especially when the territorial State objects to and obstructs the 
investigations. There was obviously no opposition to their efforts by Afghanistan and 
no threat of a political backlash. US forces also protected and supported the 
prosecutors and investigators. Numerous trips were already undertaken between the 
two countries and that probably further reduced costs so that no additional flights had 
to be arranged. It is obvious that this was no small task the prosecutors undertook. It 
is however submitted that these were peculiar circumstances, which will almost never 
be repeated elsewhere. The UK is a very wealthy and powerful country in comparison 
to most countries in the world. Yet even they would probably not have been able to 
succeed in this prosecution and arrange the required logistics if they were not already 
active in Afghanistan and didn’t have the support of US troops. Aside from their 
ability to launch investigations their will to do so is another matter. It is submitted, 
that if circumstances were not what they were, the media had not become involved, 
and Britain didn’t have to consider public opinion regarding the war effort they would 
most probably never even have considered prosecution. These few comments show 
                                                                                                                                                              
common law jurists) that the subject hardly draws scholarly attention and codification is not deemed 
necessary.’ Also see John Dugard and Christine Van den Wyngaert ‘Reconciling Extradition With Human 
Rights’ (1998) 92 American Journal of International Law 209  
451 Luc Reydams (Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) 202 
452 War Crimes Act of 1991, Section 1(2) ‘No proceedings shall by virtue of this section be brought against 
any person unless he was on 8 March 1990, or has subsequently become, a British citizen or resident in the 
United Kingdom…’  
453 International Criminal Court Act of 2001, Section 51(2)(b) ‘This section applies to acts committed 
outside the United Kingdom by a United Kingdom national, a United Kingdom resident or a person subject 
to UK service jurisdiction and Section 68(1) ‘This section applies in relation to a person who commits acts 
outside the United Kingdom at a time when he is not a United Kingdom national, a United Kingdom resident 
or a person subject to UK service jurisdiction and who subsequently becomes resident in the United 
Kingdom.’ 
454 Luc Reydams (Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) 206 ‘It would still be possible though to extradite non-
residents or hand them over to the ICC.‘ 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 115 
clearly why States are, in practice, ‘extremely reluctant to prosecute in terms of 
universal jurisdiction’. Any argument that States have a duty to exercise universal 
jurisdiction as an agent of the international community or even in terms of multi-
lateral treaty provisions must also take into account how many States are actually 
financially and practically able to do so. If it does not, it is a superficial argument and 
out of touch with reality. And if Zardad is a rare exception then its purpose of serving 
as a ‘best practice example’ is defeated because most other States simply cannot 
follow suit. 
 
3.3.3 Senegal and Hissène Habré 
 
Senegal was quite vocal in its support of universal jurisdiction during the drafting of 
the Torture Convention.
455
 Thanks to Belgium they were recently reminded of their 
erstwhile support in the ICJ in the Case of Questions relating to the Obligation to 
Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal).
456
 
 
The background of the matter was that Hissène Habré was the President of the 
Republic of Chad for eight years after taking power through a rebellion on 7 June 
1982. It was alleged that during these years large-scale violations of human rights 
were committed, which included arrests of actual of presumed political opponents, 
detentions without trial or under inhumane conditions, mistreatment, torture, 
extrajudicial executions and enforced disappearances. After being overthrown on 1 
December 1990 by his former defence and security adviser, Idriss Déby, Habré stayed 
briefly in Cameroon before being granted political asylum in Senegal. He then settled 
in Dakar where he is still currently living. 
 
In 2000 seven Chadian nationals, residing in Chad, filed a complaint with a senior 
investigating judge in Dakar, for crimes allegedly committed during Habré’s 
presidency. What followed was a serious of delays and start-stop proceedings which 
led to Belgium becoming involved, when a Belgian national of Chadian origin and 
other complainants filed a complaint with a Belgian investigating judge. The 
                                                        
455 Manfred Nowak and Elizabeth McArthur (Torture Commentary) (supra) 269 
456 International Court of Justice 20 July 2012 (hereinafter referred to as ICJ Belgium v. Senegal); See for a 
summary of the protracted proceedings: Reed Brody ‘The Prosecution of Hisséne Habré – “An African 
Pinochet”’ 35 New England Law Review (2000-2001) 321-335; Naomi Roht-Arriaza ‘Universal Jurisdiction 
Steps Forward, Steps Back’ 17(2) Leiden Journal of International Law (2004) 375-389  
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complaint was based on crimes covered by the Belgian Law of 16 June 1993 
concerning the punishment of serious violations of international humanitarian law, as 
amended by the Law of 10 February 1999, and the Convention against torture. The 
Convention was ratified by Senegal on 21 August 1986, without reservation, and 
became binding on it on 26 June 1987, the date of its entry into force. Belgium 
ratified the Convention on 25 June 1999, without reservation, and became bound by it 
on 25 July 1999. 
 
A series of diplomatic interchanges occurred between Belgium and Senegal in which 
Belgium repeatedly asked Senegal to extradite or judge Habré, and eventually on 19 
February 2009 Belgium filed proceedings before the ICJ. Belgium’s final submissions 
to the Court were that the Court should find Senegal to have breached its obligations 
under Article 5(2) of the Torture Convention, and that, by failing to take action in 
relation to Habré’s alleged crimes, Senegal has breached and continues to breach its 
obligations under Article 6(2) and Article 7(1) of that instrument and under certain 
other rules of international law. Belgium asked the Court to adjudge and declare that 
the Republic of Senegal is obliged to bring criminal proceedings against Habré for 
acts including torture and crimes against humanity and that, failing to prosecute, 
Senegal is obliged to extradite him to the Kingdom of Belgium so that he can answer 
for these crimes before Belgian courts.
457
 In a nutshell Belgium argued that Senegal 
did not enact national legislation “in a timely manner”, enabling its judicial authorities 
to exercise jurisdiction over acts of torture allegedly committed abroad by a foreign 
national who is present in its territory.
458
 It also did not immediately hold a 
preliminary enquiry and when it didn’t extradite him, it didn’t submit the case to its 
competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, as it should have done.
459
 
Senegal for its part maintained that there is no dispute between the Parties and that it 
was fulfilling its duties in terms of the Torture Convention taking financial constraints 
into consideration, although not necessarily at the pace, and in the way, that Belgium 
preferred it. 
 
Interestingly, Belgium also asked the ICJ to find that Senegal had breached its duty 
under customary international law to bring criminal proceedings against Habré for 
                                                        
457 ICJ Belgium v. Senegal paragraph 44 
458 ICJ Belgium v. Senegal paragraph 47 and Article 5(2) of the Torture Convention 
459 ICJ Belgium v. Senegal paragraph 49 and Article 6(2) and 7(1) of the Torture Convention 
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crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide allegedly committed by him. 
Again Senegal contended that no dispute existed and the Court did not have 
jurisdiction to hear the matter.
460
 
 
The Court made a distinction between the legal questions and problems of whether 
there exists an obligation for a State to prosecute crimes under customary 
international law that were allegedly committed by a foreign national abroad, and 
whether there was compliance with a State’s obligation under the Torture Convention. 
The Court found that at the time of the filing of the application, the dispute between 
the Parties did not relate to breaches of obligations under customary international law 
and that it had no jurisdiction to decide the issue. It thus conveniently limited itself to 
deciding the easier and less controversial questions concerning only the Torture 
Convention.
461
 
 
Senegal contended that Belgium could not invoke its international responsibility 
because none of the alleged victims were of Belgian nationality at the time when the 
acts were committed.
462
 Belgium argued that it was entitled to exercise a passive 
personal jurisdiction after it received a complaint from a Belgian national of Chadian 
origin. Belgium further argued that under the Torture Convention, every State party, 
irrespective of the nationality of the victims, is entitled to claim performance of the 
obligation concerned, and, therefore, can invoke the responsibility resulting from the 
failure to perform.
463
 Interestingly, but not surprisingly, Belgium also claimed a 
special interest giving it a specific entitlement in this case.
464
 Again the Court neatly 
sidestepped the difficult question of special interest and only limited itself to finding 
on the interest that belongs to a party to a convention. The Court found that Belgium 
had standing as a State party to the Convention against Torture because:  
 
‘The object and purpose of the Convention is “to make more effective the struggle against 
torture…throughout the world”. The States parties to the Convention have a common interest 
to ensure, in view of their shared values, that acts of torture are prevented and that, if they 
occur, their authors do not enjoy impunity, the obligations of a State party to conduct a 
preliminary inquiry into the facts and to submit the case to its competent authorities for 
                                                        
460 ICJ Belgium v. Senegal paragraph 53 
461 ICJ Belgium v. Senegal paragraphs 54 & 55 
462 ICJ Belgium v. Senegal paragraph 64 
463 ICJ Belgium v. Senegal paragraph 65 
464 ICJ Belgium v. Senegal paragraph 66 
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prosecution are triggered by the presence of the alleged offender in its territory, regardless of 
the nationality of the offender or the victims, or the place where the alleged offences occurred. 
All the other States parties have a common interest in compliance with these obligations by 
the State in whose territory the alleged offender is present. That common interest implies that 
the obligations in question are owed by any State party to all the other States parties to the 
Convention. All the States parties “have a legal interest: in the protection of the rights 
involved (Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 
1970, p. 32, para. 33). These obligation may be defined as “obligations erga omnes partes” in 
the sense that each State party has an interest in compliance with them in any given case. In 
this respect, the relevant provisions of the Convention against Torture are similar to those of 
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, with regard to 
which the Court observed that “In such a convention the contracting States do not have any 
interests of their own; they merely have, one and all, a common interest, namely, the 
accomplishment of those high purposes which are the raison d’être of the Convention.” 
(Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 23.) The common interest in compliance with the 
relevant obligations under the Convention against Torture implies the entitlement of each 
State party to the Convention to make a claim concerning the cessation of an alleged breach 
by another State Party. If a special interest were required for that purpose, in many cases no 
State would be in the position to make such a claim. It follows that any State party to the 
Convention may invoke the responsibility of another State party with a view to ascertaining 
the alleged failure to comply with its obligations erga omnes partes, such as those under 
Article 6, paragraph 2, and Article 7, paragraph 1, of the Convention, and to bring that failure 
to an end.’465 
 
Andenas and Weatherall argue that the Court actually meant to endorse Belgium’s 
special interest in the matter because of its comment that the prohibition of torture is 
of a jus cogens nature. But that it didn’t have to in the end because the ‘common 
interest of States parties to obligations arising under the Torture Convention-as 
obligations erga omnes partes-was sufficient to establish the standing of Belgium 
before the ICJ’.466 Their argument is, with respect, rather farfetched because it is not 
                                                        
465 ICJ Belgium v. Senegal paragraphs 68 & 69 
466 Mads Andenas & Thomas Weatherall ‘International Court of Justice: Questions Relating to the 
Obligation to Extradite or Prosecute (Belgium v Senegal) Judgment of 20 July 2012’ (2013) 62(3) 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 760-764 ‘[O]bligations in the Torture Convention which 
parallel obligations erga omnes, have, at a minimum, a legal effect commensurate to the obligations 
erga omnes they codify, which for present purposes permit any State to which the obligation is owed to 
invoke the international responsibility of the State in breach. To maintain otherwise would be to 
suggest that obligations to prevent and punish articulated by instruments codifying peremptory norms, 
such as the Torture Convention, do not go so far as the erga omnes obligations to which they give 
expression. The perverse effect of such reasoning in this instance would be to deny Belgium standing 
to invoke Senegal’s responsibility for breaching an obligation erga omnes because the specific 
obligation invoked, to punish violations of the prohibition against torture, is articulated in a convention 
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what the Court said. If the Court meant to find that Belgium would always have a 
special interest as an injured State because the prohibition of torture is of a jus cogens 
nature then it would have said so. And, what is more, it would then not have found 
that ‘[i]f a special interest were required for that purpose, in many cases no State 
would be in a position to make such a claim’.467 It is submitted that the Court didn’t 
pronounce a view on the matter because it is a controversial question with an answer 
that is anything but settled under international law. 
 
Belgium argued that aut dedere aut judicare under the Torture Convention means that 
if a State does not opt for extradition, its obligation to prosecute remains unaffected. It 
would thus, according to Belgium, only be, if for one reason or another, a State 
concerned does not prosecute, and it had received a request for extradition, that it has 
to extradite if it is to avoid being in breach of its obligation.
468
 Senegal agreed that the 
Convention required it to prosecute Habré, and they submitted that they had followed 
the required legal procedure, but that they had no obligation to Belgium under the 
Convention to extradite him.
469
 The Court found that ‘[e]xtradition is an option 
offered to the State by the Convention, whereas prosecution is an international 
obligation under the Convention, the violation of which is a wrongful act engaging 
the responsibility of the State.’470 
 
The Court also voiced the opinion that the prohibition of torture is part of customary 
international law and it has become a peremptory norm (jus cogens). The Court 
mentioned as support for this view widespread international practice, the opinio juris 
of States, international instruments of universal application, the fact that most States 
had introduced domestic law to that effect and that acts of torture are regularly 
denounced.
471
 
 
The Court found that Senegal’s failure to adopt, until 2007, the legislative measures 
necessary to institute proceedings on the basis of universal jurisdiction delayed the 
                                                                                                                                                              
established to remove barriers to the performance of the obligation in question. The ICJ was right to 
reject such a regressive understanding of the conventional expression of obligations arising from a 
peremptory norm in this instance’. 
467 ICJ Belgium v. Senegal paragraph 69 
468 ICJ Belgium v. Senegal paragraph 92 
469 ICJ Belgium v. Senegal paragraph 93 
470 ICJ Belgium v. Senegal paragraph 95 
471 ICJ Belgium v. Senegal paragraph 99 
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implementation of its other obligations under the Convention. The Court further 
found that Senegal was in breach of its obligation under Article 6(2) of the 
Convention to make a preliminary inquiry into the crimes of torture alleged to have 
been committed by Habré, as well as of the obligation under Article 7(1) to submit the 
case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution.
472
 The Court found 
that Senegal had to cease its continuing wrongful act and without further delay take 
the necessary measures to submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose 
of prosecution.
473
 The Court also found that: 
 
‘The purpose of these treaty provisions is to prevent alleged perpetrators of acts of torture 
from going unpunished, by ensuring that they cannot find refuge in any State Party. The State 
in whose territory the suspect is present does indeed have the option of extraditing him to a 
county which has made such a request, but on the condition that it is to a State which has 
jurisdiction in some capacity, pursuant to Article 5 of the Convention, to prosecute and try 
him.
474
 
 
This paragraph was a snub of most all of what Belgium was hoping to achieve in this 
matter.
475
 Belgium had repeatedly said that Senegal should prosecute Habré and that 
if it didn’t want to it should extradite him to them so they could prosecute him. 
Obviously Belgium was trying to achieve more than simply bring Habré to book for 
his crimes. They were trying to create international precedent through this matter that 
would enable any State, like them, who took their “human rights responsibilities” 
seriously, to request extradition of human rights offenders where they were living 
comfortably in States that were protecting them from prosecution. The Court, 
however, without saying so directly, found that Belgium was not entitled to request 
extradition in this matter. Otherwise it would clearly have said that Belgium may 
request extradition or would even have ordered such extradition based on Senegal’s 
procrastination and Belgium’s eagerness to prosecute. There is after all no guarantee 
that Senegal will now stop delaying and prosecute Habré. Instead the Court found that 
the only country that may request extradition is ‘a State which has jurisdiction in 
some capacity (emphasis mine), pursuant to Article 5 of the Convention, to prosecute 
and try him’. Article 5, we may recall, only allows for jurisdiction to be exercised by 
                                                        
472 ICJ Belgium v. Senegal paragraph 119 
473 ICJ Belgium v. Senegal paragraph 121 
474 ICJ Belgium v. Senegal paragraph 120 and paragraph 3.3 above 
475 This also corresponds with the argument set out in Paragraph 3.1 above  
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a State when the office was committed on its territory, or where the offender or victim 
is a national of that State, or when the offender is present on its territory and it does 
not extradite him. If an offender is present in the territory of a State it would not need 
to request extradition. This leaves only States where the offence was committed or 
where the offender or victim is a national of that State with the option of requesting 
extradition. It is submitted that if anyone was still uncertain as to the Court’s 
sentiments regarding Belgium’s argument as to it sharing with the international 
community a special interest in this matter and Senegal’s duties in terms of 
international customary law, that by this comment the Court made the position clear. 
That is why the finding that Belgium’s only standing to insist on Senegal’s 
performance of its duties, was based on its being a party to the Torture Convention. 
Not because it was an injured party with a special interest, and not because Senegal 
had duties under international customary law to prosecute or extradite Habré. 
According to the Court, Belgium, or other countries in future, would not be able to 
ask for extradition unless it had a real link to the crimes as envisaged in Article 5.
476
 
 
Judge Abraham dealt with the issue raised by Belgium of whether Senegal was 
required in terms of customary international law to prosecute Habré before its courts, 
if it did not extradite him, for acts that could be characterized as war crimes, crimes 
against humanity and genocide. He found that a dispute clearly existed between the 
parties regarding the application of customary international law and the Court should 
                                                        
476 For a similar observation see Claire Nielsen ‘Prosecution or Bust: The Obligation to Prosecute Under the 
Convention Against Torture’ (July 2013) 72:2 The Cambridge Law Journal 243 ‘The outcome of the Courts 
analysis of these obligations is not, however, as encouraging. In holding that only submission for 
prosecution, and not extradition, is an obligation under CAT, the court could not enquire Senegal to 
extradite Habré to Belgium. Extradition was merely a way for a state party to relieve itself of its obligation 
to prosecute. So while a non-injured state party like Belgium has the right to enforce these important 
obligations, it is left in the same position as before. It must wait for an unwilling state to take action. This is a 
very limited reading of the obligation to prosecute by the Court and means that, even after many years of 
failure to prosecute, no obligation to extradite arises. Given the widespread inclusion of the obligation to 
extradite or prosecute in international law treaties, this has significant implications for the prosecution of 
international crimes.’;  See in a similar vein the Declaration of Judge Owada at paragraphs 18, 21, 22 and 23 
‘In addressing the question of Belgium’s standing in the present case in this way, the Judgment avoids 
squarely addressing the primary, though more contentious, claim of Belgium on the issue of its standing 
under the Convention-the claim that: “Belgium is not only a ‘State other than an injured State’, but has also 
the right to invoke the responsibility of Senegal as an ‘injured State’… The reluctance to face the issue, 
however, will, in my view, inherently have legal repercussions…Belgium is entitled in its capacity as a State 
party to the Convention…only to insist on compliance by Senegal with the obligations under the Convention. 
It can go no further…Belgium is in a legal position neither to claim the extradition of Mr. Habré under Article 
5, paragraph 2…[E]xtradition is nothing more than an option open to the States on whose territory an 
offender is present in relation to the States parties referred to in Article 5, paragraph 1, of the Convention, 
and not an obligation to carry out in relation to any other States parties to the Convention, including those 
within the category of States referred to in Article 5, paragraph 1 of the Convention’.  
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have ruled on this issue.
477
 In a convincing argument he found the Courts’ failure to 
rule on this issue to be ‘surprising’, ‘extremely formalistic’ and ‘without any 
weight’.478 He thus felt impelled to answer the question. He went on to find that ‘there 
is no rule of customary international law requiring Senegal to prosecute Mr. Habré 
before its courts, whether for acts of torture, or complicity in torture, that are alleged 
against him - in that connection, there is indeed an obligation, but it is purely 
conventional – or for war crimes, crimes against humanity and the crime of genocide, 
which do not come within the scope ratione materiae of the convention against 
Torture – in that regard there is, at present, no obligation under international law’.479 
His reasons for so finding are insightful for the purposes of this thesis especially on 
the issue of universal jurisdiction. He refers to Judge Greenwood having asked 
Belgium to demonstrate: ‘(i) that there is State practice in respect of the jurisdiction of 
domestic courts over war crimes and crimes against humanity when the alleged 
offence occurred outside the territory of the State in question and when neither the 
alleged offender nor the victims were nationals of that State; and (ii) that States 
consider that they are required, in such cases, to prosecute the alleged perpetrator of 
the offence before their own courts, or to extradite him'.
480
 
 
Judge Abraham mentioned that the response given by Belgium did not ‘come close to 
establishing the existence of a general practice and an opinio juris which might give 
rise to a customary obligation upon a country such as Senegal to prosecute a former 
leader before its courts for crimes such as those of Mr. Hissène Habré stands accused, 
unless it extradites him’.481 He mentioned that the Courts’ remark that the prohibition 
on torture is a part of customary international law that has even become a peremptory 
norm (jus cogens) was clearly ‘a mere obiter dictum’.482 He found that the Court in 
this case was not directly called upon to rule on the ‘controversial issue of the legality 
of universal jurisdiction in international law’. Thus ‘[o]nly if the Court had found that 
                                                        
477 Separate Opinion of Judge Abraham at paragraph 12 
478 Separate Opinion of Judge Abraham at paragraph 19 and paragraph 22 ‘As these are rules which, if they 
existed, would have universal scope, it stands to reason that it is not sufficient for the two parties before the 
Court to agree on the existence of those rules, and, where appropriate, their scope, for the Court to register 
that agreement and to apply the alleged rules in question, it is for the Court alone to say what the law is and 
to do so, if necessary, ex officio – even if it is, in fact, somewhat unusual for it to find itself in such a situation.’ 
479 Separate Opinion of Judge Abraham at paragraph 21 
480 Separate Opinion of Judge Abraham at paragraph 24 
481 Separate Opinion of Judge Abraham at paragraph 25 
482 Separate Opinion of Judge Abraham at paragraph 27 and see also Dissenting Opinion of Judge ad hoc Sur 
at paragraph 4 ‘[T]he reference to jus cogens…a reference which is entirely superfluous and does not 
contribute to the settlement of the dispute…The purpose of this obiter dictum is to acknowledge and give 
legal weight to a disputed notion, whose substance is yet to be established.’ 
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international law required States to establish universal criminal jurisdiction over the 
categories of offences in question would it have ruled, a fortiori, in respect of the 
legality of such jurisdiction’.483 He reasoned as follows: 
 
‘The question which the Court could not have avoided answering directly, had it accepted 
jurisdiction as I believe it should have done, is therefore the following: is there sufficient 
evidence, based on State practice and opinio juris, of a customary obligation for States to 
prosecute before their domestic courts individuals suspected of war crimes or crimes against 
humanity (which presupposes that they have provided their courts with the necessary 
jurisdiction), when there is no connecting link between the alleged offence and the forum 
State, that is to say, when the offence and the forum State, that is to say, when the offence was 
committed outside the territory of that State and neither the offender nor the victim were 
nationals of that State?  
In my opinion, the answer to that question is very clearly and indisputably no, regardless of 
whether or not the suspect is present in the territory of the State in question. 
Belgium in response to the question put by the Court, did indeed endeavor to demonstrate that 
such an obligation exists. However, it fell far short of doing so. 
In a written document produced in reply to the above-mentioned question, Belgium supplied a 
list of States having incorporated into their domestic law provisions giving their courts 
“universal jurisdiction” to try war crimes committed in the course of a non-international 
conflict, which is the case of crimes of which Mr. Habré is accused, and crimes against 
humanity (or certain of those crimes). It found a total of 51. Among those States, some of 
them make the exercise of such jurisdiction subject to the presence of the suspect in their 
territory, while others do not, but the list draws no distinction between these two cases. 
Nevertheless, the information thus provided is quite insufficient to establish the existence of a 
customary obligation to prosecute the perpetrators of such crimes on the basis of universal 
jurisdiction, even when limited to the case where the suspect is present in the territory of the 
State concerned. And this is for three reasons. 
In the first place, the States in question represent only a minority within the international 
community, which is in any event insufficient to establish the existence of a universal 
customary rule. 
Secondly, some of those States may have adopted such legislation on the basis of a particular 
interpretation of their conventional obligations, for example those under conventions of 
international humanitarian law regarding war crimes. Apart from the fact that such an 
interpretation is not universally shared, since other States parties to the same conventions have 
not taken similar action, such an approach does not demonstrate the existence of an opinio 
juris, that is to say, a belief that there exists an obligation to establish “universal jurisdiction” 
outside of any conventional obligations. 
                                                        
483 Separate Opinion of Judge Abraham at paragraph 30 
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Thirdly and finally, certain States among the 51 – and probably many of them – may have 
decided to extend the jurisdiction of their courts over the crimes in question on the basis of a 
purely unilateral choice and sovereign decision, without in any sense believing that they were 
required to do so by some international obligation, whether conventional or customary – but 
solely in the belief that international law entitled them to do so. Here again the “opinio juris” 
is lacking. 
Let me take France, for example, which is included in the “List of 51”, and with which I am 
well acquainted. In the area which interests us here, France has only given its courts 
“universal” jurisdiction, that is to say, without any link to where the crime was committed or 
the nationality of the perpetrator or the victim, in three instances: (1) for acts of torture; (2) for 
crimes covered by the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY); and (3) for crimes within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) if the alleged offender usually resides in France. In the first case, France acted in 
accordance with its conventional obligations deriving from its status as party to the 
Convention against Torture. In the other two cases it adopted those provisions of its own free 
and sovereign choice, without considering as far as it was itself concerned – or asserting in 
relation to others – that States were required to do so. The presence of France on the list 
prepared by Belgium, while not erroneous, is thus not an argument for the recognition of a 
customary international obligation, and doubtless the same could be said for many of the other 
States on the list. 
Belgium itself at present no longer claims that it exercises universal jurisdiction, as a general 
rule, over “international crimes”. Since the provisions of its Code of Criminal Procedure 
relating to the jurisdiction of its courts were radically modified by the Law of 5 August 2003, 
Belgium no longer provides those courts with jurisdiction over war crimes and crimes against 
humanity, except in those cases where it is required to do so under an international legal 
obligation; in principle, it requires a territorial or personal connection between the alleged 
crime and itself. A link which must normally exist on the date of the crime or, at the very 
least, that the suspect should have his principal residence in the territory of the Kingdom. The 
reason why the Belgian courts continue to investigate the complaints against Mr. Hissène 
Habré regarding acts other than those which could be characterized as acts of torture is that 
those complaints were made at a time when Belgian legislation did provide for universal 
jurisdiction, and because of the transitional provisions of the Law of 5 August 2003; while 
withdrawing universal jurisdiction almost completely for the future, the latter provided that 
certain pending proceedings which had been instituted on the basis of the previous legislation 
would not be affected by that withdrawal.’484   
 
Belgium was acting on the basis of legislation that they had themselves subsequently 
repealed and it is unlikely that they will in future bring another application asking the 
ICJ to force another State to apply universal jurisdiction. It is also only Belgium that 
                                                        
484 Separate Opinion of Judge Abraham paragraphs 31-40 
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has brought this kind of an application before.
485
 It is clear that Senegal has been 
extremely reluctant to comply with its obligations in terms of the Torture Convention. 
If it was not for Belgium forcing them to take action it is very likely that Habré would 
have happily lived out his days in Senegal. At the time of writing the prosecution had 
still not started in Senegal but has been scheduled to start in 2015 and Habré has since 
been arrested.
486
 The Court did not refer to any other States that have actually 
prosecuted torturers in terms of universal jurisdiction and in a sense Senegal might 
feel aggrieved that they were the one State singled out to be made an example of. The 
Senegalese example confirms the interpretation provided of States’ general and often 
extreme reluctance to apply the universal jurisdiction provisions contained in the 
Torture Convention. In light of the decision we see that the duties are for States in 
terms of universal jurisdiction to implement legislation that enables it to investigate 
and prosecute foreign torturers when they are present in any territory under its 
jurisdiction. It however doesn’t go so far as to allow States with no link to the offence 
to ask for extradition of the offender in order to prosecute him. After considering the 
approach to universal jurisdiction over torture in the United Kingdom and Senegal we 
may now determine the position in South Africa. 
 
3.3.4 South Africa 
 
South Africa became a party to the Torture Convention on 10 December 1998. On 29 
July 2013 South Africa enacted the Prevention of Combating and Torture of Persons 
Act.
487
 This is an attempt to implement effective legislative, administrative, judicial or 
other measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction’ as a 
State Party to the United Nations Convention against Torture.
488
 Article 6(1)(c) 
provides for extra-territorial jurisdiction and provides the Republic with jurisdiction 
for acts committed outside the Republic if the accused person is ‘after the commission 
of the offence, present in the territory of the Republic…and that person is not 
extradited pursuant to Article 8 of the Convention’. 
 
                                                        
485 See Sienho Yee (Concept, Logic and Reality) (supra) 522 describing Belgium as the captain of universal 
jurisdiction that has since abandoned ship. 
486  ‘Habré lawyers say war crimes trial ‘political’’ News24 (2014/04/11) available at 
http://www.news24.com/Africa/News/Habre-lawyers-say-war-crimes-trial-political-20140410 (accessed 
2014/04/11) 
487 Act No. 13 of 2013 
488 Prevention of Torture Act (supra) Preamble 
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South Africa has thus positioned itself, by implementing this legislation, to be able to 
fulfill its duties to exercise universal jurisdiction in terms of the Torture Convention 
should the need arise. We have however also seen by studying the drafting process 
that the Torture Convention differs from other “human rights” conventions and almost 
seems an accident and a definite exception to the rule as regards the duty to exercise 
universal jurisdiction. As such, it is submitted, that it may not be argued that the 
Torture Convention proves that States somehow accepted the use of universal 
jurisdiction over the other core crimes of genocide, war crimes and crimes against 
humanity. South Africa will do well to remember that States will often be reluctant to 
have their nationals, especially their government officials investigated and prosecuted 
by other countries. Prosecutors must bear in mind that internal political opposition 
and interference is also likely should an attempt be made to enforce the universal 
jurisdiction provided for in the Act. It will, as we have seen in the Zardad case, often 
be a very intricate and expensive process to exercise universal jurisdiction. This is a 
very relevant considering the strain on, and challenges faced by, the South African 
criminal justice system. All these factors must be kept in mind and a balance should 
be sought between them when considering a possible prosecution based on universal 
jurisdiction for torture. Prosecutions of this kind to date have been the rare exception 
internationally. 
 
The approach here is to bring a measure of balance to popular and prevalent 
arguments that there is a duty on States to exercise universal jurisdiction as many 
other States are already doing. It is humbly submitted that this is simply not true; 
almost no States are doing it, and when they do it is in highly exceptional 
circumstances. If, in the face of strong moral arguments, critical questions are at least 
asked and various options in possible situations are thoughtfully considered this thesis 
would have served a useful purpose. 
 
It will be discussed in detail under the discussion of the SALC case
489
, but it is 
submitted, that suspects in that matter should have been investigated for torture 
instead of for crimes against humanity. It is so that torture is often, correctly, 
classified under crimes against humanity. Yet it is difficult, if not impossible at this 
point in time, to prove a duty to prosecute crimes against humanity in terms of 
                                                        
489 See paragraph 5.3 infra 
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universal jurisdiction. If there is a provable duty, that may actually be enforced, to use 
universal jurisdiction it is for torture. This is because the Torture Convention 
incorporates the principle of universal jurisdiction as an international obligation of all 
States parties without any precondition other than the presence of the alleged torturer. 
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Chapter 4 
 
The International Criminal Court 
 
 
4.1 Introduction to the International Criminal Court 
 
The desire by States to establish an international criminal tribunal is no new thing.
490
 
The move gathered momentum with the establishment of the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
Tribunals and the subsequent trial of Nazi and Japanese war criminals. Soon after this 
in 1948 Article VI of the Genocide Convention stipulated that trials for genocide 
would take place before ‘a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the 
act was committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction 
with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction’. 
On the same day a General Assembly Resolution called upon the International Law 
Commission to prepare the statute of the court promised by Article VI.
491
 Alongside 
the International Law Commission the General Assembly also established a 
committee tasked with drafting the statute of an international criminal court, and this 
committee submitted its report and draft statute in 1952.
492
 The whole matter was 
postponed until a definition for aggression could be found and was then halted 
because of the political difficulties involving the cold war. No progress was made, 
especially in regard to international jurisdiction, until Trinidad and Tobago proposed 
the creation of an international criminal court to deal with drug trafficking in 1989 
(which was also the year that the Berlin wall fell).
493
 Given the additional urgency by 
the worsening Yugoslav situation the International Law Commission adopted a draft 
statute for an international criminal court in 1994.
494
 In 1996 the International Law 
Commission adopted the final draft of its “Code of Crimes Against the Peace and 
                                                        
490 For an enlightening summary of the long history in this regard see William Schabas (Introduction to the 
ICC) (supra) 1-22. The discussion on the creation and provisions of the International Court relies heavily on 
the book on the subject mentioned (supra) by William Schabas. 
491 Study by the International Law Commission of the Questions of an International Criminal Jurisdiction, GA 
Res. 216 B (III) 
492 Report of the Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction, UN Doc A/2135 (1952)  
493 Malcolm Shaw (International Law) (supra) 410 and William Schabas (Introduction to the ICC) (supra) 
(10) 
494 See Malcolm Shaw (International Law) (supra) 410 and Report of the International Law Commission on 
the work of its 46th session A/49/10, chapter II, paragraphs 23-41  
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Security of Mankind”.495 The draft statute of 1994 and the draft code of 1996 played a 
pivotal role in the preparation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court.
496
 The International Law Commission draft envisioned a court with ‘primacy’ 
to correspond with the ad hoc tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda, which would 
mean that the prosecutor would decide which matters to proceed with, with States not 
having any say if they wished to do a matter themselves. But it subsequently seemed 
that the preferred model would be one of ‘complementarity’ by which the court would 
only exercise jurisdiction if domestic courts were unwilling or unable to prosecute.
497
 
 
The Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court convened on 15 June 1998 in Rome. More than 160 
States sent delegates to the Conference, in addition to many international 
organizations and hundreds of non-governmental organizations. Schabas mentions 
that the enthusiasm was astonishing with essentially all the delegations expressing 
their support for the concept.
498
 The key and difficult issues that were to be decided 
were contained in a draft statute and included the role of the Security Council, the list 
of ‘core crimes’ over which the court would have inherent jurisdiction and the scope 
of its jurisdiction over persons who were not nationals of States Parties. This draft 
was held back and only discussed on the last day. The whole matter was almost 
derailed when the United States insisted on a vote to decide on the acceptance of this 
draft. The result was 120 in favor, with twenty-one abstentions and seven votes 
against.
499
 The Statute required sixty ratifications for entry into force. The pace of 
ratifications was faster and more dramatic than anyone expected.
500
 Delays in 
ratification occurred mostly because States needed to undertake significant legislative 
changes in order to comply with the concept of ‘complementarity’ imposed by the 
Statute. Certain States thus first enacted the offences of genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes, as defined in the Statute, and made provision for universal 
                                                        
495 Timothy L.H. McCormack and G.J. Simpson ‘The International Law Commission’s Draft Code of Crimes 
Against the Peace and Security of Mankind: An Appraisal of the Substantive Provisions’ (1994) 5 Criminal 
Law Forum 1 
496 William Schabas (Introduction to the ICC) (supra) 11 
497 William Schabas (Introduction to the ICC) (supra) 16 
498 William Schabas (Introduction to the ICC) (supra) 16 
499 William Schabas (Introduction to the ICC) (supra) 21 ‘The United States, Israel and China stated that they 
had opposed adoption of the statute.’ 
500 William Schabas (Introduction to the ICC) (supra) 23 & 24 ‘The magic number of sixty ratifications was 
reached on 11 April 2002.’ 
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jurisdiction over these crimes before ratification.
501
 The Statute entered into force on 
1 July 2002. 
 
As an example of this amending of legislation on the part of States we may consider 
South Africa, who incorporated the Rome Statute into its domestic law by means of 
the Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Act 27 of 2002 
(the ICC Act) to give effect to its complementarity obligation under the Rome 
Statute.
502
 Prior to the ICC Act, South Africa had not implemented any legislation on 
the subject of war crimes or crimes against humanity and there had also been no 
domestic prosecutions of international crimes in South Africa. Du Plessis points out 
that although customary international law forms part of South African law a court 
would not easily convict an accused for the commission of an international crime 
because of the nullum crimen sine lege principle.
503
 Du Plessis advances the same 
argument in respect of prosecutions of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 
1949 because South Africa had also not incorporated the Geneva Conventions into its 
municipal law prior to the implementation of the ICC Act. This position was 
challenged before the South African Constitutional Court in the Basson matter but the 
court found it unnecessary ‘to consider whether customary international law could be 
used…as the basis in itself for a prosecution under the common law’.504 The ICC Act 
takes seriously the ‘complementarity’ obligation on South Africa to investigate and 
prosecute the ICC offences of crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide.
505
 
The Preamble mentions South Africa’s commitment to bring ‘persons who commit 
such atrocities to justice…in a court of law of the Republic in terms of its domestic 
law where possible’. Section 3 of the Act further defines as one of its objects to 
enable, ‘as far as possible and in accordance with the principle of 
complementarity…the national prosecuting authority of the Republic to adjudicate in 
cases brought against any person accused of having committed a crime in the 
Republic and beyond the borders of the Republic in certain circumstances’. The Rome 
                                                        
501 William Schabas (Introduction to the ICC) (supra) 24 & 25 
502 Max du Plessis ‘International Criminal Courts, the International Criminal Court, and South Africa’s 
Implementation of the Rome Statute’ (Chapter 10) in John Dugard (International Law: A South African 
Perspective) (supra) 200-201 
503 Max du Plessis in John Dugard (International Law: A South African Perspective) (supra) 201 ‘Like the 
Rome Statute, the ICC Act does not reach back into the past. The Act provides expressly that ‘[n]o 
prosecution may be instituted against a person accused of having committed a crime if the crime in question 
is alleged to have been committed before the commencement of the Statute’.’ And Section 5(2) of the ICC Act 
504 Max du Plessis in John Dugard (International Law: A South African Perspective) (supra) 201 and S v 
Basson 2005 (12) BCLR 1192 (CC) paragraph 172 at footnote 147 
505 Max du Plessis in John Dugard (International Law: A South African Perspective) (supra) 201 
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Statute codified the elements of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity 
and the definitions of these crimes were incorporated directly into the South African 
ICC Act through a schedule appended to the Act. These crimes now form a part of 
South African law through the Act.
506
 
 
Before we consider the grounds of jurisdiction provided for in the ICC Act for a 
South African court over ICC crimes we need to consider what the Rome Statute 
itself prescribes in this regard. 
 
4.2 The Jurisdictional Requirements of the International Criminal Court 
 
4.2.1 Complementarity 
 
Under the principle of ‘complementarity’ defined in Article 17 of the Rome Statute, 
the Court may only proceed with a case when the State responsible for prosecution is 
either ‘unwilling or unable’ to proceed. What is also known as the ‘subsidiarity’ 
principle is sometimes discussed, in conjunction with complementarity, and applies 
when States have to decide whether to exercise jurisdiction or not. Should a State with 
a closer link to the crime be unwilling or unable to proceed jurisdiction may be 
considered by the third State. The first ICC prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, 
explained this position by writing that the strategy would be to encourage States to 
initiate their own proceedings before national institutions and that the Office of the 
Prosecutor would only investigate where there is a clear case of failure to act by the 
State or States concerned.
507
 He said that the ‘exercise of national criminal 
jurisdiction is not only a right but also a duty of States.’508 He further wrote that: 
 
‘The principle of complementarity represents the express will of States Parties to create an 
institution that is global in scope while recognizing the primary responsibility of States 
themselves to exercise criminal jurisdiction. The principle is also based on considerations of 
                                                        
506 Max du Plessis in John Dugard (International Law: A South African Perspective) (supra) 201-202 ‘Part 1 
of the Schedule to the ICC Act follows the wording of article 6 of the ICC Statute in relation to genocide; Part 
2 of the Schedule mirrors article 7 of the Statute in respect of crimes against humanity; and Part 3 does the 
same for war crimes, as set out in article 8 of the ICC Statute.’ 
507 Draft Paper on Some Policy Issues before the Office of the Prosecutor, for Discussion at the Public 
Hearing in The Hague on 17 and 18 June 2003 and a discussion of these concepts by William Schabas 
(Introduction to the ICC) (supra) 35-36 
508 (Policy Issues before the Prosecutor) (supra) 4 
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efficiency and effectiveness since States will generally have the best access to evidence and 
witnesses.’509 
 
The report acknowledged that there would be instances in which national jurisdictions 
would not be able or willing to fulfill their primary duty of investigation and 
prosecution and the ICC would have to step in to close this gap.
510
 The ICC would 
however not be able to deal with all matters and therefore cooperation with the ICC 
by States would be important.
511
 It was stated that in this way ‘complementarity 
should be understood as a system that concurrently protects national sovereignty and 
promotes State action’.512 The targets for prosecution would be ‘the leaders who bear 
the most responsibility for their crimes’, such as the leaders of a State. The Prosecutor 
would encourage national prosecutions for lower-ranking perpetrators as far as 
possible and that ICC jurisdiction over crimes should be limited to ‘the most serious 
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole’.513 
 
It is thus clear that in terms of ‘complementarity’ the primary duty for the prosecution 
of international crimes lies with the Sates Parties to the ICC, with the Prosecutor only 
stepping in where States are unwilling or unable to deal with situations and when the 
situations are of sufficient gravity. As William Schabas says: ‘[t]he influence of the 
Rome Statute will extend deep into the domestic criminal law, enriching the 
jurisprudence of national courts and challenging prosecutors and judges to display 
greater zeal in the repression of serious violations of human rights’.514 
 
Jann Kleffner, in his book on complementarity, explains that it means that national 
courts ‘retain primary competence to exercise jurisdiction over core crimes’ and ‘take 
pride of place and constitute the first line of defence in the fight against impunity’.515 
But in the same breath he sketches a very bleak picture of States’ attitude thus far in 
                                                        
509 (Policy Issues before the Prosecutor) (supra) 5 
510 (Policy Issues before the Prosecutor) (supra) 5 
511 (Policy Issues before the Prosecutor) (supra) 4 
512 (Policy Issues before the Prosecutor) (supra) 5 
513 (Policy Issues before the Prosecutor) (supra) 6 
514 William Schabas (Introduction to the ICC) (supra) 58 & 61 ‘The International Criminal Court is perhaps 
the most innovative and exciting development in international law since the creation of the United Nations. 
The Statute is one of the most complex international instruments ever negotiated, a sophisticated web of 
highly technical provisions drawn from comparative criminal law combined with a series of more political 
propositions that touch the very heart of State concerns with their own sovereignty…From a hesitant 
commitment in 1945, to an ambitious Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, we have now reached 
a point where individual criminal liability is established for those responsible for serious violations of 
human rights, and where an institution is created to see that this is more than just some pious wish.’ 
515 Jann Kleffner (Complementarity)(supra) 4 
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practice to this responsibility.
516
 He proceeds from the popular presumption that in 
suppressing the core crimes of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity 
States act not only in the interest of their immediate constituency but also on behalf of 
the international community as a whole.
517
 He admits the absence of permanent, 
genuine enforcement mechanisms at the international level and uses this fact to argue 
that this is why national jurisdictions must fill the void and act in a national and 
international capacity.
518
 His argument is not logically convincing because he, in 
effect, seems to argue that because we know there is such a thing as international 
crimes and because there are, or has been, no genuine enforcement mechanisms at the 
international level it can only be that national jurisdictions have to combat these 
crimes. But then he admits that national courts don’t actually do this: 
 
‘These expectations have only occasionally been met…Overall, however, the record of 
success of national criminal jurisdictions to fulfill the central task that international law 
assigns to them has been modest…More importantly, however, even when States have an 
adequate legislative framework at their disposal, they often prove unwilling or unable to 
enforce it…States remain completely inactive…What is more, third States have never 
adequately filled these deficiencies in the national suppression of core crimes by States with a 
direct nexus to the crime. The adjudication of core crimes on the basis of universal jurisdiction 
has for a long time proved a dormant concept, and its reinvigoration in recent years has been 
at least as cumbersome and piecemeal as the prosecution of core crimes by States more 
directly involved, Exclusive reliance on national suppression of core crimes, in short, has 
proved deficient in the fight against impunity’.519 
 
                                                        
516 Other authors mention the same dichotomy, see for example Harmen van der Wilt ‘Equal Standards? On 
the dialetics between National Jurisdictions and the International Criminal Court’ International Criminal 
Law Review 8 (2008) 230 ‘The Rome Statute is crystal clear: national jurisdictions are supposed to have 
precedence in the prosecution of perpetrators of international crimes. The International Criminal Court is 
only allowed to step in if states are either ‘unwilling’ or ‘unable’ to do the job properly. In order to 
accomplish this important task, states will have to improve their record in this respect, because their 
performance has not been impressive’. 
517 The authority he provides for this ‘big’ assumption is a quotation from the Eichmann Case and a 
reference to the Guatemalan Generals Case, Jann Kleffner (Complementarity) (supra) 1 & 26-27, but for a 
realistic and succinct declaration of exactly the opposite see Harmen van der Wilt  ‘Universal jurisdiction 
under attack: an assessment of the African misgivings of international criminal justice, as administered by 
Western states’ (2011) 9 Journal of International Criminal Justice 1061 ‘Moreover, and despite all rhetoric 
about the international community being aggrieved by international crimes, the legal order of the forum 
deprehensionis is not directly affected by the crimes.’ 
518 Jann Kleffner (Complementarity) (supra) 1 
519 Jann Kleffner (Complementarity) (supra) 1-2 and 42 ‘States have also frequently not established 
extraterritorial jurisdiction, especially universal jurisdiction, over (some) core crimes. This is even the case 
with regard to those crimes for which international law imposes a clear obligation to do so…Even when 
extraterritorial jurisdiction is established, its applicability has at times been limited to crimes committed in 
certain periods or places’ 
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It is thus not easy to see how this situation is suddenly going to change despite all the 
current enthusiasm about complementarity. It seems to be the widely held hope that a 
new era of respect for human rights has been signaled by the creation of the ICC and 
this era will be ushered in and led by individual States acting in terms of 
complementarity. It will be discussed in more detail below but as an introduction we 
may briefly mention in a simplistic way that, barring a Security Council referral, for 
States Parties to actually be able to prosecute a matter or cooperate with an ICC 
request to hand an offender over to the ICC the offence would have had to occur on 
the territory of the State Party or one of its nationals would have had to be the 
offender. Thus provision is made for the principles of territoriality and active 
nationality but not the more drastic passive nationality or universal jurisdiction. This 
system from the outset does not introduce any radical formula into the equation that 
might lead to unprecedented or new results. What happens is only that States who 
have already showed their support for the ICC by becoming members may now be 
“forced” to deal with international crimes that happened on their territory or were 
committed by their nationals. If they don’t the Prosecutor might embarrass (or help 
them) by finding them either unwilling or unable to comply with their duties. This 
still does not solve or even address the problem of third States who care nothing for 
the ICC or for human rights.
520
 The ICC at this stage can only preach to the converted 
and is only able to hold those already committed to their promises. This undercuts the 
hope of universal jurisdiction serving its very purpose of being used as a tool to 
prosecute those who would otherwise never be prosecuted.  
 
It is predicted that complementarity and the ICC will not impact on the increase of the 
exercise by States of universal jurisdiction. The ICC and its Prosecutor also were not 
given the authority to act in terms of universal jurisdiction to investigate any matter. 
This is again not considering a Security Council referral or the temporal and other 
restrictions on the ICC, which will be discussed infra. It is submitted that States were 
simply not prepared to give the Court such wide investigating powers because States 
(especially powerful third States who participated in the drafting process but 
eventually didn’t become members) were not sure they would happily abide by and 
tolerate this power being used against them by a Court they might later be obliged to 
                                                        
520 The Rome Statute is a treaty and only binds States Parties to it. This accords with the rule of 
international law set out in Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which reads that ‘[a] 
treaty does not create either obligations of rights for a third State without its consent’. 
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support. It is submitted that States also didn’t like the prospect that they might be 
forced by the ICC in terms of complementarity to exercise universal jurisdiction over 
a situation or offender where they might not necessarily have wanted to. States in 
other words did not want any rules made or precedents set regarding the compulsory 
use of universal jurisdiction and they were willing (and this is an optimistic view for 
why universal jurisdiction was rejected) to reserve themselves a right to exercise 
universal jurisdiction if and when it suited them but not give others or the Court the 
right to invoke it against them. These are elementary and introductory remarks based 
on what has been said above but these aspects will now be considered and tested in 
more detail. As a start we may determine when jurisdiction is ‘triggered’ in terms of 
the Rome Statute. 
 
4.2.2 Jurisdictional Triggers 
 
The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg and the international criminal 
tribunals for the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Lebanon had no need 
for their jurisdiction to be “triggered” or activated and the prosecutors were given free 
rein to identify their targets as limited by the jurisdiction of the Court itself. The 
situation regarding the ICC is very different.
521
 The Rome Statute provides three ways 
of ‘triggering’ the jurisdiction. First, a State Party may refer a situation to the Court 
provided this concerns the nationals or the territory of a State Party or, in the case of a 
non-party State, there is acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to Article 
12(3). Secondly there is referral of a situation by the Security Council. ‘Finally – and 
this is the great innovation – the Prosecutor may initiate charges acting proprio motu, 
that is on his or her own initiative. Here, he or she may select any situation as long as 
it is within the jurisdiction of the Court. In other words, he or she may choose from 
crimes committed on the territory of any of the more than 110 States Parties to the 
Statute as well as crimes committed by nationals of any of those States Parties 
anywhere else in the world.’522 Article 13, entitled ‘Exercise of jurisdiction’, states: 
 
The Court may exercise its jurisdiction with respect to a crime referred to in article 5 
in accordance with the provisions of this Statute if: 
                                                        
521 William Schabas (Introduction to the ICC) (supra) 158 
522 William Schabas (Introduction to the ICC) (supra) 158 
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(a) A situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been 
committed is referred to the Prosecutor by a State Party in accordance with 
article 14; 
(b) A situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been 
committed is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting 
under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations; or 
(c) The Prosecutor has initiated an investigation in respect of such a crime in 
accordance with article 15. 
 
4.2.2.1 State Party Referral 
 
When the Rome Statute was being drafted the provision for State Parties to refer 
matters was intended primarily to cater for States referring matters against other 
States.
523
 But there was not much hope for such a system resulting in many cases for 
the Court because it was well known, and often pointed out, that States weren’t 
altruists and almost never referred cases against other States for committing 
international crimes on a bilateral basis unless they had vital interests at stake.
524
 It 
was therefore a tremendous surprise when the State Party referral mechanism brought 
the first three situations before the Court. But these were not inter-State complaints, as 
intended, at all. They were rather a case of States referring situations occurring within 
their own borders. They became known as ‘self-referrals’ although the States in 
question did not intend prosecution to be directed against themselves.
525
 The first 
referral, and the only one we will consider here, was by Uganda referring the situation 
concerning the “Lord’s Resistance Army’ in northern and western Uganda. 526 
Although many commentators seem to be excited that self-referrals mean that the ICC 
has work to do, Schabas is not enthusiastic about the concept and calls it ‘superfluous’ 
because every State that ratified the Rome Statute have already accepted the authority 
of the Prosecutor to investigate cases on its territory.
527
 He points out that the 
Ugandan referral originated in the Hague and not in Kampala, and along with this 
plan of the Prosecutor it meant that he had to reassure Uganda in the process that such 
                                                        
523 Willam Schabas (Introduction to the ICC) (supra) 161 ‘The language employed suggests that what was 
contemplated was a ‘complainant State’ ‘lodg[ing] a complaint’ against another State.’ 
524 Willam Schabas (Introduction to the ICC) (supra) 159 
525 Willam Schabas (Introduction to the ICC) (supra) 159-160 
526 Willam Schabas (Introduction to the ICC) (supra) 160-161 The second and third referrals respectively 
were by the DRC and the CAR each for situations brought about by rebel activities in their countries. 
527 Willam Schabas (Introduction to the ICC) (supra) 165 
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a referral held no danger for ‘their own’ State agents.528 Schabas argues that if the 
Prosecutor intends to successfully keep encouraging self-referrals he will have to 
show a consistent track record of one-sided investigations directed only against anti-
government forces and entities.
529
 Schabas argues convincingly that the great flaw 
with ‘self-referrals’ is that it results in States not shouldering their own 
responsibilities and simply shifting the burden to the ICC.
530
 But as we have seen this 
undermines complementarity with its stated purpose of assigning to States the main 
responsibility for preventing and punishing atrocities committed in their own 
territories with the ICC only stepping in when such States fail to conduct 
investigations or are unwilling or unable to do so. Schabas argues the Prosecutor is 
sending out a ‘troubling message that States may decline to assume their duty to 
prosecute, despite the terms of the preamble to the Statute, not to mention obligations 
imposed by international human rights law, by invoking the provisions of Article 14 
and referring the ‘situation’ to The Hague. If the prosecutor is sincere about his desire 
to stimulate national systems, he might do better to send the case back, and give the 
State in question a lecture about its responsibilities in addressing impunity’.531 Thus 
we can see that State Parties have not yet referred matters against each other to the 
ICC and that it is not necessarily a good thing that the ICC is currently mostly dealing 
with self-referrals. As we will see under the next two headings of referrals by the 
Security Council and the proprio motu powers to investigate of the Prosecutor that 
these have so far led to serious complications. 
 
4.2.2.2 Security Council Referral 
 
The jurisdiction of the Court can also be triggered through a Security Council referral. 
Article 13(b) authorizes the Court to exercise its jurisdiction over crimes within its 
jurisdiction in accordance with article 5 if ‘[a] situation in which one or more of such 
crimes appears to have been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security 
Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations’. The Security 
Council is one of the principal organs of the United Nations, and it has ‘primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security’.532 Chapter VII 
                                                        
528 Willam Schabas (Introduction to the ICC) (supra) 166 
529 Willam Schabas (Introduction to the ICC) (supra) 166 
530 Willam Schabas (Introduction to the ICC) (supra) 166 
531 Willam Schabas (Introduction to the ICC) (supra) 167 
532 Article 24 of the Charter of the United Nations 
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of the Charter declares that ‘[t]he Security Council shall determine the existence of 
any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make 
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 
41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security’. In accordance with 
Article 23 of the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council consists of five 
permanent members being China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United 
States, and ten non-permanent members who are elected by the General Assembly 
from among the membership of the organization to two-year terms. Nine votes are 
required to adopt a resolution, but any permanent member may exercise a veto. The 
Relationship Agreement between the United Nations and the Court makes specific 
provision for cooperation where there is a Security Council referral.
533
 The Security 
Council may thus refer any situation that they consider to be a threat to international 
peace and security to the Prosecutor. And in turn the Court may inform the Security 
Council of the failure by a State to cooperate for the Security Council to consider 
taking appropriate action. This arrangement obviously provides for the Security 
Council to use universal jurisdiction to refer situations to the Court even where these 
situations involve States not Party to the Rome Statute.  
 
The first example of this cooperation was when the Security Council referred the 
situation in Darfur, in western Sudan to the ICC.
534
 On 4 March 2009, Pre-Trial 
Chamber 1 issued a warrant of arrest against Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir for 
his alleged responsibility under article 25(3)(a) of the Statute for the crimes against 
humanity and war crimes (but not genocide) alleged by the Prosecution.
535
 Even the 
United States didn’t veto the decision but only abstained in the vote. This was 
however only after the United States made sure that they would not be entangled 
                                                        
533 William Schabas (Introduction to the ICC) (supra) 168 and Article 17 of the Negotiated Relationship 
Agreement Between the International Criminal Court and the United Nations: ‘1. When the Security Council, 
acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, decides to refer to the Prosecutor pursuant to 
article 13, paragraph (b), of the Statute, a situation in which one or more of the crimes referred to in article 
5 of the Statute appears to have been committed, the Secretary-General shall immediately transmit the 
written decision of the Security Council to the Prosecutor together with documents and other materials that 
may be pertinent to the decision of the Council. The Court undertakes to keep the Security Council informed 
in this regard in accordance with the Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. Such information 
shall be transmitted through the Secretary-General… 
3. Where a matter has been referred to the Court by the Security Council and the Court makes a finding, 
pursuant to article 87, paragraph 5 (b) or paragraph 7, of the Statute, of a failure by a State to cooperate 
with the Court, the Court shall inform the Security Council or refer the matter to it, as the case may be, and 
the Registrar shall convey to the Security Council through the Secretary-General the decision of the Court, 
together with relevant information in the case. The Security Council, through the Secretary-General, shall 
inform the Court through the Registrar of action, if any, taken by it under the circumstances.’ 
534 William Schabas (Introduction to the ICC) (supra) 170 
535 Max du Plessis in John Dugard (International Law: A South African Perspective) (supra) 197 
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before the ICC in the peace process in Sudan, when in Resolution 1593 they restated 
the obvious in Paragraph 2 by ‘recognizing that States not party to the Rome Statute 
have no obligation under the Statute, [but] urges all States and concerned regional and 
other international organizations to cooperate fully’. Paragraph 6 similarly ‘[d]ecides 
that nationals, current or former officials or personnel from a contributing State 
outside Sudan which is not a party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of that contributing State for all 
alleged acts or omissions arising out of or related to operations in Sudan established 
or authorized by the Council or the African Union, unless such exclusive jurisdiction 
has been expressly waived by that contributing State’.536  
 
It can be said that the Resolution is an attempt to define the ‘situation’ as being that in 
Darfur minus peacekeepers from non-party States.
537
 Schabas points out that these 
provisions are completely contrary to treaty provisions binding upon almost all United 
Nations Member States, including the United States. As he shows the four Geneva 
Conventions oblige a State Party ‘to search for persons alleged to have committed, or 
to have ordered to be committed, such grave breaches, and [to] bring such persons, 
regardless of their own nationality, before its own courts’ and that the Torture 
Convention imposes similar duties, yet Resolution 1593 tells them to ignore these 
provisions.
538
 The problem is that the Security Council acts as if it has the prerogative 
to mandate a limit of the jurisdiction of the ICC.
539
 To determine if the Security 
Council is entitled to act in this way Schabas refers to Article 103 if the Charter of the 
United Nations that stipulates that ‘[i]n the event of a conflict between the obligations 
of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations 
under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter 
shall prevail.’ Schabas argues that if this is indeed the case ‘then the ability of the 
Security Council to, in effect, neutralize the grave breaches provisions of the Geneva 
                                                        
536 For a discussion of how the United States always does this see Johan D van der Vyver ‘American foreign 
policy: Prejudices and responsibilities of the sole surviving superpower in the world’ (2005) Tydskrif vir die 
Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 436 ‘The United States always takes an active part in the drafting of multinational 
treaties. It almost invariably adopts an extremely conservative position regarding the substance of those 
treaties, prompting other countries in a spirit of compromise to abide by less than desired arrangements 
and lukewarm implementation procedures. But even then, when the time for ratification comes, the United 
States simply refuses to play ball.’  
537 Olympia Bekou and Robert Cryer ‘The International Criminal Court and Universal Jurisdiction: A Close 
Encounter?’ (2007) 56 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 59 
538 William Schabas (Introduction to the ICC) (supra) 172-173 and discussions of these Conventions in 
Chapter 3 (supra) 
539 William Schabas (Introduction to the ICC) (supra) 173 
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Conventions puts in doubt the claims of many writers that these are norms of jus 
cogens.’540 Schabas argues that paragraph 6 is certainly in conflict with the Rome 
Statute and when Uganda tried to refer their matter to the ICC, so as to exclude 
jurisdiction over certain individuals, the Prosecutor would have none of it. But when 
the Security Council does the same not a word is said.
541
  
 
Such selectivity and double standards have certainly led in part to the discontent that 
many African States have felt with the Security Council referral of the situation in the 
Sudan to the ICC and the arrest warrant against Omar al-Bashir. African States have 
complained that the ICC only focuses on Africa while ignoring similar violations on 
other continents, that is a ‘hegemonic tool of western powers which is targeting or 
discriminating against Africans’ and that it is merely an agent of neocolonialism or 
neo-imperialism.
542
 The Sudan referral has emphasized many of the most 
controversial issues in international law such as it being the first time that a sitting 
president has been investigated for international crimes before at the ICC as provided 
for in article 27(1) of the Rome Statute, which provides that ‘functional immunity 
does not apply to any individual before the ICC’.543  
 
Charles Jalloh points out that African States, rightly or wrongly, conflate the ICC with 
powerful European States and their concern is that African officials, through tools like 
universal jurisdiction, are being subjected to the jurisdiction of European Courts, 
while they feel this to be contrary to the principle that one State may not exercise its 
authority on the territory of another equal sovereign and independent State under 
Article 2(1) of the UN Charter.
544
 The concerns are so serious that the African Union 
called on the Security Council to defer the ICC’s investigation into al-Bashir in terms 
of article 16 of the Rome Statute asking for a suspension of prosecution or 
investigation for a period of up to 12 months.
545
 The AU went so far as to take a 
                                                        
540 William Schabas (Introduction to the ICC) (supra) 173 
541 William Schabas (Introduction to the ICC) (supra) 174 
542 Max du Plessis in John Dugard (International Law: A South African Perspective) (supra) 199 and also 
Charles Jalloh (AU Perspective on Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) 4 ‘In fact, recent AU statements suggest 
that the Hague-based criminal court is already feeling the chilling effect of the growing view among African 
states that universal jurisdiction and ICC jurisdiction are the same. And, worse, that the two jurisdictional 
devices are the new weapons of choice of former colonial powers targeting weaker African nations.’ 
543 Max du Plessis in John Dugard (International Law: A South African Perspective) (supra) 198 ‘[S]ince 
Sudan is not party to the Rome Statute this has given rise to questions about ‘head of state immunity under 
customary international law and the extent to which the Rome Statute’s provisions which strip that 
immunity can be applied to President al-Bashir’.’ 
544 Charles Jalloh (AU Perspective on Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) 29  
545 Max du Plessis in John Dugard (International Law: A South African Perspective) (supra) 200 
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resolution at a meeting in Sirte, Libya on 3 July 2009 where it called upon its 
members to defy the international arrest warrant issued by the ICC for al-Bashir.
546
 
Although there is an arrest warrant in circulation for al-Bashir he has not been 
arrested yet and there have been reports that States like Kenya, Chad and Djibouti 
have failed to enforce the warrant after inviting al-Bashir to visit their territory.
547
  
 
Although we have seen that the Security Council has the power to refer just about any 
situation to the ICC, we have see that the first time they tried to do so it has resulted 
in serious tensions and allegations leveled against the Security Council, some of 
which, it is submitted, are not wholly unjustified. The sad thing is that it is hard to 
think of a more horrific example of the abuse of human rights than that currently 
occurring in Sudan
548
, but even in this clear cut case African States prefer to rather 
make use of the rhetoric of colonialism and ICC discrimination against African States 
instead of cooperating with the ICC to end the abuse. It might well be asked that if the 
situation in Sudan does not evoke the sympathy of neighboring States and their 
acceptance of duties voluntarily assumed under the Rome Statute, will there ever be 
any situation that will? Jalloh mentions a noticeable recent push back by African 
governments against notions of universality, which has inevitably resulted in the same 
resistance to international justice and to the ICC.
549
 Whatever one’s personal views as 
to the justifiability of such action by African States it can certainly not be ignored. 
Jalloh, while believing universal jurisdiction to be a good thing raises pertinent 
concerns which should be heeded along with his warning that ‘seemingly well-
meaning European jurisdictions…should show sensitivity to context to avoid, or at 
least minimize, charges that universal jurisdiction is the new imperialism 
masquerading as international rule of law’.550 
                                                        
546 Max du Plessis in John Dugard (International Law: A South African Perspective) (supra) 200; Dire Tladi 
‘The African Union and the International Criminal Court: the battle for the soul of international law’ (2009) 
34 South African Yearbook of International Law 57 and for South Africa’s involvement see Max du Plessis 
and Christopher Gevers ‘Making amend(ment)s: South Africa and the International Criminal Court from 
2009 to 2010’ (2009) 34 South African Yearbook of International Law 4 ‘Thereafter, in what was 
undoubtedly the low-point in ICC-Africa relations, South Africa joined ranks with others at an AU meeting in 
Sirte, Libya in July 2009, to support an AU resolution (apparently driven by President Gadaffi) calling on its 
members to defy the international arrest warrant issued by the ICC for al-Bashir.’   
547 Max du Plessis in John Dugard (International Law: A South African Perspective) (supra) 200 
548 ‘Briefing; The humanitarian situation in Darfur’ IRIN Humanitarian News and Analysis (2013/08/15) 
available at http://www.irinnews.org/report/98580/briefing-the-humanitarian-situation-in-darfur 
(accessed 2014/04/28) 
549 Charles Jalloh (AU Perspective on Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) 2-4 
550 Charles Jalloh (AU Perspective on Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) 5 and see also Harmen van der Wilt 
(Universal jurisdiction under attack) (supra) 1088 ‘[T]he present author would like to end on a more 
somber and modest note: courts of formal colonial powers should be extremely careful in taking the lead in 
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All the difficulties contemplated, it is still submitted that if there is any ‘safe’, 
relatively uncontroversial and feasible way for States to exercise universal jurisdiction 
over core crimes it is when the Security Council has referred a situation to the ICC 
and requests UN member States to assist the Court with prosecuting suspects or 
delivering suspects to the Court. This is what happened with the ICTY and ICTR and 
in those circumstances States seemed willing to assist.
551
 It must not be forgotten 
however that the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda weren’t in a position to protest and 
that States at the receiving end of a Security Council referral will probably still 
protest, but at least the prosecuting State will have some form of international 
legitimacy, political backing and protection for its endeavor and the inevitable 
backlash. Obviously this does not assist at all with an attempt to prosecute citizens of 
nations like China and the United States but it is the only system and solution 
available at the moment.  
 
4.2.2.3 Proprio motu authority of the Prosecutor 
 
During the drafting process of the Rome Statute it was felt that the Prosecutor would 
need to have proprio motu powers to independently initiate investigations or else the 
Court would not have much work to do. This was opposed by the United States and 
some other powerful States but supported by the caucus of ‘like-minded’ States and 
the non-governmental organizations, with the latter winning the argument.
552
 Article 
15 makes provision for the proprio motu prosecutor.
553
 But certain safeguards, such 
                                                                                                                                                              
prosecution and trial of suspects of atrocities in armed conflicts which are the legacy of their own states’ 
gloomy machinations’. 
551 The ad hoc Tribunals were formed under the auspices of the UN Security Council and article 25 of the 
Charter of the United Nations imposes a duty on all Member States ‘to accept and carry out the decisions of 
the Security Council in accordance with the Charter’. 
552 William Schabas (Introduction to the ICC) (supra) 177 
553 Article 15 reads as follows:  
1. The Prosecutor may initiate investigations proprio motu on the basis of information on crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court. 
2. The Prosecutor shall analyze the seriousness of the information received. For this purpose, he or she may 
seek additional information from States, organs of the United Nations, intergovernmental or 
nongovernmental organizations, or other reliable sources that he or she deems appropriate, and may 
receive written or oral testimony at the seat of the Court. 
3. If the Prosecutor concludes that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation, he or she 
shall submit to the Pre-Trial Chamber a request for authorization of an investigation, together with any 
supporting material collected. Victims may make representations to the Pre-Trial Chamber, in accordance 
with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 
4. If the Pre-Trial Chamber, upon examination of the request and the supporting material, considers that 
there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation, and that the case appears to fall within the 
jurisdiction of the Court, it shall authorize the commencement of the investigation, without prejudice to 
subsequent determinations by the Court with regard to the jurisdiction and admissibility of a case. 
5. The refusal of the Pre-Trial Chamber to authorize the investigation shall not preclude the presentation of 
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as a degree of oversight by the Pre-Trial Chamber and a robust version of 
complementarity were put in place to placate concerned opponents.
554
 These measures 
were, however, not enough for the United States and their main problem was that the 
territorial State might refer a matter to the ICC when an offence was committed in its 
territory and the offender was the national of another State and the consent of the 
State of nationality was not obtained.
555
 The Prosecutor will proceed to investigate 
‘on the basis of information’ received if ‘there is a reasonable basis to believe’ that a 
crime falling within the jurisdiction of the Court has been or is being committed and 
will always consider the ‘interests of justice’. Cases are selected according to their 
gravity and the Prosecutor will only focus on the most serious crimes and those who 
bear the greatest responsibility for these crimes and will rely on national efforts in 
terms of the principle of complementarity for matters against other offenders.
556
It was 
further the most foreseeable of the three triggers that the Prosecutor would receive 
information from individuals or organizations, rather than referrals from States.
557
 
 
The first instance of the Prosecutor using his proprio motu powers was in 2009 when 
an investigation was launched into the crimes allegedly committed during the 2007-
2008 post-election violence in Kenya. On 8 March 2011 ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II 
issued summons for six suspects on both sides of the election violence, including for 
the current President Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta.
558
 These efforts could probably not 
have gotten of to a worse start than it has with Kenya’s political elite responding 
aggressively to the ICC indictments and its Parliament passing a resolution on 22 
December 2010 calling for Kenya’s withdrawal from the Rome Statute. 559  ICC 
Prosecutors have recently admitted that they have no realistic chance of successfully 
prosecuting President Kenyatta in the face of the Nairobi Government’s “pure 
obstructionism.”560 These trends are disturbing, albeit not surprising, and show that 
                                                                                                                                                              
a subsequent request by the Prosecutor based on new facts or evidence regarding the same situation. 
6. If, after the preliminary examination referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2, the Prosecutor concludes that the 
information provided does not constitute a reasonable basis for an investigation, he or she shall inform 
those who provided the information. This shall not preclude the Prosecutor from considering further 
information submitted to him or her regarding the same situation in the light of new facts or evidence. 
554 William Schabas (Introduction to the ICC) (supra) 179-180 
555 Jo Stigen ‘The Relationship between the International Criminal Court and National Jurisdictions, The 
Principle of Complementarity’ (2008) Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 85  
556 William Schabas (Introduction to the ICC) (supra) 181-182 and the Report on Prosecutorial Strategy 
published by the Office of the Prosecutor in The Hague on 14 September 2006 
557 Olympia Bekou and Robert Cryer (The ICC and Universal Jurisdiction: A Close Encounter?) (supra) 55 
558 Max du Plessis in John Dugard (International Law: A South African Perspective) (supra) 196 
559 Max du Plessis in John Dugard (International Law: A South African Perspective) (supra) 197 
560 Thomas Escritt ‘Kenyatta trial doomed unless Kenya helps: ICC Prosecutors’ Reuters (2014/02/05) 
available: http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/05/us-kenya-icc-hearing (last accessed 2014/04/28) 
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the ICC and its first attempts at a Security Council referral and a proprio motu 
investigation by the Prosecutor are on the verge of foundering on the rocks of political 
opposition.
561
 
 
Without trying to sound pessimistic it doesn’t seem unreasonable to predict that the 
reaction by Kenya to its leaders being prosecuted is what may be expected in the 
overwhelming majority of similar cases in future. It probably is too much to expect of 
a State Party to abide by its previous declaration of solidarity with the ICC when they 
have since become the target and this means they might very well, as a result, lose the 
power they hold as leaders of that country.
562
 This is true especially if means of 
escaping such a prosecution (like a claim to notions of sovereignty or discrimination 
from the Courts’ side) is readily at hand. It is really no more fanciful than expecting 
an accused, in a domestic criminal matter, to do the prosecutors work and prove 
himself guilty. As we see when the current leaders of a State like Kenya are 
prosecuted they suddenly become unwilling to cooperate with the Prosecutor and this 
renders him or her powerless.
563
 There is really no enforcement mechanism except a 
referral by the Court of the matter to the Security Council. But the Security Council 
will in all likelihood not act, as they by then had not seen the matter as so affecting 
the issues of peace and security (or their own interests to be more accurate) that they 
referred it in the first place.  
 
                                                                                                                                                              
and also BBC News ‘Kenyatta appears at ICC in Hague for landmark hearing’ BBC News Africa (2014/10/08) 
available: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-29530638 (last accessed 2014/10/11) ‘But the trial has 
reached a deadlock. The prosecution accuse the Kenyan Government of withholding vital evidence, the 
defence say without evidence there should be no trial…Mr. Kenyatta has accused the court of being biased 
against African leaders…Analysts say he turned the prosecution to his advantage, portraying it as foreign 
intervention in Kenya’s domestic affairs.’  
561 The phrase ‘foundered on the rocks of fact’ is borrowed and adapted from Alfred, P Rubin (Actio 
Popularis, Jus Cogens and Offenses Erga Omnes) (supra) 267   
562 Frédéric Mégret ‘Why would States want to join the ICC? A theoretical exploration based on the legal 
nature of complementarity’ in Jann K Kleffner & Gerben Korr (eds) ‘Complementary Views on 
Complementarity’ (2006) TMC Asser Press, The Hague 3 ‘My realism is not of the unwavering dogmatic kind. 
But, conversely, my impression is that international lawyers are too quick to take for granted that States 
join the ICC for the grand reasons for which they claim to join the ICC. I am deeply skeptical of a certain 
triumphalist international law discourse which seems to assume that States should – or worse do – join the 
ICC just because such is the moral imperative of the times. What I want even less than being dogmatically 
realist, as will become apparent, is to assume uncritically that States behave spontaneously in ways 
designed to maximize the global common good.’ 
563 In Antonio Cassese ‘On the Current Trends towards Criminal Prosecution and punishment of Breaches of 
International Humanitarian Law’ (1998) 9 European Journal of International Law it was said by the ICTY’s 
first president, Antonio Cassese that ‘The ICTY is very much like a giant without arms and legs-it needs 
artificial limbs to walk and work. And these artificial limbs are state authorities. If the cooperation of states 
is not forthcoming, they cannot fulfill their functions.’ 13. And this remains true for the ICC today. 
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The issue of the veto will also bedevil such an endeavor even further. We may take 
the civil war in Syria as an example. Should a prosecution by the ICC be 
contemplated at some stage in future and the Security Council is asked to intervene 
because of a possible lack of cooperation it is very likely that Russia, a close ally of 
Syria, will obstruct and veto any such efforts. From the example of Sudan we also see 
that not even a Security Council sanctioned investigation is any guarantee of 
cooperation by the State under investigation. If Kenya can rely on its sovereignty, 
obstructing techniques, or anything else, to avoid its leader being tried before the ICC 
and if Sudan and other sympathetic States can blame the ICC of being a 
discriminatory tool in Western hands to avoid prosecution they will do so.
564
 As much 
as commentators and other States condemn this, each such observer must contemplate 
how he would react if found in a similar situation. It is submitted that it can almost 
not be conceived of a State Party meekly accepting ICC jurisdiction if the ICC intends 
prosecuting its own leaders, and even less so a third State, whether there is a Security 
Council referral or not. The implications for the possible exercise of universal 
jurisdiction are not hard to see. If a ‘model’ State like Kenya who is actually a 
member of the ICC suddenly opposes the ICC to the extent that it does, how can 
success be expected where the prosecution of a third State, who has never pretended 
to swear allegiance to the ICC, is attempted? 
 
4.3 No Universal Jurisdiction for the ICC 
 
Against the above background we may now consider whether the ICC Prosecutor was 
given the power to act in terms of universal jurisdiction in prosecuting international 
crimes. But just before we do so we need to briefly look at the ways jurisdiction is 
limited in terms of the Rome Statute. We have already seen that in terms of Article 17 
the Court will defer to national justice systems unless the State having jurisdiction 
over the specific offence is unwilling or unable genuinely to investigate and 
prosecute. In addition to this the Court possesses a temporal jurisdiction (ratione 
temporis), which means it cannot deal with crimes committed before the entry into 
                                                        
564 Johan van der Vyver (Universal jurisdiction) (supra) 132 describes this phenomenon well when he says: 
‘[w]hile a particular regime feels politically secure, the persons in authority can afford to abide by the rules 
of good government, but once the maintenance of political control is under threat, one can never tell!’ 
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force of the Statute, which date is 1 July 2002.
565
 Then there is personal (ratione 
personae) jurisdiction whereby the ICC exercises jurisdiction over nationals of a State 
Party who are accused of a crime, regardless of where the crime was committed.
566
 
Territorial (ratione loci) jurisdiction applies and means that the Court has jurisdiction 
over crimes committed on the territory of States Parties, regardless of the nationality 
of the offender.
567
 Lastly as far as subject-matter (ratione materiae) jurisdiction goes 
the ICC has jurisdiction over four categories of international crimes: genocide, crimes 
against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression. These crimes are described 
as ‘the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole’ and 
the Statute calls them ‘unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of 
humanity’.568 
 
Schabas says that the four crimes subject to the jurisdiction of the ICC are 
international crimes because they are not usually prosecuted in ordinary criminal 
justice systems, but unlike earlier treaty crimes like for example piracy, the slave 
trade and terrorism they are not prosecuted, not because they are territorially 
inaccessible or have a transnational element but because they are usually left 
unpunished by the very State where the crime was committed. Thus the explanation is 
political as the State of territorial jurisdiction is unwilling to prosecute because of its 
own complicity in the criminal behavior.
569
 
 
The ICC was created with the consent of those who are themselves subject to its 
jurisdiction and they have agreed that crimes committed on their territory, or by their 
nationals may be prosecuted.
570
 These two primary grounds of jurisdiction are set out 
in Article 12.
571
 When jurisdiction was discussed in Rome it was an extremely 
                                                        
565 See in this regard Articles 24 and 11 dealing respectively with temporal jurisdiction and non-
retroactivity and the exception providing for a State not Party to the Rome Statute to make an ad hoc 
declaration accepting the Court’s jurisdiction over specific crimes in accordance with Article 12(3). 
566 Article 12(2)(b) and William Schabas (Introduction to the ICC) (supra) 76 ‘Creating jurisdiction based on 
the nationality of the offender is the least controversial form of jurisdiction and was the absolute minimum 
proposed by some States at the Rome Conference.’ 
567 Article 12(2)(a) and William Schabas (Introduction to the ICC) (supra) 81 ‘It also has jurisdiction over 
crimes committed on the territory of States that accept its jurisdiction on an ad hoc basis, in accordance 
with Article 12(3), as well as where jurisdiction is conferred by the Security Council, pursuant to Article 
13(b) but also acting in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations’. 
568 See Article 5 together with the preamble to the Statute and William Schabas (Introduction to the ICC) 
(supra) 89 
569 William Schabas (Introduction to the ICC) (supra) 89 
570 William Schabas (Introduction to the ICC) (supra) 64 
571 (a) The State on the territory of which the conduct in question occurred or, if the crime was committed 
on board a vessel or aircraft, the State of registration of that vessel or aircraft; 
(b) The State of which the person accused of the crime is a national. 
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difficult and controversial issue, the issue that led to a break in the consensus.
572
 
During the drafting there were some who argued that what States could do on their 
own in their national justice systems they should also be able to do collectively in the 
ICC.
573
 The basis on which the ICC operates is delegated authority obtained from its 
State Parties.
574
 Schabas argues that the jurisdiction accepted by the international 
community for the ICC is narrower than the jurisdiction that individual States are 
entitled to exercise over the same crimes.
575
 It is narrower, for instance, because it 
does not provide for universal jurisdiction. Bekou and Cryer argue that it need not 
necessarily have been this way as States are ‘entitled to assert universal jurisdiction 
over international crimes’. 576  Schabas is a bit more cautious and elaborates by 
mentioning that under customary international law universal jurisdiction could be 
exercised over piracy, the slave trade and traffic in women and children. Then he 
mentions that recent multilateral treaties provide for universal jurisdiction over 
hijacking, piracy, attacks upon diplomats, nuclear safety, terrorism, apartheid, torture 
and enforced disappearances. When he gets to genocide, war crimes and crimes 
against humanity he mentions that universal jurisdiction ‘is also widely accepted’ but 
that recent developments have left the matter not only ‘unresolved but also still in 
some doubt’.577  
 
Some States during drafting argued that since they are delegating their jurisdiction to 
the ICC which includes their ability to exercise universal jurisdiction over the core 
crimes the ICC should obviously also be able to do so.
578
 Germany proposed a ‘pure’ 
form of universal jurisdiction, which would have given the ICC ‘jurisdiction over any 
offence committed anywhere, irrespective of whether the suspect was present in the 
territory of a State Party to the Statute’. Another, more moderate proposal came from 
South Korea. This would have seen the ICC have jurisdiction when States with 
territorial, nationality or passive personality jurisdiction, or the State with custody of 
the accused delegated their jurisdiction to the ICC. The last mentioned ground would 
                                                        
572 Olympia Bekou and Robert Cryer (The ICC and Universal Jurisdiction: A Close Encounter?) (supra) 50 
573 William Schabas (Introduction to the ICC) (supra) 65 
574 Dapo Akande ‘The Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court over Nationals of Non-Parties: Legal 
Basis and Limits’ (2003) 1 Journal of International Criminal Justice 621 
575 William Schabas (Introduction to the ICC) (supra) 64 
576 Olympia Bekou and Robert Cryer (The ICC and Universal Jurisdiction: A Close Encounter?) (supra) 50 
577 William Schabas (Introduction to the ICC) (supra) 64-65 
578 William Schabas (Introduction to the ICC) (supra) 66 
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have been universal jurisdiction with presence or what is sometimes known as a 
conditional form of universal jurisdiction.
579
 
 
There were two objections to universal jurisdiction in any of its forms and as a result 
neither were adopted. One objection came about because China and the United States 
quarreled with the legality of an international court that could exercise universal 
jurisdiction.
580
 The United States argued unconvincingly
581
 that there was no rationale 
in law for such a court and insisted that the only legal basis for jurisdiction could be 
active personal jurisdiction, meaning that the court would only be entitled to try 
nationals of a State Party. This would mean that a State could protect its nationals 
from prosecution simply by withholding ratification.
582
 The United States were not 
successful in this endeavor and is still not happy with the solution regarding 
territoriality reached at the Rome Conference because it means that the ICC can 
exercise jurisdiction over Americans in certain circumstances without its consent.
583
 
 
Many others were critical of the compromise embodied by Article 12 and its failure to 
provide for universal jurisdiction, as they believed this would doom the Court to 
impotence. It was feared that the States that never faced problems would join the 
Court including the Scandinavians, Canada, Ireland, the Netherlands, and so on. But 
States facing war and internal strife, especially those in the South, would never join 
and thereby protect themselves from its reach, at least with regard to crimes 
committed in their territories. Others took the middle path and believed that the 
provision wasn’t perfect but was all that was possible at the time.584 Bekou and Cryer 
mention that the criticism of the jurisdictional provisions of the ICC persists with 
authors contending that most of the perpetrators of egregious crimes will never be 
prosecuted by anyone and that the phenomenon of ‘travelling tyrants’ cannot be dealt 
with.
585
 What happened however was that along with a very rapid pace of acceleration 
the very States expected to steer clear of the ICC, because of their obvious 
vulnerability to prosecution, were the ones ratifying the Statute. This included States 
                                                        
579 Olympia Bekou and Robert Cryer (The ICC and Universal Jurisdiction: A Close Encounter?) (supra) 51 
580 William Schabas (Introduction to the ICC) (supra) 66 
581 See for a convincing and comprehensive rebuttal of their argument Dapo Akande (Jurisdiction over 
Nationals of Non-Parties) (supra) 622-625  
582 William Schabas (Introduction to the ICC) (supra) 66 
583 William Schabas (Introduction to the ICC) (supra) 66 
584 William Schabas (Introduction to the ICC) (supra) 67 
585 Olympia Bekou and Robert Cryer (The ICC and Universal Jurisdiction: A Close Encounter?) (supra) 52 
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with troubled pasts like Fiji, Sierra Leone, Cambodia, the DRC, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, Afghanistan and Burundi. Obviously this was totally 
unexpected and disproved the arguments of those critical of the compromise on 
jurisdiction in Article 12.
586
  
 
Schabas wonders whether the rapid rate and number of ratifications would have 
happened had broad universal jurisdiction been adopted because it would have left 
very little initiative for States to join the Court. He argues that if universal jurisdiction 
applied crimes committed on the territory of States would have been subject to the 
Court’s jurisdiction one way or another. Schabas thus argues that far from dooming 
the Court to impotence the limited jurisdictional scheme of Article 12 has actually 
helped and contributed to the high rate of ratification.
587
 This writer tends to agree 
with Schabas on this aspect and believes that a very positive result of so many States 
with troubled pasts becoming members of the ICC is that these States have indicated 
that they will not tolerate such offences again. They are making it clear that on their 
territories, and for their nationals, justice will in future be done. Although it will not 
be easy to measure, this action should have a strong deterrent effect on would be 
offenders residing in these countries, and if this happens, it is more than many 
probably could have hoped for. 
 
Bekou and Cryer note that if the ICC had been granted universal jurisdiction it might 
have provided support for and helped bring about the ideal of universal justice. It 
could have assisted in encouraging prosecutions throughout the world with States 
taking a more active role in prosecuting core offences domestically.
588
 Yet these 
authors, although firmly supportive of universal jurisdiction, feel that the decision not 
to grant the ICC universal jurisdiction was the best one. Their reasons are 
enlightening. They argue firstly that because the United States was particularly hostile 
to any form of universal jurisdiction and promised to actively oppose the Court if it 
were given such jurisdiction that this would have allowed the United States and others 
to set their aim on this ‘slightly more vulnerable target’. They point out that the ICJ 
Congo v Belgium matter placed universal jurisdiction ‘a little on the back foot’ and 
the concept is ‘beleaguered enough without being further critiqued.’ They advise a 
                                                        
586 William Schabas (Introduction to the ICC) (supra) 68 
587 William Schabas (Introduction to the ICC) (supra) 68 
588 Olympia Bekou and Robert Cryer (The ICC and Universal Jurisdiction: A Close Encounter?) (supra) 52 
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period of retrenchment, which would not be available if ‘those critiques of universal 
jurisdiction were also apt to be employed as an anti-ICC measure’.589 They also point 
out that China, India and Russia have been content so far with having the United 
States take the lead in the fight against the ICC but they would actively join the 
United States very quickly if there were any risk of the ICC attempting to assert non-
consensual jurisdiction over their nationals. The ICC would then find itself in a very 
difficult position facing the ire of three permanent members of the Security Council 
and one other powerful State. This would have made cooperation or even cordiality 
between the ICC and the Security Council very hard and might have incapacitated the 
ICC before it even started.
590
  
 
The next reason they provide is what they term the ‘Belgium’ problem591 and how the 
wide jurisdiction there ‘led to a plethora of politically sensitive claims being brought 
before the Belgian courts…which caused huge consternation internationally’. The 
authors predict a ‘similar furor’ had the ICC been given universal jurisdiction and the 
ICC Prosecutor attempted to exercise it. Thus if Belgium ‘was unable to withstand the 
international heat, it would be a great deal to ask the ICC to do so’.592  
 
In line with this concern they mention the very practical aspect of costs involved in 
investigations and prosecution of crimes under universal jurisdiction. The Prosecutor 
has to set priorities taking into account limited resources for which he is answerable 
to the Assembly of States Parties. It would be difficult to defend, and speculative to 
launch, an investigation in situations where the nationality or territoriality State is not 
obliged to cooperate, hoping that a perpetrator will turn up in a State which is under 
obligation to transfer him to the ICC.
593
 They also mention that the use of ‘situation’ 
in the Rome Statute was adopted specifically to prevent one-sided trials but that 
universal jurisdiction, even where there was custody of a suspect, would not be able 
to avoid appearing to be biased as in all likelihood only a small group of one side’s 
suspects will be available for trial.
594
  
 
                                                        
589 Olympia Bekou and Robert Cryer (The ICC and Universal Jurisdiction: A Close Encounter?) (supra) 54 
590 Olympia Bekou and Robert Cryer (The ICC and Universal Jurisdiction: A Close Encounter?) (supra) 55 
591 See the discussion of this aspect in detail under paragraph 3.2.2 supra 
592 Olympia Bekou and Robert Cryer (The ICC and Universal Jurisdiction: A Close Encounter?) (supra) 55-57 
593 Olympia Bekou and Robert Cryer (The ICC and Universal Jurisdiction: A Close Encounter?) (supra) 56-57 
594 Olympia Bekou and Robert Cryer (The ICC and Universal Jurisdiction: A Close Encounter?) (supra) 58-59 
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Bekou and Cryer also mention that the ‘ICC will not be effective unless States 
circumvent the lack of any real supranational enforcement system by cooperating with 
the ICC’. A strong cooperation system is necessary for there to be trials and 
convictions and for this to happen States need to assist by delivering up defendants, 
collecting evidence, serving documents, etc.
595
 They mention that for universal 
jurisdiction in the ICC to work cooperation by non-parties States with the ICC would 
have been indispensable but these third States would not take ownership and 
cooperation would be very unlikely.
596
 Cooperation with the ICC is entirely 
consensual and in the absence of any enforcement measures there is nothing to do 
about even recalcitrant States Parties, who refuse the ICC’s request for assistance.597 
Lastly we may consider what the authors term the ‘complementarity paradox’, which 
simply means that the very same unwilling and unable States would also be the ones 
required to cooperate with the ICC so that there may be effective prosecutions and 
trials. But this is obviously an unrealistic expectation, unlikely to happen and as the 
authors point out there is currently no solution for this serious problem.
598
 
 
Hence we see that universal jurisdiction was not conferred on the ICC. Some might 
say that this was mainly due to the political resistance to the concept by powerful 
States like the United States and China and this is very likely. But like Bekou and 
Cryer point out there were also practical considerations of concern to everyone and 
whatever the motivation for this decision was it was probably the right one. 
 
4.4 Universal Jurisdiction for States Parties to the ICC? 
 
It was concluded that universal jurisdiction was not conferred upon the ICC, but we 
must still consider where this leaves States Parties to the ICC. Does the ICC provide 
any incentive for them to exercise universal jurisdiction? Jann Kleffner says that the 
Statute does not include any express reference to universal jurisdiction and appears 
‘agnostic’ in this regard, which leaves the pre-existing jurisdictional regime with 
                                                        
595 Olympia Bekou and Robert Cryer (The ICC and Universal Jurisdiction: A Close Encounter?) (supra) 60-61 
and the general obligation to cooperate contained in Article 86 of the Rime Statute: ‘States Parties shall, in 
accordance with the provisions of this Statute, cooperate fully with the Court in its investigation and 
prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.’ 
596 Olympia Bekou and Robert Cryer (The ICC and Universal Jurisdiction: A Close Encounter?) (supra) 66 
597 Olympia Bekou and Robert Cryer (The ICC and Universal Jurisdiction: A Close Encounter?) (supra) 61-63 
598 Olympia Bekou and Robert Cryer (The ICC and Universal Jurisdiction: A Close Encounter?) (supra) 63 
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regard to core crimes unaltered.
599
 States themselves hold contrasting views with 
some limiting their jurisdiction to that underlying the ICC namely territoriality and 
nationality,
600
 while others have enacted universal jurisdiction.
601
 Some believe that 
the establishment of universal jurisdiction over ICC crimes would be contrary to the 
Rome Statute and others believe that such establishment amounts to a legal duty 
imposed on them by the Statute.
602
 Luc Reydams finds it unbelievable that some 
attempt to argue that any particular State has broader jurisdiction than the ICC, 
because as he points out, an early justification of universal jurisdiction was precisely 
the absence of an international court.
603
 Kleffner argues along similar lines but then 
immediately contends that because the ICC cannot possibly deal with all matters 
universal jurisdiction might still have a role to play in preventing gaps through which 
perpetrators could escape.
604
 Based on its track record it is humbly submitted that 
universal jurisdiction has not played much of such a role so far. Be that as it may 
however, Kleffner’s argument is not new, it is simply a repeat of the same timeworn 
argument that still doesn’t tell us whether the ICC promotes universal jurisdiction or 
not.  
 
Louise Arbour
605
, a former prosecutor at the ICTY, remarks that there is no express 
provision in the Rome Statute that ‘requires’ States to exercise their universal 
jurisdiction, but that the Preamble in Paragraph 6 ‘[r]ecalls that it is the duty of every 
State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international 
crimes’. She believes that the Rome Statute calls for, and relies upon, the fullest 
exercise by States of their own international criminal jurisdiction, which includes 
their permissive and compulsory universal jurisdiction. But she also admits that her 
observations are based on speculation and that end game may depend on the 
Prosecutor and the ICC making the deliberate policy choice of encouraging an 
                                                        
599  Jann K Kleffner ‘The Impact of Complementarity on National Implementation of Substantive 
International Law’ (2004) 1 Journal of International Criminal Justice 106 
600 Jann Kleffner (Impact of Complementarity on National Implementation) (supra) 107 and Section 51 of 
the UK International Criminal Court Act 2001 
601 Section 1 of Germany's Code of Crimes Against International Law of 26 June 2002, section 8(b) of 
Canada's Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act of 29 June 2000, section 8(1)(c) of New Zealand's 
International Crimes and International Criminal Court Act (2000), section 268-117 of Australia's 
International Criminal Court (Consequential Amendments) Act 2002 in conjunction with Article 15(4) of the 
Criminal Code Act 1995 
602 Jann Kleffner (Impact of Complementarity on National Implementation) (supra) 108 
603 Luc Reydams (Rise and Fall) (supra) 7 
604 Jann Kleffner (Impact of Complementarity on National Implementation) (supra) 108-109 
605 Louise Arbour ‘Will the ICC have an Impact on Universal Jurisdiction?’ (2003) 1 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 585-588 
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expansion of the existing universal jurisdiction of member States. She also believes 
that such a choice may come from a more political source namely that the States 
Parties may decide that it is cheaper to encourage widespread universal jurisdiction by 
themselves rather than fund the default jurisdiction of the ICC. She thus predicts that 
the express preference in the Rome Statute for domestic prosecutions may lead to 
States increasing their use of universal jurisdiction. One cannot be sure however and 
this is probably why she is so cautious in her predictions. It is submitted that it is not 
very likely that the ICC or the Prosecutor will openly encourage the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction by member States as Arbour hopes they will. If it does it is 
likely to exceed its own jurisdictional mandate, because it only has jurisdiction when 
an offence was committed by the national or on the territory of a State Party, except 
of course in the case of a Security Council referral. Thus if a State Party were to 
respond to such a call, where the ICC doesn’t have jurisdiction, and it later became 
unable to conduct the prosecution the ICC wouldn’t be able to take the matter over 
and the ICC would find itself on dangerous political ground even if it tried to assist 
such a State in other more subtle and indirect ways. The political embarrassment for a 
State that arrests a suspect only to realize later that it has no authority to either 
prosecute him or transfer the proceedings to the ICC would be also immense.  
 
The scenario sketched by Max du Plessis provides a good example of this problem.
606
 
He asks what happens when South Africa for instance tries to prosecute Robert 
Mugabe and in this regard he refers to Article 98(1) of the ICC Statute, which 
provides that: 
 
The [International Criminal] Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or assistance 
which would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under 
international law with respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a person or property of a 
third State, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of that third State for the waiver 
of the immunity. 
 
Du Plessis goes on to argue that the South African ICC Act in Section 4(2)(a), by 
providing South African courts with jurisdiction over high-ranking officials, tries to 
cut across a major problem in international criminal law in attempting to scrap the 
                                                        
606 Max du Plessis ‘South Africa’s Implementation of the ICC Statute – An African Example’ (2007) 5 Journal 
of International Criminal Justice 472-477 
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defence of immunity for a head of State, a Member of Parliament or a government 
official. Yet there is serious controversy in international law as to immunity for heads 
of state and other senior government members. Thus according to Du Plessis ‘a South 
African court faced with a claim of immunity from a serving head of state, and in 
light of the prevailing international and foreign case law that indicate binding 
customary international law, might be inclined to uphold the personal immunity of a 
head of state notwithstanding the provisions of Section 4(2)(a) of the ICC Act’.607 Du 
Plessis concludes that  
 
‘[I]f one accepts that under international law personal immunity attaches to incumbent senior 
cabinet officials such as heads of state, then not only would any prosecution by South Africa 
under the ICC Act of a current leader of a country that is not party to the ICC Statute be 
possibly inconsistent with its (South Africa’s) obligations under customary international law, 
but the ICC would also be prevented from requesting the surrender of that person. This may in 
fact mean the proceedings against such a person are effectively precluded.’608  
 
Moreover it is also very likely that such a call by the ICC for States to exercise 
universal jurisdiction would also very quickly turn the indifference of sleeping giants 
like Russia and China to open antagonism towards the ICC. The scenario envisioned 
by Bekou and Cryer would not be far-fetched and the ICC might lose any prospect of 
cooperation or even cordiality with the Security Council and three of its powerful 
members. Louise Arbour says that the likelihood of an ICC prosecution of a US 
citizen, against the wishes of the US Government, or even a Canadian or a EU citizen 
is ‘remote in the extreme’ and this is why national jurisdictions should fulfill this 
task.
609
 But we may well ask what will happen to the poor State so brave as to try? If 
there were such a State it would find itself isolated and buckle under the pressure just 
as Belgium has. It is my prediction that the ICC will not come out in open support of 
such a State for prudent and (mainly political) reasons. 
 
We have seen that the Rome Statute contains no express reference to universal 
jurisdiction. Yet some writers contend that universal jurisdiction is implied in the 
Preamble of the Statute to the extent that it would thwart and undermine the very 
                                                        
607 Max du Plessis (South Africa’s Implementation of the ICC Act) (supra) 475 
608 Max du Plessis (South Africa’s Implementation of the ICC Act) (supra) 476-477 
609 Louise Arbour (Will the ICC have an Impact on Universal Jurisdiction?) (supra) 588 
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purpose for which the ICC was created if it were not read in such a way.
610
 The 
reference is usually to sections in the Preamble that: ‘affirm that the most serious 
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not go unpunished 
and that their effective prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at the national 
level and by enhancing international cooperation’; determine ‘to put an end to 
impunity of perpetrators of these crimes’; and recalls ‘that it is the duty of every State 
to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes.’ It 
seems however that inherent, even in these purposes heralded by supporters of 
universal jurisdiction, are also clear limits to jurisdiction. Cooperation for instance 
denotes the working together of States, which is the opposite of a unilateral exercise 
of an unlimited universal jurisdiction. One may also ask what the duty on a State to 
exercise its criminal jurisdiction means? Traditionally this would mean its territorial 
and maybe active nationality jurisdiction. Passive nationality is questionable and even 
more so is universal jurisdiction.
611
 It is highly unlikely that States would consider 
themselves bound or obliged to exercise universal jurisdiction as part of its 
jurisdiction in terms of the Rome Statute. Logically States would only agree to be 
bound to something for which they are responsible and over which they had actual 
control. In other words they can only be responsible for themselves and what they do, 
not what others do. For arguments sake let us assume that there were measures or 
sanctions available to the ICC to use against recalcitrant States Parties. Would States 
bind themselves and in so doing invite possible sanctions for failing to prosecute a 
crime with which they have no link and over which they probably have no control, 
including the suspect? I think not. It is submitted that the same applies even where the 
suspect is present in the State Party even for a short while. Among a myriad of 
possibilities, a suspect might receive a tip-off enabling him to leave before the 
authorities have a chance to obtain a warrant. Were a State bound in terms of the ICC 
to arrest the suspect it would run such a great risk of sanctions that they would 
probably contact the suspect themselves and kindly request him not to visit. Where 
would the line be drawn and when may the ICC find that a State has violated its duty 
in such a scenario?  
                                                        
610 Jordan J Paust ‘The Reach of ICC Jurisdiction Over Non-Signatory Nationals’ (January 2000) 33(1) 
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 7-8 
611 Ward Ferdinandusse ‘The Interaction of National and International Approaches in the Repression of 
International Crimes’ (2004) 15(5) European Journal of International Law 1046 ‘it is obvious that territorial 
jurisdiction would top that hierarchy, as it is widely seen as the strongest foundation for prosecution and 
the basis of criminal law. At the other end of the scale, universal jurisdiction is undoubtedly the weakest 
foundation’. 
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These are practical questions that those who argue that the ICC imposes a duty on 
States to exercise universal jurisdiction don’t start to consider. This does not even 
deal with the fact that there is no proof that there is a duty on States under 
international law to exercise universal jurisdiction. The farthest some have gone is to 
try and show that even though there is no duty, there is at least a right for States to do 
so. But even this argument based on a fanciful construction of the Lotus case is far 
from convincing in the light of what States actually do. How then can the ICC be said 
to impose such a duty? The ICC only imposes a duty on its States Parties to exercise 
their jurisdiction over crimes committed on their territory or by their nationals. Lastly, 
it is not often mentioned that the Preamble also emphasizes that ‘nothing in this 
Statute shall be taken as authorizing any State Party to intervene in an armed conflict 
or in the internal affairs of any State.’ This is another express limit to the powers of 
the ICC and its State Parties and echoes the main protest against universal jurisdiction 
namely that it intervenes in the internal affairs, by undermining, the sovereignty of 
another State.
612
 This provision reads almost the same as Article 2(7) of the Charter of 
the United Nations that ‘[n]othing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the 
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any state…’ No State may thus take it upon itself to interfere in the 
internal affairs of another State if it intends using the Rome Statute as its authority for 
doing so. Considering all these aspects it seems clear that it cannot be argued that the 
ICC imposes a duty on States Parties to exercise universal jurisdiction. As to whether 
it permits States Parties to exercise universal jurisdiction we also see that it contains 
no explicit instruction and one must agree with Kleffner that it leaves the pre-existing 
jurisdictional regime with regard to core crimes intact and it neither promotes nor 
discourages universal jurisdiction. This said the time has come to consider the 
position in South Africa and apply what we have learnt so far to the situation here. 
 
  
                                                        
612 Antonio Cassese (Current Trends) (supra) 11 ‘the reluctance of states regarding international penal 
enforcement is hardly surprising given that international criminal tribunals intrude on one of the most 
sacred areas of state sovereignty: criminal jurisdiction…international law is an edifice built on a volcano-
state sovereignty.’ 
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Chapter 5 
 
South Africa, The ICC and Universal Jurisdiction 
 
5.1 International law in South Africa 
 
5.1.1 Monism and Dualism 
 
The interaction between international and national law centers on the debate between 
monism and dualism. Monists contend that there is but a single system of law, with 
international law forming a part of it alongside the other branches of domestic law. 
Dualists hold that there are two essentially different systems of law, existing side by 
side each within its own sphere of either international or domestic law.
613
 Monists 
thus contend that municipal courts are obliged to apply rules of international law 
directly and there is no need for an act of adoption or transformation. No contextual 
or formal change is needed for international law to be applied at a domestic level. 
Some traditional and extreme monists contend that international law is supreme to 
municipal law and that municipal law which conflicts with international law will be 
regarded as void. Dualists on the other hand believe that domestic courts may apply 
international law only if it has been ‘adopted’ by such courts, or it has been 
transformed into local law by legislation and the philosophy behind this approach is 
that international law applies primarily between States.
614
 Dugard holds that the 
absolute monist position has since been qualified to ensure harmony between 
international and domestic law. It is called the ‘harmonization theory’ by which 
means customary international law is applied directly as forming part of the common 
law, but conflicting statutory rules and acts of State might still prevail over 
international law.
615
 Scholtz argues that the monism/ dualism debate is no longer 
relevant and that in terms of harmonization no conflict regarding primacy arises, as 
each law is supreme in its own sphere. There may still however be conflicts between 
obligations where a State for instance has obligations in terms of the international 
                                                        
613 See for a discussion of this relationship, Rosalyn Higgins ‘Problems and Process – International law and 
how we use it’ (1994) Clarendon Press, Oxford 205-218 
614 John Dugard (International Law: A South African Perspective) (supra) 42 and Werner Scholtz ‘A few 
thoughts on section 231 of the South African Constitution, Act 108 of 1996’ (2004) 29 South African 
Yearbook of International Law 204-205 
615 John Dugard (International Law: A South African Perspective) (supra) 43 
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sphere but does not act on these at the domestic level, the State would then breach its 
international duties but not violate any municipal law. Scholtz argues that a State 
cannot escape its international responsibilities by hiding behind deficiencies in its 
municipal law and it has a duty to bring its municipal law into line with its 
international obligations.
616
 
 
5.1.2 The South African legal tradition 
 
South Africa has a Roman-Dutch and English law heritage. Roman-Dutch writers like 
Grotius and those after him saw international law and municipal law as components 
of a universal legal order founded on natural law. Grotius did not regard international 
law as a foreign legal system and did not draw any sharp distinction between 
international and municipal law. Thus Dugard argues that in South Africa under 
Roman-Dutch law international law formed part of municipal law.
617
  This position 
did not change after British occupation and because Roman-Dutch law was retained 
as the common law and international law remained part of the common law it was 
applied directly by the courts without any statutory incorporation.
618
 Until 1994 
English law was an important part of South African public law, which included public 
international law and the recourse to English law confirmed the common law position 
regarding the relationship between international and municipal law.
619
 The position in 
South Africa has thus always been much more monist than dualist.
620
 As customary 
international law falls under common law it forms part of South African domestic 
law.
621
 Section 232 of the Constitution of South Africa confirms the common law 
position by stating that: ‘Customary international law is law in the Republic unless it 
is inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of Parliament.’622 Section 233 provides 
that: ‘when interpreting any legislation, every court must prefer any reasonable 
interpretation of the legislation that is consistent with international law over any 
alternative interpretation that is inconsistent with international law.’ Dugard argues 
that the common law and judicial decisions ‘are now subordinate to customary 
                                                        
616 Werner Scholtz (A few thoughts on section 231) (supra) 205 
617 John Dugard (International Law: A South African Perspective) (supra) 43-44 
618 John Dugard (International Law: A South African Perspective) (supra) 44 
619 Gerhard, P Kemp ‘Individual Criminal Liability for the International Crime of Aggression’ (2010) 
Intersentia, Antwerp, 176 
620 John Dugard (International Law: A South African Perspective) (supra) 47 
621 Gerhard Kemp (Individual Criminal Liability) (supra) 176 
622 Act 108 of 1996 
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international law as it is only the Constitution and Acts of Parliament that enjoy 
greater legal weight’.623 Kemp points out that this view corresponds to the position 
under English law where customary rules are considered part of the law of the land 
and enforced as such except insofar as they are inconsistent with Acts of Parliament 
or prior judicial decisions.
624
 
 
On proving customary international law Dugard writes that regard must not only be 
had to Section 232 but also to judicial precedent to determine which rules of 
customary international law are to be applied and how they should be proved. 
Because international law is not seen as foreign law but as part of the common law 
courts may take judicial notice thereof. In practice this means that courts have regard 
to the judicial decisions of international tribunals and to South African and foreign 
domestic courts as well as to writings on international law as to ‘whether or not a 
particular rule is accepted as a rule of customary international law on the ground that 
it meets the twin qualifications of usus (settled State practice) and opinio juris 
(practice backed by a sense of obligation that the rule is binding).
625
 
 
5.1.3 Incorporation and transformation of treaties 
 
It is not only customary international law, but also treaties, that form a source of 
international law. There are broadly speaking two methods of implementing 
international law, and these are incorporation and transformation. Ward 
Ferdinandusse describe these two positions as follows: 
 
‘Incorporation takes place when an international rule is integrated in the national legal order, 
so that the judiciary can directly apply that rule. This method of incorporation promotes 
complete implementation of the international rule, as it cannot be modified. Transformation 
denotes the enactment of a national law that mirrors the content of the international rule, thus 
transforming a rule of international law in a national one. This method of transformation gives 
the legislature the opportunity to tailor, or even modify, the international rule to fit the 
peculiarities of the national legal system. Technically speaking, international law is applied 
                                                        
623 John Dugard (International Law: A South African Perspective) (supra) 50 
624 Gerhard Kemp (Individual Criminal Liability) (supra) 177 
625 John Dugard (International Law: a South African perspective) (supra) 52 
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not at all after transformation. In these cases, national courts apply national law that 
reproduces the content of the original international norm.’626  
 
As Gerhard Kemp points out is not always easy to determine which approach is 
followed by national systems and that one domestic system may contain elements of 
both incorporation and transformation that are often used interchangeably.
627
 Werner 
Scholtz mentions that it ‘is clear from the wording of section 231(4) of the 1996 
Constitution that international agreements must be enacted before they can find 
municipal application in South Africa’.628 This position corresponds to the dictum set 
out by Chief Justice Steyn in Pan American World Airways Incorporated v SA Fire 
and Accident Insurance Co Ltd
629
 when he stated that it was: 
 
‘trite law…that in this country the conclusion of a treaty, convention or agreement by the 
South African government with any other government is an executive and not a legislative act. 
As a general rule, the provisions of an international instrument so concluded, are not 
embodied in our law except by legislative process…In the absence of any enactment giving 
[its] relevant provisions the force of law, [it] cannot effect the rights of the subject.’  
 
Scholtz further clarifies the difference between what he calls ‘international 
ratification’ and ‘constitutional ratification’ as follows:  
 
‘International ratification refers to the international process that brings the agreement into 
operation on the international plane through confirmation by the necessary state authority. 
Constitutional ratification refers to the procedure whereby the agreement receives approval of 
parliament and achieves municipal application. Constitutional ratification depends solely on 
                                                        
626 Ward, N Ferdinandusse ‘Direct Application of International Criminal Law in National Courts’ (2006) TMC 
Asser Press, The Hague 7 [Emphasis in the original] 
627 Gerhard Kemp (Individual Criminal Liability) (supra) 179 
628 Werner Scholtz (A few thoughts on section 231) (supra) 209 and Section 231 of the Constitution 108 of 
1996: (1) The negotiating and signing of all international agreements is the responsibility of the national 
executive. 
(2) An international agreement binds the Republic only after it has been approved by resolution in both the 
National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces, unless it is an agreement referred to in subsection 
(3). 
(3) An international agreement of a technical, administrative or executive nature, or an agreement which 
does not require either ratification or accession, entered into by the national executive, binds the Republic 
without approval by the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces, but must be tabled in the 
Assembly and the Council within a reasonable time. 
(4) Any international agreement becomes law in the Republic when it is enacted into law by national 
legislation; but a self-executing provision of an agreement that has been approved by Parliament is law in 
the Republic unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution of an Act of Parliament. 
(5) The Republic is bound by international agreements which were binding on the Republic when this 
Constitution took effect. 
629 1965 (3) SA 150 (A) at 161C-D and this dictum was confirmed in Azapo v President of the Republic of 
South Africa 1996 (4) SA 671 (CC) at 688 paragraph 26 
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the constitutional provisions of a state, while international ratification is an act in terms of 
international law where a deposit of the instrument of ratification takes place.’630  
 
Treaties in South Africa are thus ‘enacted’ or ‘incorporated’ into national law and this 
process involves three broad stages. First, the Cabinet consents to the submission of 
the treaty to Parliament. A legal technical process follows where the department drafts 
legislation, which is then submitted to the State law advisors to ensure it complies 
with domestic law. The draft legislation is done by the Department of Justice. The 
Department of Foreign Affairs also have to make sure that the draft legislation is in 
line with international law and the Republic’s international relations and other 
obligations. The last stage happens when the legislation has to pass through 
Parliament in compliance with Chapter 4 of the Constitution and its provisions for the 
national legislative process.
 631
 The position is very different to the pre-1994 position 
where the executive had all control over the incorporation of treaties. To improve 
transparency and accountability the executive now retains the power to negotiate and 
sign treaties but Parliament has to agree to the ratification of and accession of 
treaties.
632
 A ratified agreement does not automatically lead to the incorporation of 
international law into domestic law, but should the Republic fail to comply with the 
agreement it might still incur an international obligation towards the other signatory 
States.
633
 The legislature transforms treaties into domestic law in three ways: 
 
‘In the first instance, the provisions of a treaty may be embodied in the text of an Act of 
Parliament; secondly, the treaty may be included as a schedule to a statute; and thirdly, an 
enabling Act of Parliament may give the executive the power to bring a treaty into effect in 
municipal law by means of proclamation or notice in the Government Gazette.’634 
 
                                                        
630 Werner Scholtz (A few thoughts on section 231) (supra) 206 
631 The discussion of these stages is based on the discussion of them by Gerhard Kemp (Individual Criminal 
Liability) (supra) 179 
632 Hermanus, J van der Merwe ‘The Transformative Value of International Criminal Law’ (2012) Thesis 
submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Legum Doctor (LLD) in the Faculty of Law at 
Stellenbosch University 252 
633 Werner Scholtz (A few thoughts on section 231) (supra) 213 
634 John Dugard (International Law: A South African Perspective) (supra) 55 and see also the minority 
judgment of Chief Justice Ngcobo at 374 paragraph 92 in Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa 
and Others 2011 (3) SA 347 (CC) ‘An international agreement that has been ratified by resolution of 
Parliament is binding on South Africa on the international plane. And failure to observe the provisions of 
this agreement may result in South Africa incurring responsibility towards other signatory states. An 
international agreement that has been ratified by Parliament under section 231(2), however, does not 
become part of our law until and unless it is incorporated into our law by national legislation. An 
international agreement that has not been incorporated in our law cannot be a source of rights and 
obligations.’ 
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5.2 South Africa and the International Criminal Court 
 
At the Rome Conference in 1998 South Africa was among those nations campaigning 
for a strong and independent ICC. South Africa signed and ratified the Rome Statute 
on 17 July 1998.
635
 South Africa enacted the ICC Act soon hereafter and was the first 
African State Party to pass legislation implementing the law of the Rome Statute
636
. 
According to Gerhard Kemp ‘[t]he Implementation of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court Act 27 of 2002 (‘ICC Act, 2002’) thus ‘incorporated’ the 
Rome Statute of the ICC, 1998 (a multilateral treaty to which South Africa is state 
party) into South African law.’637 The ICC Act incorporates the definitions of war 
crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide into South African domestic law for 
the first time and in order to give effect to its complementarity obligations under the 
Rome Statute.
638
 Before this Act, conduct consisting of genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes may have been punished as the ordinary crimes of murder, 
rape and robbery for example. But because the specific new crimes were not common 
law or statutory crimes an act by Parliament was necessary to make such conduct a 
crime in South Africa and to specify the conduct constituting these crimes.
639
 Anton 
Katz calls the ICC Act an act of transformation.
640
 Gerhard Kemp agrees and points 
out that this is so because the drafters of the ICC Act ‘have chosen to tailor the Act 
for South African purposes’. 641  Kemp mentions in this regard that although 
definitions of the crimes were not modified and taken directly from the Rome Statute 
the ICC Act also omits certain parts of the Rome Statute. The parts omitted were 
Article 9 (the Rome Statute on Elements of Crimes) and Part 3 of the Rome Statute on 
general principles of liability and defences.
642
 Definitions of the core crimes were 
                                                        
635 HJ van der Merwe (Transformative value of International Criminal Law) (supra) 275-276 and Jessberger 
and Powell (Prosecuting Pinochet’s) (supra) 345  
636 HJ van der Merwe (Transformative value of International Criminal Law) (supra) 276 
637 Gerhard Kemp (Individual Criminal Liability) (supra) 178-179 
638 Gerhard Kemp (Individual Criminal Liability) (supra) 180; Max du Plessis (South Africa’s Implementation 
of the ICC Statute) (supra) 461 and Max du Plessis in John Dugard (International Law: A South African 
Perspective) (supra) 200 
639 Anton Katz ‘An Act of transformation – The incorporation of the Rome Statute of the ICC into national 
law in South Africa’ (2003) 12(4) African Security Review 27 
640 Anton Katz (Act of transformation) (supra) 26 
641 Gerhard Kemp (Individual Criminal Liability) (supra) 180 
642 Gerhard Kemp (Individual Criminal Liability) (supra) 180; Max du Plessis (South Africa’s Implementation 
of the ICC Statute) (supra) 464 and Max du Plessis in John Dugard (International Law: A South African 
Perspective) (supra) 202 ‘While the Act usefully incorporates the definitions of these crimes into South 
African domestic law; neither the ICC Act not Schedule 1 refers specifically to article 9 of the Rome Statute 
on Elements of Crimes. There is nothing, however, that prevents a South African court from having regard to 
the Elements of Crimes, were it to be involved in the domestic prosecution of an ICC offence. However, in 
the interests of clarity and completeness, it is suggested that South Africa follow the example of other states 
parties and incorporate, by regulation, the elements of crimes.’ 
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attached through a schedule appended to the ICC Act. Part 1 of Schedule 1 follows 
the wording of article 6 of the ICC Statute in relation to genocide; Part 2 of the 
Schedule mirrors article 7 of the Statute in respect of crimes against humanity; and 
Part 3 does the same for war crimes, as set out in article 8 of the ICC Statute.
643
 The 
preamble to the ICC Act describes South Africa as ‘an integral and accepted member 
of the community of nations’ and requires the Republic to honor its international 
obligations by ‘bringing persons who commit such atrocities to justice…in a court of 
law of the Republic in terms of its domestic law where possible’. 
 
5.2.1 Co-operation with the ICC 
 
We have seen that the ICC has no enforcement mechanisms at its disposal and it is 
primarily dependent on national law enforcement mechanisms. South Africa has 
recognized this responsibility. In conformance with the requirements of 
complementarity the ICC Act in Section 5 sets out the procedures for the institution of 
a prosecution in South African courts. At the outset the permission of the National 
Director of Prosecutions is required for a potential prosecution. The Cabinet member 
responsible for the administration of justice must then in writing, after consultation 
with the Chief Justice of South Africa and the National Director, designate a 
specialized High Court for such purpose. As Max du Plessis points out the 
expectation in the Act is that ‘a prosecution will take place within the Republic’.644 
The Act further stipulates that should the National Director decline to prosecute a 
person under the Act he must provide the Director-General for Justice and 
Constitutional Development with full reasons for his decision. The Director-General 
is in turn obliged to forward this decision, together with reasons, to the Registrar of 
the ICC in The Hague. 
 
As far as arrest and surrender go there are two possible kinds of warrants envisaged 
by the Act. Section 8 provides for a warrant issued by the ICC itself and South Africa 
subsequently receives a request by the ICC for the arrest and surrender of a suspect. 
The procedure is that the request is referred to the Director-General, with the 
necessary documentation to satisfy a local court that there are sufficient grounds for 
the surrender of a person to The Hague. The Director-General then forwards this 
                                                        
643 Max du Plessis in John Dugard (International Law: a South African Perspective) (supra) 201 
644 Max du Plessis in John Dugard (International Law: a South African Perspective) (supra) 204 
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request and supporting documents to a Magistrate who must endorse the ICC’s 
warrant of arrest for execution in any part of the Republic. Section 9 deals with a 
request received by the Director-General from the ICC for the provisional arrest of a 
suspect. The Director-General then forwards this request to the National Director who 
applies for a warrant before a Magistrate. In both cases after arrest the person must be 
brought to court within 48 hours. The Magistrate must be satisfied that the person 
before the court is indeed the person mentioned in the warrant
645
, that the arrest was 
in accordance with local law and procedures
646
 and that the person’s rights (in 
accordance with the Bill of Rights) have been respected.
647
 
 
Article 93 of the Rome Statute also requires States Parties to assist the ICC by co-
operating with regards to investigations and prosecutions. Part 2 of the ICC Act and 
Section 14 of the act set out some of these measures such as the questioning of 
suspects, the identification of and determination of whereabouts of persons or items, 
the taking of evidence, inspections in loco and the execution of searches and seizures 
are a few examples of the many contained in the Act.
648
   
 
A Priority Crimes Litigation Unit (PCLU) has been established within the National 
Prosecuting Authority so that South Africa may fulfill its duties under the ICC Act. A 
Special Director of Public Prosecutions heads the PCLU. The Special Director has the 
tasks to head the unit and ‘manage and direct the prosecution of crimes contemplated 
in the Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act.’649 
As Max du Plessis points out the PCLU depends on the cooperation of the South 
African Police Services for the investigation of matters against alleged perpetrators.
650
 
A Directorate for Priority Crimes Investigation (DPCI) has now also been established 
within the police with the powers to investigate the crimes mentioned in the ICC 
Act.
651
 These two units will in practice work together to investigate and prosecute 
core crimes. 
 
                                                        
645 Section 10(1)(a) 
646 Section 10(1)(b) 
647 Section 10(1)(c) 
648 See Max du Plessis in John Dugard (International Law: a South African Perspective) (supra) 206-207 for a 
detailed discussion of these measures of cooperation. 
649 Max du Plessis in John Dugard (International Law: a South African Perspective) (supra) 208 
650 Max du Plessis in John Dugard (International Law: a South African Perspective) (supra) 208 
651 Max du Plessis in John Dugard (International Law: a South African Perspective) (supra) 208 
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5.2.2 Grounds of Jurisdiction 
  
Under the common law South African Courts do not normally exercise extra-
territorial jurisdiction for crimes that were committed outside South Africa.
652
 It may 
even be said that there is a presumption against the extra-territorial operation of 
criminal law. Treason and conspiracy committed in more than one country but with a 
link to South Africa serve as examples of exceptions to this rule.
653
 Parliament may 
also provide explicitly that a Statute is to operate extra-territorially and it is doing so 
increasingly.
654
 The Torture and the Rome Statute Acts, which both provide for 
universal jurisdiction if the accused person is in the territory of the Republic; The 
Geneva Conventions Act, which provides for unlimited universal jurisdiction and 
lastly the Protection against Terrorism Act, which provides for limited universal 
jurisdiction if the person is found in the Republic are all examples. 
 
We will now consider the jurisdictional provisions of the ICC Act in more detail. 
Section 4(1) creates jurisdiction for a South African court over ICC crimes by 
providing that ‘[d]espite anything to the contrary in any other law of the Republic, 
any person who commits [an ICC] crime is guilty of an offence and liable on 
conviction to a fine or imprisonment’. Section 4(3) provides for jurisdiction of a 
South African court, as if a crime had been committed in the Republic, where a 
person commits a core crime outside the territory of the Republic if: 
(a) that person is a South African citizen; or 
(b) that person is not a South African citizen but is ordinarily resident in the 
Republic; or 
(c) that person, after the commission of the crime, is present in the territory of 
the Republic; or 
                                                        
652 Gerhard Erasmus & Gerhard Kemp (International criminal law before domestic courts) (supra) 76; 
Florian Jessberger & Cathleen Powell ‘Prosecuting Pinochets in South Africa – Implementing the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court’ (2001) South African Journal of Criminal Justice 351 
653 Etienne du Toit et al ‘Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act’ (2013) 5 Juta, Cape Town, S 110 16-2A, 
16-13 and Jonathan Burchell and John Milton ‘Principles of Criminal Law’ (2nd ed.) (1997) Juta, Cape Town 
681 
654  Section 128(5) of the Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998; Section 90 of the Electronic 
Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002; Sections 1, 4(1) and 4(3) of The Implementation of the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act 27 of 2002; Section 35 of The Prevention and 
Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004; Section 15 of The Protection of Constitutional Democracy 
against Terrorist and Related Activities Act 33 of 2004; Section 61 of The Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and 
Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007; Section 7 of The Implementation of the Geneva Conventions 
Act 8 of 2012 and Section 6 of The South African Prevention of Combating and Torture of Persons Act 13 of 
2013. 
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(d) that person has committed the said crime against a South African citizen or 
against a person who is ordinarily resident in the Republic. 
 
The jurisdiction of Section 4(1) is based on the principle of territoriality whereby, as 
we will recall, a State has jurisdiction in respect of all acts committed within its 
territory. Section 4(3) in providing for extra-territorial jurisdiction starts with Section 
4(3)(a) providing for jurisdiction based on nationality. It is also well accepted in 
international law that States may extend their jurisdiction to cover their nationals for 
crimes committed anywhere in the world. 4(3)(b) extends jurisdiction ‘over South 
African residents on the basis that they have a close and substantial connection with 
South Africa at the time of the offence.’655 Max du Plessis points out ‘the jurisdiction 
in trigger (c) is grounded on the idea of universal jurisdiction’ and he goes on to 
describe this as: 
 
‘jurisdiction which exists for all states in respect of certain crimes which attract universal 
jurisdiction by their egregious nature, and consequently over the perpetrators of such crimes 
on the basis that they are common enemies of mankind.’ 
 
We will recall that this is the form of universal jurisdiction referred to as ‘limited’ or 
‘conditional’ universal jurisdiction. HJ van der Merwe mentions that this form of 
jurisdiction ‘recognizes the territorial limits of South Africa’s enforcement 
jurisdiction, namely the general rule that a state may not enforce its criminal laws in 
the territory of another state…accordingly, any state may prosecute individuals for 
certain crimes provided that the individual is present in the state at the time.’656  
 
Trigger (b) of the ICC Act is superfluous because trigger (c) is automatically activated 
if a suspect of core crimes is simply present in South Africa. There was thus no need 
to require a suspect to additionally have close ties with South Africa. Considering this 
oversight one wonders whether providing for trigger (c) and its incumbent universal 
jurisdiction was completely thought through and its implications considered and 
understood at the time of the drafting of the ICC Act. It is admittedly a small 
oversight but might possibly point at a conglomeration of divergent approaches to 
jurisdiction put together in haste. Be that as it may, it will be argued later that only 
                                                        
655 Max du Plessis in John Dugard (International Law: a South African Perspective) (supra) 203 
656 HJ van der Merwe (Transformative value of International Criminal Law) (supra) 278-279 
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providing for trigger (b) and not for trigger (c), or for trigger (c) but with certain 
qualifications would have been a far better choice and would still have provided for 
universal jurisdiction albeit in a less controversial, viable and more sustainable way. 
 
Section 4(3)(d) provides for passive personality jurisdiction whereby a State in 
International law has jurisdiction over an individual who causes harm to one of its 
nationals overseas. 
 
The ICC Act also imitates the Rome Statute and limits jurisdiction ratione temporis 
by not allowing for retrospective prosecutions. This also follows the rule laid down in 
Section 35(3)(1) of the South African Constitution which guarantees that all persons 
the right ‘not to be convicted for an act or omission that was not an offence under 
either national or international law at the time it was committed’.657  
 
5.3 The SALC Case 
 
5.3.1 Introduction and background to the case 
 
On 29 October 2014 the Constitutional Court confirmed the Supreme Court of Appeal 
and the North Gauteng High Court in Pretoria’s rulings that ordered the South African 
National Prosecuting Authority and the South African Police Service to investigate 
the arrest and torture of political opponents of the ZANU-PF that occurred during 
2007 in Zimbabwe. This was after an application was brought for the review of a 
decision of the Acting National Director of Public Prosecutions (the NDPP), its Head 
of the Priority Crimes Litigation Unit (the HPCLU) and the Acting National 
Commissioner of the South African Police Service (the Commissioner) not to institute 
an investigation into alleged crimes against humanity of torture committed by 
Zimbabwean police and officials against Zimbabweans in Zimbabwe, in favor of the 
two applicants, the South African Human Rights Litigation Centre (SALC) and the 
Zimbabwe Exiles Forum (the ZEF). The applicants in the matter were acting in the 
interest of the Zimbabwean torture victims. The SALC is an initiative of the 
International Bar Association and the Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa. Its 
aim is to provide support to human rights and public interest initiatives undertaken by 
                                                        
657 HJ van der Merwe (Transformative value of International Criminal Law) (supra) 281 
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domestic lawyers within the Southern African region. The ZEF aims to ‘combat 
impunity and achieve justice and dignity for victims of human rights violations 
occurring in Zimbabwe with particular emphasis on the exiled victims’.658 
 
On 16 March 2008 the SALC sent a detailed memorandum to the HPCLU containing 
allegations of crimes against humanity involving mainly torture that were made 
against Zimbabwean officials. The memorandum alleged that named members of ‘the 
law and order unit’ engaged in acts of torture against members of the official 
opposition political party in Zimbabwe, the Movement for Democratic Change (the 
MDC). It was alleged that this torture occurred after a raid on Harvest House, the 
headquarters of the MDC, allegedly in the aftermath of a bombing incident. Other 
instances of abuse were also mentioned and Amnesty International and Human Rights 
Watch indicated that this was all part of an orchestrated attempt by the ruling party to 
clamp down on and punish dissidents and opposition members. The memorandum 
alleged that the acts of torture carried out by lower level State officials implicated 
senior officers, six government Ministers and Heads of Department through the 
doctrine of command responsibility. The memorandum suggested that the supporting 
affidavits contained evidence, which on a prima facie basis implicated superior 
officers in the Law and Order Unit. This evidence allegedly contains the testimony of 
doctors, lawyers and family members and they describe severe physical assaults, 
which included the use of truncheons, baseball bats, fan-belts and booted feet. There 
are accounts of victims being suspended by a metal rod between two tables; of being 
subjected to water boarding; and of electrical shocks being applied to the genitals of 
some of them. That is the background of this matter. 
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal summarized the main issue succinctly when it said:  
 
‘To those unfamiliar with International Criminal Law, the following instinctive question 
arises: What business is it of the South African authorities when torture on a widespread scale 
is alleged to have been committed by Zimbabweans against Zimbabweans in Zimbabwe? It is 
that question that is at the heart of this appeal. Put simply, and hopefully concisely, this appeal 
concerns the investigative powers and obligations of the NPA and the South African Police 
Service in relation to alleged crimes against humanity perpetrated by Zimbabweans in 
                                                        
658 National Commissioner of the South African Police Service v Southern African Human Rights Litigation 
Centre (485/2012) [2013] ZASCA 168; 2014 (2) SA 42 (SCA); [2014] 1 All SA 435 (SCA) (27 November 
2013) paragraph 6 
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Zimbabwe. It involves a consideration of the implementation of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court Act 27 of 2002 (the ICC Act). Put jurisprudentially, this appeal 
concerns the exercise of jurisdiction by a domestic court (and the logically antecedent exercise 
of investigative powers by the relevant authorities) over allegation of crimes against humanity 
– in particular, the crime of torture – committed in another country.659 
 
The judgment ordering the investigations into the torture was the first to apply the 
ICC Act in South Africa. The focus of the decision was the scope of the police and 
prosecution’s rights and duties to investigate crimes in terms of universal jurisdiction. 
The judgment relied heavily on the ICC Act, which provides for universal jurisdiction 
in cases where a person suspected of a crime under international law committed 
abroad is present in South Africa. This decision was appealed to the SCA in 
Bloemfontein, which in essence upheld the decision and the Constitutional Court in 
Johannesburg has finally confirmed this ruling. The High Court case focused mainly 
on three aspects, namely the applicants’ standing, the reviewability of the decision not 
to investigate, and the duty of South African authorities to investigate allegations of 
crimes against humanity committed in Zimbabwe. The focus will mostly be on the 
third of these aspects because this formed the gist of the SCA and CC judgments and 
it is most important for purposes of the present study. 
 
5.3.2 The duty to investigate and the duty to prosecute 
 
The High Court was asked to overrule the decision not to investigate and to order the 
respondents to initiate an investigation. The Court found that the respondents had not 
considered the applicable law in making their decision not to prosecute. The acting 
NDPP had for instance conceded that he had not even considered the provisions of the 
ICC Act even though he believed that a reasonable suspicion of crimes against 
humanity having been committed existed.
660
 According to the Court the police and 
prosecution had paid an inordinate amount of attention to politics and as a result 
ignored legal considerations. The Court found that such behavior would render the 
ICC Act virtually ineffective and completely undermine the purpose of international 
criminal law.
661
 The Court found that there was a refusal to investigate, that the 
                                                        
659 SALC v. National Director of Public Prosecutions paragraph 5 
660 SALC v. National Director of Public Prosecutions paragraphs 39 and 88-89 
661 SALC v. National Director of Public Prosecutions paragraphs 86-89 
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respondents discretion was misguided and was therefore liable to be set aside.
662
 The 
Court found that there was a duty to prosecute crimes against humanity and that if this 
were so there must also be a duty to investigate reasonable allegations of such 
crimes.
663
 The Court further found that such a duty existed even when the suspects 
were not present in the country. Although Section 4(3)(c) of the ICC Act did require 
the presence of the accused before jurisdiction could be exercised this only applied to 
the trial and not to the preceding investigation. The Court found that if this were not 
so South African authorities would only be able to investigate a matter when a suspect 
was present in the country and would then have to suspend investigations again as 
soon as the suspect left the country and this would be absurd and result in an 
ineffective system.
664
  
 
As already mentioned the High Court judgment was appealed to the Supreme Court of 
Appeal in Bloemfontein where the SCA upheld the findings of the High Court. On 29 
October 2014 the Constitutional Court agreed in substance with the two Courts below 
and dismissed the appeal by the SAPS. Because a Constitutional Court ruling on a 
matter is more authoritative than that of the High Court or the SCA the focus of this 
discussion will focus more on the Constitutional Court judgment. Before the matter 
was heard in Bloemfontein the respondents submitted heads of argument to the 
Supreme Court of Appeal.
665
 It is insightful to consider their arguments because the 
SCA and the Constitutional Court in substance agreed with their line of reasoning and 
dismissed the appeal. As such a discussion of the respondent’s heads of argument 
almost completely captures a discussion of the SCA and CC judgment. A critical 
analysis of respondent’s argument, interwoven with a discussion of a few elements of 
the judgment not covered by the heads of argument, follows next.
666
 
 
 
 
                                                        
662 SALC v. National Director of Public Prosecutions paragraph 84 
663 SALC v. National Director of Public Prosecutions paragraphs 80-82 
664 SALC v. National Director of Public Prosecutions paragraphs 90-91 
665 Respondents’ Heads of Argument available at 
Error! Hyperlink reference not valid. 2FSubmissions - SALC-SCA-
ZimbabweTortureCase.pdf&ei=HKeSU8aUJuGV7AauzoHoCg&usg=AFQjCNHb-s-
EH5YbdMNEWlzvC9CyB0zeBg&sig2=6a635L4-_b6ccxNriuZbMg&bvm=bv.68445247,d.ZGU 
666 The discussion is based on the Constitutional Court Case of National Commissioner of the South African 
Police Service v Southern African Human Rights Litigation Centre and Another [2014] ZACC 30 and personal 
notes made by the author during the judgment.  
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5.3.3 Respondent’s Heads of Argument  
 
The respondents had set out by narrowing the issue in dispute to the question of 
whether the SAPS and the NPA have the power to investigate crimes against 
humanity allegedly committed in Zimbabwe by Zimbabwean nationals who come to 
South Africa from time to time. According to respondents the applicant’s case was 
that they derive their power from Section 4(3) of the ICC act and that they are only 
allowed to investigate such a crime if and when the suspects are present in South 
Africa. The respondents in turn submitted that the SAPS and NPA don’t derive their 
power to investigate crimes against humanity from Section 4(3) of the ICC Act but 
rather from Section 4(1), which makes a crime against humanity a crime under South 
African domestic law. Hence the SAPS and NPA have constitutional and statutory 
powers to investigate all crimes alleged to have been committed under South African 
law. The second is that the SAPS and NPA have a range of statutory powers, which 
specifically permit and require them to investigate crimes against humanity. The 
respondents accepted that the SAPS and NPA may not exercise these powers of 
investigation on foreign territory beyond the borders of South Africa without the 
consent of the foreign State involved. They however argued that they may undertake 
an investigation within South Africa of crimes against humanity wherever they might 
have been committed.
667
 
 
Respondents argued that the Rome Statute and the ICC ‘exemplify a common 
understanding that certain conduct offends all humanity and hence the prosecution 
and prevention of such conduct is the shared responsibility of the international 
community’. 668  They then pointed to the complementarity principle and to the 
preamble of the Rome Statute, which reads that ‘it is the duty of every State to 
exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes’ to 
argue that States are obliged to not only provide assistance to the ICC, but also to 
undertake domestic prosecution of international crimes where they have the 
jurisdiction to do so.
669
 
 
                                                        
667 Respondents’ Heads of Argument (supra) paragraphs 2-7 
668 Respondents’ Heads of Argument (supra) paragraph 20 
669 Respondents’ Heads of Argument (supra) paragraph 21 
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The argument continued that the ICC Act was enacted by Parliament to give effect to 
South Africa’s complementarity obligations under the Rome Statute, which requires 
South Africa to investigate and prosecute international crimes even when committed 
abroad. Thus ‘[t]he Rome Statute obliges South Africa under international law to 
investigate and prosecute crimes against humanity and the ICC Act recognizes and 
informs this duty.’670 They then argued that ‘on the basis of a variety of domestic 
statutory provisions the SAPS may undertake an investigation within South Africa of 
any crime against humanity regardless of where and by whom it is alleged to have 
been committed, including if it is committed outside South Africa’. 671  This, the 
respondents contended is ‘compatible with customary international law, a fact 
confirmed by a comparative assessment of state practice’.672 
 
The respondents placed much emphasis on the fact that the application did not 
concern South Africa’s obligation to prosecute international crimes in South Africa, 
but only with the competence of the applicants to investigate international crimes. The 
respondents argued that the applicants misunderstood international law on the issue 
and even more fundamentally misconstrued the domestic law in this regard. They then 
proceeded to attempt to show how the Constitution and various other domestic acts 
sanction the investigation of international crimes, even extra-territorially, and equips 
special units in the SAPS and the NPA to do so.
673
 
 
Respondents then quoted the applicants who argued that the court a quo’s 
interpretation of Section 4(1) ‘amounted to finding that absolute universal jurisdiction 
had been adopted for the investigation of the crimes created in the ICC Act’ and that 
this finding is ‘unequivocally wrong and inconsistent with the ordinary principles 
regulating the interpretation of statutes, domestic law and International Criminal 
Law’. The applicants further argued that Section 4(3) dictates the investigative power 
of the NPA and the SAPS and they relied on international law and universal 
jurisdiction to argue that international law prohibits investigations in absentia.
674
 
 
                                                        
670 Respondents’ Heads of Argument (supra) paragraph 23 
671 Respondents’ Heads of Argument (supra) paragraph 24 
672 Ibid 
673 Respondents’ Heads of Argument (supra) paragraphs 33-42 
674 Respondent’s Heads of Argument (supra) paragraphs 43-44 
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The respondents called the applicant’s contention a red herring because they argued 
that the applicants ‘never engage with the reality that the exercise of their 
investigative jurisdiction in relation to crimes committed within South Africa’s 
borders and extraterritorially is permitted-indeed required-under our domestic law’. 
They argued that the domestic law on the aspect is clear and that the question is not 
whether section 4(3) empowers the SAPS and NPA to investigate crimes against 
humanity, but whether it restricts their powers of investigation. So they argued that 
the only purpose of Section 4(3) is ‘to secure the jurisdiction of a South African court’ 
and places no restriction on investigative powers and thus permits investigations in 
absentia. They then echo the court a quo in pointing out the absurdity of 
investigations only being allowed when a suspect is present and then being suspended 
as soon as he leaves. They argued that, were the entire investigation to be subject to 
having established the presence of an accused, there is a risk that no prosecution 
would ever be undertaken. They concluded on this aspect by arguing that the 
applicants may commence investigation on the basis of anticipated presence and that 
this was also what South Africa had done in the case of Omar al-Bashir when it issued 
a warrant for him under the ICC Act.
675
 
 
The respondents then turned to a ‘short discussion of international law’. They argued 
that the applicants were not only wrong in their interpretation of domestic law but 
also of international law. They attempted to make this point by referring to the 
distinction between jurisdiction to prescribe, enforce and adjudicate. They quoted a 
small section of the Lotus Case and argued that ‘States have a wide discretion to 
apply their laws and exercise jurisdiction in respect of crimes beyond their borders 
under international law’.676 They suggest that the only question is what limitations 
there are on the exercise of that jurisdiction.
677
 
 
With reference to the ICJ case of DRC v Belgium that ‘the only prohibitive rule 
(repeated by the Permanent Court in the “Lotus” case) is that criminal jurisdiction 
should not be exercised, without permission within the territory of another State.’678 
They also refer to the Constitutional Court ruling in Kaunda where it was stated that 
                                                        
675 Respondent’s Heads of Argument (supra) paragraphs 48-49 
676 Lotus Case (supra) 9 
677 Respondent’s Heads of Argument (supra) paragraphs 57-66 
678 Joint Separate Opinion (supra) paragraphs 54-56 
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‘It is not necessary to enter this controversy. What seems to be clear is that when the 
application of a national law would infringe the sovereignty of another state, that 
would ordinarily be inconsistent with and not sanctioned by international law.’679 
Thus respondents argued that as long as enforcement jurisdiction does not occur in a 
foreign State, without that State’s permission, jurisdiction may be exercised lawfully. 
It would, according to respondents, follow that the accused does not have to be 
physically present in South Africa for the enforcement step of investigations to be 
taken. It was only adjudicative jurisdiction that would be expressly conditioned on the 
accused’s presence because failure by him to appear at his own trail would violate his 
fair trial rights.
680
 
 
The discussion on international law was concluded with reference to the Belgium v 
Congo Case.  They contended that the applicants omitted the ICJ’s key final 
conclusions as to the practice of universal jurisdiction. They pointed out that the 
Judges had stated that the lack of established practice of absolute universal 
jurisdiction ‘does not necessarily indicate, however, that such an exercise would be 
unlawful…State practice – is neutral as to the exercise of universal jurisdiction’681 
Respondents contended that the ICJ in considering State practice did not outlaw 
absolute universal jurisdiction but purposefully left States’ discretion on this aspect 
intact and that the judgment found that there is a movement toward domestic 
jurisdictions exercising universal jurisdiction over international crimes. According to 
respondents the ICC Act is a lawful part of this trend. ‘The Rome Statute obliges 
South Africa under international law to investigate and prosecute crimes against 
humanity and the ICC Act recognizes and gives effect to this duty.’ (emphasis 
mine)
682
 
 
Lastly the respondents countered the applicants’ attempt to use comparative 
international law to show a presence requirement for prosecutions and hence arguing 
that it is equally applicable to investigations. In so doing respondents referred to:  
- The Institute of International Law, which observed that ‘[a]part from acts of 
investigation and requests for extradition the exercise of universal jurisdiction 
                                                        
679 Kaunda and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2005 (4) SA 235 at paragraph 39 
680 Respondent’s Heads of Argument (supra) paragraphs 67-69 
681 Joint Separate Opinion paragraph 45 
682 Respondent’s Heads of Argument (supra) paragraphs 70-74 
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requires the presence of the alleged offender in the territory of the prosecuting 
State…’683 
- The Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction, which state that a judicial 
body may try accused persons on the basis of universal jurisdiction. ‘provided 
the person is present before such judicial body’. But that ‘does not prevent a 
state from initiating the criminal process, conducting an investigation, issuing 
an indictment or requesting extradition, when the accused is not present.’684 
- The Third Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States which 
proclaims that ‘a state may enforce its law – whether through courts or 
otherwise – only if it has jurisdiction to prescribe the law sought to be 
enforced. It may enforce its law through the courts only if it also has 
jurisdiction to adjudicate, but it may take non-judicial enforcement 
measures…whether or not is has jurisdiction to adjudicate.’ 685  And so 
respondents argue that ‘as but one example, United States law clearly 
recognizes States’ authority to conduct investigations on domestic soil in 
respect of crimes committed abroad, within the confines of proper 
enforcement jurisdiction.’686 
- With reference to European States respondents relied on a report by Human 
Rights Watch indicating among other things that displaced victims can act as 
witnesses and NGO reports and other tools will assist countries to investigate 
international crimes domestically without the presence of the offender and that 
this often happens in Europe.
687
 In Norway presence is required at the time of 
the indictment but not upon initiation of an investigation.
688
 In Germany it was 
pointed out that adjudicative jurisdiction exists where a potential defendant is 
present in the country or if his presence is anticipated and that presence is not 
necessary to commence an investigation.
689
 Greek and Italian universal 
jurisdiction cases do not require presence.
690
 Britain requires presence for trial 
                                                        
683 M. Christian Tomuschat, Institute of International Law ‘Resolution on Universal Criminal Jurisdiction 
with Regard to the Crime of Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes (2005) paragraph 3(b) 
available at http://www.idi-iil.org/idiE/resolutionsE/2005_kra_03_en.pdf  
684 The Princeton Principles (supra) 32 
685 Third Restatement (supra) 401 and 432 
686 Respondent’s Heads of Argument (supra) paragraph 86 
687 Respondent’s Heads of Argument (supra) paragraph 87 and Human Rights Watch ‘Universal Jurisdiction 
in Europe: The State of the Art’ (2006) 18, No. 5(D) 13 Human Rights Watch), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ij0606web.pdf (last accessed 2014/06/07) 
688 Human Rights Watch Report (supra) 81 
689 Human Rights Watch Report (supra) 64 and 67 
690 Respondents’ Heads of Argument (supra) paragraphs 92-93 
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but allow police to carry out an investigation regardless of the location of the 
accused.
691
 
- The 2012 draft African Union Model National Law on Universal Jurisdiction 
over International Crimes notes that a prosecution requires the presence of the 
accused but does not insist upon a similar requirement in the context of 
investigations.
692
 
 
Respondents then pointed out how applicants had cited various reforms in European 
legal systems in support of the proposition that absolute universal jurisdiction is 
disfavored. They argued that these reforms indeed suggest a global trend against 
absolute universal jurisdiction in the context of adjudicative jurisdiction, but that 
‘there is no single approach adopted by States with regard to a presence requirement 
in the context of non-judicial enforcement jurisdiction, which includes police 
investigations. The exact timing of when presence is required – at the stages of 
investigation, issuance of an arrest warrant, or trial – belongs to domestic law and 
policy’. 693  Respondents argued that South Africa’s legislature made it clear that 
physical presence is only required for the exercise of adjudicative jurisdiction in 
respect of international crimes.
694
 
 
Respondents’ heads concluded with the statement that ‘rigid presence requirements in 
law or prosecutorial policy “greatly diminish the effectiveness of universal 
jurisdiction laws as an ‘important reserve tool in the international community’s 
struggle against impunity.’”’(emphasis original)695 
 
5.3.4 Critical assessment of Respondents’ argument 
 
In a sense, this entire thesis has turned out to be a critical assessment of the claims the 
respondents make. By the time the matter was heard on appeal in both the SCA and 
the CC the issues had been narrowed down to the question of whether the SAPS and 
                                                        
691 Human Rights Watch Report (supra) paragraph 94 
692 Respondents’ Heads of Argument (supra) paragraph 96 and African Union, Meeting of Government 
Experts and Ministers of Justice/ Attorneys General on Legal Matters, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia “African Union 
(Draft) Model National Law on Universal Jurisdiction Over International Crimes” (7-15 May 2012), available 
at http://www.ejiltalk.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/AU-draft-model-law-UJ-May-2012.pdf. Last 
visited on (2014/06/10)  
693 Respondents’ Heads of Argument (supra) paragraph 103 
694 Respondents’ Heads of Argument (supra) paragraph 104 
695 Respondents’ Heads of Argument (supra) paragraph 107 
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NPA have the power to investigate crimes against humanity allegedly committed in 
Zimbabwe by Zimbabwean nationals who come to South Africa from time to time. In 
making this the only issue it is humbly submitted that both sides missed the most 
important aspect of the entire matter. The result is that the SCA and the CC have only 
ruled on the narrow issue of the legality of investigations based on universal 
jurisdiction in absentia. The plausibility, practical effects and desirability of the ICC 
Act were never critically analyzed. The applicants for their part took the ICC Act at 
face value and from there tried to contrive an argument that the Act only makes 
mention of prosecutions and not investigations, a flimsy argument that ended up not 
convincing anyone, least of all the court. The respondents on the other hand probably 
breathed a sigh of relief and gladly kept the focus on the domestic implications of the 
ICC Act while dealing as little as possible with the controversial question of the status 
of prosecutions based on universal jurisdiction under international law. This 
completely overlooks the gaping gap between prescriptive and enforcement 
jurisdiction in practice.
696
 The respondents repeatedly labeled investigations as an 
enforcement step. This is however confusing because laws can be prescribed and 
investigations undertaken which have no chance of ever seeing the inside of a court. 
The line between enforcement and adjudicative jurisdiction, drawn by the respondents 
in this case is artificial because the goal with universal jurisdiction is obviously that 
the suspect be tried in a domestic court. It is because of this aspect that it really is 
quite hard to understand exactly what the respondents were trying to accomplish 
through this case. Admittedly they had little choice but to proceed in the way that they 
did as there had until then not been any investigation by the SAPS, nor any prospect 
of such investigations. But it still seems that the most that could be achieved in this 
way was that the SAPS and NPA would now have to domestically investigate these 
alleged crimes against humanity committed in Zimbabwe. It seems that political 
complications involved in such a step have simply been postponed to another time or 
situation. It would also be extraordinary if any of the suspects ever set foot in South 
Africa again given all the media attention that the case has evoked. The problem is 
that the focus has only been on the legality of prescriptive jurisdiction and in this 
sense seems to be little more than academic. The respondents only asked the courts to 
rule on what may be done but what should be done was not considered. Legal theory 
                                                        
696 See paragraph 2.1.4 and 2.1.5 (supra) and Roger O’Keefe (Clarifying the Basic Concept) (supra) 735-760 
which discusses the distinction between prescription and enforcement 
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won the day and realistic political and workable considerations have all but been 
ignored.  
 
It is submitted that the applicants made the mistake of trying to argue that they are not 
allowed to investigate these crimes. They might however have had more success by 
showing how difficult their position is made if they have to investigate any and all 
crimes against humanity brought to their attention by sometimes overeager, and 
sometimes blatantly biased, human rights groups. They could have argued that this is 
not practically possible and is not expected of any State anywhere in terms of 
international law. They could have argued that the ICC Act is illogical and 
impractical on this aspect and based on a fundamental misunderstanding of 
international law and even more-so on the jurisdictional regime of the ICC. This 
might have led to the Act being revisited, and perhaps even amended, which would 
have provided more clarity and certainty on the SAPS and NPA’s role instead of a 
simple finding that it is not illegal for them to conduct such investigations. 
 
5.3.4.1 Assumption that certain conduct offends all humanity and prosecution 
becomes a shared responsibility  
 
Respondents argued, rather predictably, that the Rome Statute and the ICC ‘exemplify 
a common understanding that certain conduct offends all humanity and hence the 
prosecution and prevention of such conduct is the shared responsibility of the 
international community’.697 To realize that this is incorrect one only has to ask that if 
this were so, why the Rome Statute does not provide for universal jurisdiction? The 
respondents were trying to show that at some stage, or more specifically when the 
Rome Statute was drafted, most nations had agreed that certain conduct offends all 
humanity and everyone now regards it as their responsibility to prosecute these crimes 
simply because of the serious nature of such offences. This thesis has however shown 
that there was never such a stage or such a decision, not even during the drafting of 
the ICC Statute. In this regard it is submitted that since the logical precursor of 
universal jurisdiction in absentia is a belief of shared responsibility for the 
prosecution of core crimes, the well-known fact that universal jurisdiction in absentia 
has never been exercised, or accepted, proves that the notion of shared responsibility 
                                                        
697 Respondent’s Heads of Argument (supra) paragraph 20 
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for the prosecution of core crimes is a fiction. The respondents thus skipped quite a 
few steps in trying to show that universal jurisdiction is an acceptable base of 
international jurisdiction. They simply asserted that it is well founded and point to the 
Rome Statute and the creation of the ICC as proof of this fact. 
 
5.3.4.2 Complementarity 
 
The respondents then made the briefest mention of complementarity and argued that 
the ICC Act was enacted by Parliament to give effect to South Africa’s 
complementarity obligations under the Rome Statute, which requires South Africa to 
investigate and prosecute international crimes even when committed abroad. They 
also said that ‘[t]he Rome Statute obliges South Africa under international law to 
investigate and prosecute crimes against humanity and the ICC Act recognizes and 
informs this duty.’698  
 
One must be alert and careful to notice that respondents didn’t say that the Rome 
Statute and complementarity requires and obliges South Africa to perform its duty to 
exercise universal jurisdiction over crimes against humanity. They couldn’t have said 
that there is such a duty because it simply would not have been true.
699
 But the 
impression is nonetheless cleverly created that there is such an international duty on 
South Africa. The impression is further reinforced by the respondent’s immediate 
jump to, and subsequent focus on, the domestic law that requires South Africa to 
exercise universal jurisdiction. The result is that it appears as if the reference to 
universal jurisdiction in the ICC Act was somehow derived from an international 
obligation to provide for universal jurisdiction. Of course there is no such 
obligation.
700
 
                                                        
698 Respondents’ Heads of Argument (supra) paragraph 23 
699 See paragraph 4.2.1 (supra) where it was stated that barring a Security Council referral, for States 
Parties to actually be able to prosecute a matter or cooperate with an ICC request to hand an offender over 
to the ICC the offence would have had to occur on the territory of the State Party or one of its nationals 
would have had to be the offender. Thus provision is made for the principles of territoriality and active 
nationality but not the more drastic passive nationality or universal jurisdiction. 
700 Gerhard Werle and Christoph Bornkamm ‘Torture in Zimbabwe under Scrutiny in South Africa – The 
Judgment of the North Gauteng High Court in SALC v. National Director of Public Prosecutions’ Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 11 (2013) 668-669 ‘[w]hen it comes to crimes against humanity, as alleged in 
the present case, this duty is generally regarded as being incumbent only on the state where the crime was 
committed. Third states exercising universal jurisdiction do not have a duty to prosecute; they 
merely have a right to do so… Thus under this general rule, South Africa was not obliged to proceed 
against the alleged perpetrators of crimes committed in Zimbabwe in the present case. It is therefore quite 
surprising that the Court relied on South Africa’s ‘international obligation to … prosecute’ crimes against 
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The impression obviously stuck because, without further ado, and under the rubric of 
‘complementarity’ the CC focused on the ‘duty of every State to exercise its criminal 
jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes’ (emphasis original) 
mentioned in the preamble to the ICC Statute. The CC also found that it would go 
further than the SCA and not only find that the SAPS had a power but also a duty to 
investigate the allegations of torture.
701
 Despite the fact that the ICC does not possess 
universal jurisdiction the CC then found that this duty is most pressing where crimes 
are committed on the territory of countries that are not party to the Rome Statute or 
else impunity would prevail. Accordingly such offenders could only be brought to 
book by means of universal jurisdiction.
702
 The Court managed to place its finger 
squarely on the most serious problem with an international criminal law, one that 
even the ICC is unable to solve due to its lack of jurisdiction. Whether universal 
jurisdiction is the solution is however doubtful. This thesis has also shown that it is, 
with respect, not cogently convincing to argue that simply because impunity is a 
problem this suddenly translates to a duty on all States to exercise universal 
jurisdiction.  
 
5.3.4.3 Presence as requirement for investigations 
 
The respondents dealt next with the contention by the applicants that it could never 
have been intended that investigations be based on universal jurisdiction in absentia. 
They could not be expected to investigate matters regardless of where, against whom 
and by whom they are committed. Applicants argued that presence should be a 
requirement before an investigation could be conducted. It is very likely that political 
interference played a part in the reluctance of the SAPS to conduct an investigation. 
Hennie Strydom wonders whether one should ‘in the circumstances surmise that the 
potential or anticipated political ramifications of an investigation weighed too heavily 
against compliance with a legally circumscribed investigation duty, and that putting a 
lid on the matter was the politically expedient way out of the dilemma?’703 It seems in 
                                                                                                                                                              
humanity in order to justify its conclusion that South African authorities had to initiate an investigation. 
Unfortunately, the Court did not specify the legal foundation of this ‘international [!] obligation’. 
701 SAPS v. SALC [2014] ZACC 30 (supra) paragraph 55 
702 SAPS v. SALC [2014] ZACC 30 (supra) paragraphs 30-32 
703 Hennie Strydom ‘The vicissitudes of the Rome statute in the hands of South Africa’s law enforcement 
agencies’ Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (2012) 822 
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this case that a certain stance was taken during the drafting of this legislation. Yet, the 
moment that the Act was to be applied, there seemed to be another political influence 
trying to undermine the entire process. The interference started at the first possible 
level, in this case the police. Yet politics were always going to play a decisive 
influence in matters of this kind. But even when one does not consider the political 
pressure involved you still have to appreciate the predicament the applicants face in 
potentially having to conduct investigations against suspects in no way linked to 
South Africa. It is fair to say that the SAPS should police South Africa effectively 
before it tries to police the world. The respondents seemed unconcerned with this 
practical problem and argued instead that it would be illogical if investigations were 
only allowed when a suspect was present in South Africa and halted again when he 
left. 
 
It is submitted that the formulation of the ICC Act is to blame for the illogical 
situation in this regard. What will be better for legal certainty, and a sensible 
allocation of scarce resources, will be a presence requirement based on a measure of 
relative permanence, instead of a fleeting presence, or worse – no presence - before 
investigations are considered and a prosecution instituted. Good examples will be the 
situations, already discussed above, of Habré living in Senegal and Zardad living in 
the UK. The problem with the SALC case and the Zimbabwean suspects is that after 
lengthy and expensive court cases it is still almost certain, and probably even more 
certain after the publicity created by the cases, that none of the suspects will ever see 
the inside of a South African court.  
 
The respondents referred to the arrest warrant for Omar al-Bashir that has been issued 
in South Africa to provide an example of how investigative steps could be conducted 
in absentia. But this is an exception to the rule and there has only been one such a 
request issued yet by the UN Security Council. The point is that such requests will not 
be issued often. To assist the UN South Africa can easily justify the allocation of 
scarce resources towards this purpose as an international duty and a sensible 
diplomatic step based on international cooperation. This is different to receiving 
frequent requests and then, mero motu, launching out against another country. 
 
Werle and Bornkamm point out that ‘South African law permits judicial review of 
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decisions not to prosecute to an extent that is quite extraordinary compared to other 
legal systems’ and that ‘this finding would have been impossible under many other 
legal systems where prosecutorial discretion is exempt from judicial control.’704 The 
difference in most other countries that provide for universal jurisdiction is that there 
are various “safe-guards” in the system including that the prosecuting authorities have 
much more autonomy in their decisions on whether to investigate or not.
705
 This is 
simply not the case in South Africa. It will be very hard for a court dealing with 
specific facts and situations to give more than broad guidelines that apply generally. 
The respondents however asked for precisely this when they asked the Court to rule 
that ‘when an investigation is to be initiated, irrespective of whether it is an 
international or national crime, each case should be decided on its own merits, within 
a workable practicable legislative framework.’706  The problem is that the current 
legislative framework is too wide. Every refusal by the police or prosecution will 
become reviewable. A determined complainant will then simply argue that the 
prosecutor did not exercise his discretion properly. Thus should the facts differ in the 
next case, as they inevitably will, the SALC case will simply be the first in a long line 
of cases.
707
  
 
This prediction is confirmed by the CC finding that before South Africa assumes an 
investigation into an international crime using universal jurisdiction it must determine 
whether it is reasonable and practicable in the circumstances of each particular case. 
The authorities must determine, amongst other things, whether a prosecution is likely 
and whether the perpetrators would likely be present in South Africa on their own or 
through an extradition request. The enquiry would finally be whether the SAPS acted 
                                                        
704 Werle and Bornkamm (Torture in Zimbabwe under Scrutiny in South Africa) (supra) 673 
705 In this regard it is insightful to consider some of the items on the list of Amnesty International’s so-called 
“obstacles to universal jurisdiction”, which, it is submitted, may as well be translated “safeguards in national 
legal systems”, See: Amnesty International Universal Jurisdiction: A Preliminary Survey of Legislation Around 
the World available at https://www.amnesty.org/fr/library /asset/IOR53/004/2011/en/d997366e-65bf-
4d809022fcb8fe284c9d /ior530042011en.pdf (last visited on 2014/08/09); some of these include: - 
presence requirements in order to open an investigation or to seek extradition; - limiting universal 
jurisdiction to persons who are residents or who subsequently become residents or nationals; - statutes of 
limitations; political control over decisions to investigate, prosecute or extradite.   
706 Respondent’s Heads of Argument (supra) paragraph 100 
707 Werle and Bornkamm (Torture in Zimbabwe under Scrutiny in South Africa) (supra) 671 ‘The present 
case could have been an opportunity for the Court to spell out how South Africa’s commitment to 
international criminal law should translate into prosecutorial practice. After all, South African authorities 
cannot realistically be expected to open up criminal proceedings whenever a crime envisaged in the ICC Act 
is committed anywhere in the world, just because the suspects might one day enter South African territory. 
There must be additional elements justifying the conclusion that the prosecution and the police are obliged 
to investigate. In particular, there must be a reasonable prospect that proceedings will be successful, 
meaning that they may lead to the prosecution of the suspects in South Africa or support prosecutions 
elsewhere by securing evidence.’ 
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reasonably in declining to investigate crimes against humanity committed in another 
country.
708
 A side note is that the Court’s mention of extradition as a possible means 
to exercise universal jurisdiction is, with respect, unfortunate and dangerous. This 
potentially opens the door to a plethora of cases and seems to indicate that the Court 
took no notice of even the respondents’ admission that universal jurisdiction in 
absentia is not supported in international law. This remark is also utterly wrong and 
makes no mention of the ICJ case of Habré that made an international ruling against 
such an interpretation, specifically in the case of torture.
709
 But back to when 
investigations are called for, we can see that the Court effectively took this decision, 
and all future decisions of this nature, from the hands of the investigative authorities. 
Who will determine whether the SAPS acted reasonably by declining to investigate, 
but the Courts? And which complainant or human rights group will ever agree that the 
SAPS’s ruling declining to prosecute is ‘reasonable’?    
 
As a practical solution it is submitted that the ICC Act can easily, and should, be 
amended to provide as an exception for a requirement of preliminary investigations to 
be conducted whenever the Security Council issues such a request to member UN 
States. This position would be no different to a request for extradition or for mutual 
legal assistance from another nation where South Africa takes steps to investigate, 
arrest and extradite the suspect. As such South Africa will still be able to fulfill its 
international duties. At home we will however have more certainty, we will be able to 
allocate scarce resources more predictably, and we will be able to have more success 
in prosecuting international crimes. As far as foreigners go, it is submitted that the 
most sensible solution would be to require a link or a measure of permanence to the 
stay of a suspect in South Africa before investigations or a prosecution is considered. 
This approach will still ensure that South Africa will not become a safe haven for 
international criminals. 
 
5.3.4.4 The position in international law 
 
Respondents referred in their argument to the Lotus as well as to the DRC v Belgium 
cases to argue that international law does not outlaw investigations based on universal 
jurisdiction in absentia. They pointed out that international law leaves these types of 
                                                        
708 SAPS v. SALC [2014] ZACC 30 (supra) paragraphs 63-64 
709 See paragraph 3.3.3 (supra) 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 184 
arrangements to domestic law and that the only prohibitive rule is that criminal 
jurisdiction should not be exercised, without permission within the territory of another 
State. This interpretation of these two cases has already been discussed and criticized 
and it is not necessary to do so again. It was obviously a response to the argument by 
the appellants that they are not allowed to investigate matters in terms of universal 
jurisdiction. But it does not help to argue that there is no rule in international law 
against universal jurisdiction and leave it there. The reality is that the State whose 
officials are the subjects of such investigations and prosecutions will usually feel that 
their sovereignty is undermined.
710
 This immediately brings diplomatic 
considerations, complications and inevitably interference into the picture. It is easy to 
theorize about this and declare that in terms of international law such a State is not 
entitled to feel aggrieved or to take steps to protect its citizens. It is to be doubted 
however that the aggrieved State will share these sentiments. Luc Reydams says that 
while universal jurisdiction in absentia does not violate the non-interference principle 
it does contravene the more fundamental principle of sovereign equality of States of 
which non-interference forms only one aspect.
711
 It is true that these considerations 
should not have been the concern of the SAPS at that stage in the SALC matter. Yet 
one feels that this was only the start of the complications and interference, which 
would continue to intensify as the matter proceeded. It just seems that invoking the 
Lotus case, in the manner that the respondents did, merely postponed these very real 
problems to a later date. 
 
Respondent quoted as authority for the permissibility of investigations based on 
universal jurisdiction in absentia the Institute of International Law, the Third 
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States as well as the Princeton 
Principles on Universal Jurisdiction. Respondents described the Institute of 
International Law as an organization dedicated to the development of international 
law. It is submitted that what Luc Reydams says about the Third Restatement applies 
as well to the statement by the Institute of International Law: ‘[i]ts Restatements of 
the Law purport to be unofficial codifications of United States law, but in reality 
contain a healthy dose of attempts to influence the development of the law’.712 This 
                                                        
710 Luc Reydams (Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) 223 ‘it is difficult to determine whether a government has 
repeatedly objected to, or acquiesced in, another government’s practice. The relevant material may consist 
of confidential diplomatic notes or classified internal memoranda.’ 
711 Luc Reydams (Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) 224 
712 Luc Reydams (Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) 213 
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also applies to the Princeton Principles. Luc Reydams groups this project along with 
other ‘policy oriented’ law schools for whom international law is not a fixed set of 
rules but rather something that must be developed to address issues of concern to the 
international community. Yet the problem is that courts easily read these statements 
attempting to influence the law, as the law. Reydams says that although the Principles 
acknowledge that they ‘are of a mixture of lex lata and lex desidereta, the text itself 
reads like a confident statement of the law.’ Reydams continues and says that 
‘[t]hrough endless recycling of reports like these, universal jurisdiction – however 
radical and counter-intuitive - became dogma in no time.’713 This is true and this is 
exactly what happened in the SALC case. The respondent’s confidently quoted the 
Principles as law and so the Courts accepted it. The troubling part is that this is such 
an important issue with such potentially far-reaching effects that much more caution 
is called for. 
 
5.3.4.5 Comparative State Practice 
 
In referring to the approach taken by different countries the respondents argued that 
an investigation, even in the absence of a suspect ‘would be compatible with 
customary international law.’ 714  As to the countries mentioned in support by the 
respondents, only the most influential ones will briefly be discussed. It will be useful 
to refer again to Luc Reydams, who did an in-depth study of state practice on 
universal jurisdiction. After his study of 14 countries, representative of the major 
legal systems, he concludes that ‘the primary criterion for including a State in this 
study was merely that of its having some record of legislative or judicial practice in 
relation to universal jurisdiction, the resulting number of States is only a small 
fraction of the world’s total. It therefore follows that in the great majority of States 
relevant practice is negligible or non-existent.’715 
 
Respondents used Germany as an example, and as a leading nation, we may well 
consider how they approach universal jurisdiction. As indicated above the position 
changed in Germany when the German Code of Crimes against International Law was 
                                                        
713 Luc Reydams  (Rise and Fall) (supra) 337-338 
714 Respondent’s Heads of Argument (supra) paragraph 24 
715 Luc Reydams (Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) 223 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 186 
implemented.
716
 Before this a legitimizing link with Germany was required and yet 
quite a lot of war criminals fleeing from the conflict in the Balkans and trying to hide 
in Germany were prosecuted in the 90’s. It was hoped that the new Code would make 
it even easier to prosecute international criminals. This was however not the case and 
the report relied upon by respondent mentions, in a section omitted by respondents, 
that ‘[i]n light of the considerable experience of German practitioners obtained in the 
investigation of international crimes…the current commitment does not seem to 
correspond to that once shown on a practical level by German authorities.’717 In fact, 
as far as could be ascertained, there have been no significant universal jurisdiction 
prosecutions since the implementation of the new Code. This was however not for 
lack of opportunity or attempts by various groups. Attempts to have investigations 
and prosecutions launched against Donald Rumsfeld (before and after he left office), 
Jiang Zemin and the Uzbek Minister of Interior Zokirjon Almatov have all failed.
718
 
The decision by the federal prosecutor to not investigate charges against Rumsfeld 
was further upheld by the Higher Regional Court in Stuttgart. The result of this case 
was that complainants no longer ‘have the right to appeal to the courts against the 
decision of the federal prosecutor not to investigate according to 153f of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure. Instead complainants must direct their complaint to the Ministry 
of Justice in a purely administrative procedure’.719 Several other safeguards have been 
inserted into the Code including a wide discretion vested in the prosecutor. In terms of 
the subsidiarity principle the prosecutor has to consider whether another State or the 
ICC is not already investigating a matter and also the practical ability of the German 
authorities to investigate a matter. The prosecutor may also refuse to investigate a 
matter if the likelihood of a successful prosecution is non-existent.
720
 Seeing that the 
Zimbabwean officials in this case will probably never be prosecuted in South Africa 
this might have been a good guideline for South Africa to follow. 
                                                        
716 Paragraph 4.4 (supra) 
717 Human Rights Watch (Universal Jurisdiction in Europe) (supra) 68 
718 Human Rights Watch (Universal Jurisdiction in Europe) (supra) 67-68 and also see Sascha-Dominik 
Bachmann ‘The German criminal charges against Donald Rumsfeld the long road to implement criminal 
justice at the domestic level’ Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (2008) 265 ‘[T]he Rumsfeld case seems to 
demonstrate to what extent Realpolitik may affect the quest for justice…[it] could have provided the 
opportunity to test the practical value of the Code of Crimes against International Law…to miss such a 
chance is unfortunate, considering the fact that the prosecution of international crimes before domestic 
courts has faced some stagnation since the outcomes in the Pinochet and Yerodia cases.’ 
719 Human Rights Watch (Universal Jurisdiction in Europe) (supra) 68 
720 Human Rights Watch (Universal Jurisdiction in Europe) (supra) 67 and Section 153(f) of the Code that 
provides inter alia that prosecutor’s may in particular decide not to prosecute if (a) no German is suspected 
of having committed the crime; (b) the offence has not been committed against a German; (c) the accused is 
not present in Germany or a presence is not to be expected; 
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The respondents also cited the United Kingdom as example and The Human Rights 
Watch report relied on the Zardad case to prove support for universal jurisdiction. It 
was already argued that this case was unique in its circumstances, which allowed for a 
rare occurrence of investigations continuing and a prosecution succeeding.
721
 This 
conclusion is confirmed by even the NGO report mentioning that ‘[s]everal other 
reports have been filed under the UK’s universal jurisdiction laws but none have yet 
proceeded to trial.’ 722  The report also mentions that ‘charges of crimes against 
humanity and genocide can be prosecuted only where a suspect was a UK resident at 
the time at which the crime was committed.’723 That a suspect should be a resident 
before an investigation is initiated was suggested earlier as a feasible solution for 
universal jurisdiction in South Africa. 
 
Respondents finally mentioned the 2012 draft African Union Model National Law on 
Universal Jurisdiction
724
 to show that this document also does not contain a strict 
presence requirement. With regard to all the mentioned examples the respondent’s 
argued that to read ‘a strict presence requirement will not facilitate the purpose and 
use of the ICC Act in the manner that Parliament intended, and will frustrate 
compliance by South Africa with its obligations under the Rome Statute’.725 Having 
argued that the Rome Statute does not oblige any country to exercise universal 
jurisdiction it is disputed that a strict presence requirement would frustrate South 
Africa in its performance of obligations under the Rome Statute. It seems however 
that respondents again try to end their argument by focusing more on the domestic 
law and the legislature’s intention than on the position internationally.  
 
It has been contended that Parliament’s intentions as contained in the ICC Act are not 
necessarily in line with the approach taken by the majority of other nations. The 
respondent’s admit that ‘there is indeed a global trend against absolute universal 
jurisdiction in the context of adjudicative jurisdiction, but that there is no single 
approach adopted by States with regard to a presence requirement in the context of 
                                                        
721 Paragraph 3.3.2 (supra) 
722 Human Rights Watch (Universal Jurisdiction in Europe) (supra) 93 
723 Human Rights Watch (Universal Jurisdiction in Europe) (supra) 94 
724 African Union, Meeting of Government Experts and Ministers of Justice/Attorneys General on Legal 
Matters, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia “African Union (Draft) Model National Law on Universal Jurisdiction Over 
International Crimes” (7-15 May 2012), available at http://www.ejiltalk.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/08/AU-draft-model-law-UJ-May-2012.pdf. (last visited on 2014/06/10)   
725Respondent’s Heads of Argument (supra) paragraph 99  
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non-judicial enforcement jurisdiction, which includes police investigations’.726 One 
has to ask what the point of such investigations is especially where prosecution is 
highly unlikely. Obviously the trend against absolute universal jurisdiction is not 
because the world wants to avoid something like trials in absentia, but that they prefer 
not to exercise universal jurisdiction at all! As stated earlier Belgium and Spain had 
legislation providing for a very wide form of investigation and prosecution of 
international crimes in terms of universal jurisdiction. When they changed the 
legislation they didn’t only tighten regulations regarding prosecution but also those 
regarding investigation. It is submitted that their reconsideration was largely due to 
the excessively wide range of investigations they were required to conduct, especially 
when there was very little chance of a successful prosecution. 
 
Countries are mentioned in respondent’s argument and reference is made to their 
requirements regarding presence before investigations are considered but little is said 
of the actual practice in these countries.
727
 As the examples of Germany and the 
United Kingdom showed potential cases are filtered and even blocked by various 
measures such as the wide discretion bestowed on the prosecutor even though their 
legislation provides for investigations in the absence of offenders.
728
 The result is that 
there have been almost no prosecutions, and probably as few investigations, based on 
universal jurisdiction in recent years. It is in light of what States actually do that the 
respondent’s final resort to ‘the international community’s struggle against impunity’ 
rings rather hollow. 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
726 Respondent’s Heads of Argument (supra) paragraph 103 
727 France was not mentioned by the respondents but the same situation applies there, see for example: 
Maximo Langer (The Diplomacy of Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) 25 ‘France ratified the Rome Statute of 
the ICC in June 2000…This article includes a very narrow universal jurisdiction provision regarding these 
crimes, establishing four limitations to the exercise of universal jurisdiction by French courts. First, the 
alleged perpetrator must become a resident of France after the crime. Second, the crimes have to be 
established by the state where they took place or the state in question must be a party to the ICC Statute. 
Third, only the prosecutor – not the victim or NGO’s as civil parties – may launch formal criminal 
proceedings. Fourth, the prosecutor may initiate such proceedings only if no other international or national 
jurisdiction requests the rendition or extradition of the alleged offender.’  
728 Maximo Langer (The Diplomacy of Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) 10- 41 ‘These states [Germany, 
England(and Wales), France, Belgium and Spain] were chosen because, while each has enacted universal 
jurisdiction statutes and has received universal jurisdiction complaints, they accord varying degrees of 
control to the executive branch over the resulting prosecutions and trials.’ 
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5.3.5 The exercise of universal jurisdiction as customary international law? 
 
In continuing with the study of contemporary State practice it is necessary to 
investigate the claim of the respondents that investigations based on universal 
jurisdiction in absentia is compatible with customary international law.
729
 Customary 
international law is one of the sources of international law as stipulated by Article 
38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.
730
  Brierly
731
 describes 
custom as meaning ‘something more than mere habit or usage; it is a usage felt by 
those who follow it as obligatory. There must be a feeling that if the usage is not 
followed some sort of adverse consequence will probably, or at any rate ought to, fall 
on the transgressor…Evidence that a custom in this sense exists in the international 
sphere can be found only by examining the practice of states.’ The first leg of the test 
is State practice. The second leg is called opinio juris. In this regard Brierly says that 
what we would be looking for is the ‘general recognition among states of a certain 
practice as obligatory.’ 
 
In the SALC matter the respondent’s seemed to argue that customary international law 
has formed on the issue because many States believe that they are allowed to provide 
for universal jurisdiction. But the test, in this instance, would be whether they regard 
such practice as obligatory. Being allowed and feeling obliged are incompatible 
concepts. Respondent’s reference to customary international law, to show that many 
States believe they are allowed to provide for universal jurisdiction to investigate 
crimes in absentia, does, with respect, not make sense.
732
 
 
Claus Kreß, develops this line of reasoning, and argues for a relevant principle of 
universal jurisdiction based on ‘verbal’ state practice following a ‘modern positivist’ 
approach. With reference to the preamble of the ICC he argues that States have 
                                                        
729 Respondent’s Heads of Argument (supra) paragraph 24 
730 The sources as set out are (a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules 
expressly recognized by the contesting states; (b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice 
accepted as law; the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; subject to the provisions of 
Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, 
as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law. 
731 Andrew Clapham ‘Brierly’s Law of Nations’ (7th ed) 2012 Oxford University Press, Oxford, 57-63  
732 Judge Abraham’s separate judgment in the ICJ Belgium v. Senegal matter makes this point, quoted in 
paragraph 3.3.3 (supra) ‘Thirdly and finally, certain States among the 51 – and probably many of them – 
may have decided to extend the jurisdiction of their courts over the crimes in question on the basis of a 
purely unilateral choice and sovereign decision, without in any sense believing that they were required to 
do so by some international obligation, whether conventional or customary – but solely in the belief that 
international law entitled them to do so. Here again the “opinio juris” is lacking.’ 
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elevated genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes to the level of crimes 
under international law and have solemnly declared that such crimes ‘must not go 
unpunished’ and that ‘their effective prosecution must be ensured by taking measures 
at the national level’. Universal jurisdiction is thus seen as an additional effective 
means to prevent impunity for international crimes. Accordingly Kreß
 
asserts that 
when States categorize conduct as a crime under international law, this already firmly 
points toward a customary State competence to exercise universal jurisdiction.
733
 
 
In this way much more weight is placed on “verbal State practice”, rather than “hard” 
State practice. The first problem is, with so little “hard” practice available, the 
traditional test for opinio juris becomes almost useless. The second, but related, 
problem is that ‘claims may be lofty, inconsistent and even based on 
misinterpretations and erroneous assumptions as to what the concept of universal 
jurisdiction is.’734 For example even a “hard” case as significant as Eichmann does 
not necessarily support universal jurisdiction.
735
 Similarly reports may proclaim that 
universal jurisdiction was exercised in a case when in actual fact suspects had taken 
up permanent residence in the forum State and had resisted being sent back to the 
countries in which their deeds had been done. Or the affected State had consented to, 
or even supported the prosecution. Or the offences had taken place in the former 
Yugoslavia or Rwanda and the prosecutor of those tribunals and the UN Security 
Council had encouraged all States to search for and try suspects on their territory. As 
Reydams points out in almost all these cases, used as “examples” of universal 
jurisdiction, extradition was impossible, either legally or practically. Reydams refers 
to various examples to make his point and then says that in these cases prosecutions 
were reasonable to everyone and ‘unfolded in a sphere of mutual legal assistance and 
international law was used to solve problems, as it should…Yet media and NGO 
reports lump together these uncontroversial cases of judicial cooperation and highly 
contentious cases of judicial intervention under the single rubric of ‘universal 
jurisdiction’…this is unhelpful and distortive.’736  Relying mostly on “verbal State 
practice”, as Kreß, proposes tends to sketch a distorted picture of reality. 
 
                                                        
733 Claus Kreß (Institut de Droit International) (supra) 573-576 
734 Matthew Garrod (The Protective Principle) (supra) 818 
735 See paragraph 2.3 (supra) 
736 Luc Reydams (Rise and Fall) (supra) 345-346 
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More generally, authors often attempt to prove that States feel obliged to provide for 
universal jurisdiction over international crimes, by linking the concept to those of jus 
cogens and obligations erga omnes.
737
 These crimes are then usually framed as an 
attack on the fundamental values of the international community as a whole. Hence, 
the argument goes that these crimes are of universal concern so that every State in the 
world has an obligation erga omnes to punish such offenders. Should a State thus fail 
to prosecute such crimes on its own territory or by its nationals, this would be a 
breach of obligations erga omnes, hence qualifying any other State to protect the 
international community’s “fundamental values”, using universal jurisdiction.738 
 
The notion of jus cogens first appeared in article 53 of the 1969 Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties and provides that ‘[a] treaty is void if…it conflicts with a 
peremptory norm of general international law…accepted and recognized by the 
international community of states as a whole.’ The ICJ has identified as jus cogens 
the prohibition of inter-State force
739
, known as one of the fundamental principles of 
international law, as well as war crimes and crimes against humanity.
740
 
 
The notion of erga omnes was introduced in the ICJ Barcelona Traction case, where 
it was stated that: 
 
‘…an essential distinction should be drawn between obligations of a State towards the 
international community as a whole, and those arising vis-á-vis another State…By their very 
nature the former are the concern of all States. In view of the importance of the rights 
involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection, they are obligations 
erga omnes’.741 
 
According to the ICJ these obligations derived from the outlawing of acts of 
aggression, genocide and the protection of individuals from slavery and racial 
                                                        
737 Harmen van der Wilt (Universal jurisdiction under attack) (supra) 1045-1046 and Kenneth Randall 
(Universal Jurisdiction) (supra) 831-832 
738 Matthew Garrod (The Protective Principle) (supra) 815; Sienho Yee (Concept, Logic and Reality) (supra) 
505 and Luis Benavides ‘The Universal Jurisdiction Principle: Nature and Scope’ (2001) 1 Anuario Mexicano 
de Derecho Internacional 32  
739 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States) 
(Merits) ICJ Reports 1986, paragraph 190. 
740 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening), ICJ Reports 2012 at 
paragraph 95 
741 Case concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Limited, ICJ Reports, 1970 (Second 
Phase) paragraph 33 
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discrimination.
742
 This case should however not be quoted as support for universal 
jurisdiction. Higgins says that this case is often quoted incorrectly as authority for 
more than it can sustain and as support for contemporary universal jurisdiction. She 
explains, however, that the Court was doing nothing of the sort. The matter was a 
civil case, involving diplomatic protection, and did not involve erga omnes 
obligations.
743
 It might be because these issues were only dealt with in the abstract 
that the court provided no reasons as to why it regarded these specific crimes as erga 
omnes.  
 
Since Barcelona Traction, the ICJ has not recognized that an act in breach of an 
obligation erga omnes and of a jus cogens nature is capable of giving rise to universal 
jurisdiction.
744
 Later, in the ICJ Belgium v. Senegal matter, we saw how Belgium 
claimed to have a special interest, as an injured party, because of the nature of the 
crime of torture. The ICJ, in that case however, would not go so far and only found, 
with reference to the Barcelona Traction Case, that the obligations applied erga 
omnes partes.
745
 It is interesting to note that in the ICJ Belgium v. Senegal matter the 
Court added the word “partes” to the original phrase erga omnes as found in the 
Barcelona Traction Case. It is submitted that while it might still have been possible to 
use the obiter reference to erga omnes in Barcelona Traction to argue that all nations 
have a legal interest in the prevention of certain offences the speculation was ended 
by the ICJ Belgium v. Senegal judgment. It was a, not-so-subtle, way of ending 
random references to erga omnes whenever it suited a particular party’s case.746 
 
                                                        
742 Barcelona Traction Case paragraph 34 
743 Rosalyn, Higgins (Problems and Process) (supra) 57 ‘Its dictum was made in the context not of the 
assertion of jurisdiction but of an examination of the law relating to diplomatic protection. Usually, it is 
necessary for a state, before bringing an international claim, to show that the defendant state has broken an 
obligation towards the claimant state in respect of its nationals. Only the party to whom the international 
obligation is due can bring a claim in respect of its breach. The Court was suggesting that, in respect of these 
offences, the restrictive requirements of the nationality-of-claims rule concerns diplomatic representation 
in civil claims. This is true of the stated exception to the rule, where obligations are owed erga omnes. The 
universality principle, by contrast, is concerned with the application of criminal jurisdiction.’  
744 Matthew Garrod (The Protective Principle) (supra) 816 
745 Paragraph 3.3.3(supra) and paragraphs 68 and 69 of that judgment 
746 Alfred Rubin (Actio Popularis, Jus Cogens and Offenses Erga Omnes) (supra) 271-272 ‘The phrase “jus 
cogens” first appeared in modern positive international law in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties article 53…No specification was given…as to the substance of any such “peremptory norm.” While 
some scholars doubted that there was any substance to the set of rules from which treaties could not 
derogate others began putting their favorite substantive rules into the category and an apparent consensus 
soon emerged that “human rights” were not only “rights” in the legal order as distinguished from the moral 
or other normative orders, but were rights from which no derogation by treaty could be permitted: jus 
cogens.’ See also Matthew Garrod (The Protective Principle) (supra) ‘The interpretation of the concepts erga 
omnes and jus cogens has developed almost entirely, if not exclusively, out of legal scholarship de lege 
ferenda.’  
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Matthew Garrod says that while ‘[i]t may be one thing to proclaim that crimes under 
international law are erga omnes and jus cogens, it is a great conceptual leap to 
suggest that these concepts permit and give legitimacy to universal jurisdiction under 
customary international law.’747 He points out that just as forceful an argument can be 
made that other values held by the international community, such as sovereignty, 
sovereign equality and independence, non-interference in internal affairs and the 
inviolability of incumbent State officials, possess the status of erga omnes and jus 
cogens. Garrod, rightly it is submitted, asks whether it is credible to invoke these 
concepts to justify universal jurisdiction, while at the same time overriding other 
principles of international law that probably have an equal status and character. 
Garrod warns that stretching these; ‘controversial, contested and equivocal,’ concepts 
beyond their reasonable interpretation will weaken their validity in international law. 
 
Whenever customary international law is used to justify universal jurisdiction it must 
be remembered that this is not a straightforward issue and is far from settled. The 
respondent’s brief reference to this effect does not do justice to the complexity, 
confusion and controversy surrounding this issue in international law. 
 
Yet we see that the Constitutional Court, relying on only one author, ruled that States, 
even in the absence of binding international treaty law were required to suppress 
torture, piracy, slave-trading, war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and 
apartheid because “all states have an interest” in suppressing these crimes that violate 
the values constituting the foundation of the world public order.
748
 The Court further 
attempted to bolster its argument and found that the ban on torture has the customary 
international law status of a peremptory norm from which no derogation is permitted. 
Based on the absolute ban on torture the Court then used the piracy analogy to 
describe the torturer as an enemy of mankind. It is however submitted, in the light of 
the research done in this thesis, that the Court went much too far. It is the contention 
of this thesis that these findings are based on assumptions driven mostly by academic 
writers, without sufficient State practice to support it, and seemingly oblivious to 
realities inherent in the international system of inter-State politics. 
   
 
                                                        
747 Matthew Garrod (The Protective Principle) (supra) 817 
748 SAPS v. SALC [2014] ZACC 30 (supra) paragraph 37 
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5.3.6 Charging the suspects with torture instead of crimes against humanity 
 
The respondents would perhaps have been wiser if it asked the appellants to 
investigate the suspects for torture instead of crimes against humanity. The 
Constitutional Court however came to their assistance, and moved onto safer ground, 
when it, of its own accord, invoked the Torture Convention as justification of a duty 
to exercise universal jurisdiction.
749
 The Torture Convention indeed provides for a 
duty to exercise universal jurisdiction over torturers. On the other hand, a duty to 
prosecute crimes against humanity is generally regarded as incumbent only on the 
State on whose territory the crime was committed. Third States exercising universal 
jurisdiction don’t have a duty to prosecute, they only have a right to do so.750 Werle 
and Bornkamm
751
 argue for a duty to prosecute under customary law on the basis that 
the acts alleged in the present case amount to torture, whether or not they qualify as 
crimes against humanity. They point out that while Zimbabwe is not a party to the 
Convention, South Africa, together with 153 other countries, is. They point out that 
treaties that enjoy such near universal jurisdiction may give rise to rules of customary 
international law, provided that there is consistent State practice. They are however 
skeptical about this issue when they consider the ‘highly inconsistent’ State practice.  
According to them ‘international support for the Convention is not quite as large as 
the number of state parties suggest’. They however believe that Article 7(1) of the 
Torture Convention should apply directly even with respect to torture committed on 
the territory of a non-State party. Their contention relies on two bases, namely that 
States Parties to the Torture Convention have entered into the commitment to the 
prosecution of torture regardless of where it was committed. Secondly, that applying 
aut dedere aut judicare to torture committed on the territory of a non-State party 
would not interfere in that State’s rights. I don’t believe their resort to the fact that the 
obligations arising from the Torture Convention arise from the jus cogens prohibition 
on torture and are owed erga omnes was even necessary.
752
 Without going so far, it 
seems clear that it would not be compatible with South Africa’s clear commitment to 
the provisions of the Torture Convention which unlike the Rome Statute actually 
provides for universal jurisdiction, if it refrained from taking any measures against 
                                                        
749 SAPS v. SALC [2014] ZACC 30 (supra) paragraph 38 
750 Robert Cryer et al (Introduction to International Criminal Law) (supra) 73 
751 Werle and Bornkamm (Torture in Zimbabwe under Scrutiny in South Africa) (supra) 670-671 
752 I also do no agree with them, see paragraph 3.3.3 (supra) for ICJ Judge Abraham’s view that there is no 
such duty under international customary law to prosecute torture, but only a conventional duty. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 195 
alleged torturers present on its territory. The only problem might have been that up 
until then South Africa had not implemented the Torture Convention in national 
legislation. If it came to that, they would still have been able, with reference to duties 
accepted in terms of the Torture Convention, to charge the suspects with similar 
common law crimes such as assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm. But for 
crimes committed since the implementation of the domestic Torture Act this will no 
longer be a problem.   
 
Next, Werle and Bornkamm admit that the exercise of foreign jurisdiction over acts 
on Zimbabwean territory may constitute interference with Zimbabwe’s sovereignty. 
They are quick to point out, however, that because international law permits such an 
exercise of universal jurisdiction, Zimbabwe is obliged to tolerate this interference. If 
South Africa did exercise such a jurisdiction they will certainly hope that Zimbabwe 
sees the logic of such an argument. But they probably won’t. Still, it will ultimately 
be up to South African authorities (prosecutors and politicians) to decide whether 
they will take this approach. At least their decision will be based on, and backed up 
by, a sound interpretation of international criminal law. The Constitutional Court, for 
its part showed little deference to other branches of Government and ventured onto 
executive and delicate diplomatic terrain when it found it ‘very unlikely that the 
Zimbabwean police would have pursued the investigation with the necessary zeal in 
view of the high profile personalities to be investigated.’753 If, as the Constitutional 
Court found, merely investigating Zimbabwean officials for torture does not impinge 
on their sovereignty one cannot help but wonder if this will still be the case if a high 
ranking Zimbabwean official is actually arrested in South Africa. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The usual justification for universal jurisdiction, namely that any State may act as an 
agent of humanity to punish its common enemies, is fatally flawed. If this were 
indeed the position it would follow logically that universal jurisdiction in absentia 
would be a valid concept, steadily gaining traction internationally. The fact that it has 
                                                        
753 SAPS v. SALC [2014] ZACC 30 (supra) paragraph 62 
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never formed the basis of jurisdiction, and that it is still losing ground, is a sure sign 
that a serious mistake is being made.  
 
Relying on the jurisdiction exercised over pirates to find support for universal 
jurisdiction in antiquity is not valid and even staunch supporters of universal 
jurisdiction have abandoned a reliance on this analogy. The old writers were in 
support of State sovereignty; cooperation between them and the protection of State 
interests and never promoted an elaborate attempt to undermine this system. 
 
Jurisdiction exercised over German war criminals in the aftermath of WWII was 
based primarily on the protective principle and not universal jurisdiction. This right 
had always belonged to belligerents for crimes committed against themselves or their 
allies by a common enemy. Respect for sovereignty and a concern for their own 
interests weighed more with the Allies than punishing war criminals for atrocious 
crimes committed against humanity. This same protective principle was confirmed in, 
the often quoted, case of Eichmann when Israel punished him for crimes committed 
against Jews. 
 
Universal jurisdiction, without recourse to piracy, old authorities and jurisdiction 
exercised over war criminals after WWII, becomes a concept void of historical 
support and rhetorical appeal. Small wonder then that proponents grasp at the Lotus 
Case to argue that States may still exercise universal jurisdiction because they are not 
prohibited from doing so. This is where the gaping gap between prescriptive and 
enforcement jurisdiction appears. Theorists celebrate their freedom to implement 
universal jurisdiction and criticize those responsible for applying these laws, but seem 
to forget that the last-mentioned will be responsible the mess that might follow if they 
do. This is why it is often said that everyone talks about universal jurisdiction, but no 
one does anything about it. 
 
After studying the drafting process and jurisdictional provisions of the Genocide, 
Geneva and Torture Conventions we are able to understand why so few States rely on 
them to exercise universal jurisdiction. The failed attempts of Belgium and Spain to 
provide for far reaching universal jurisdiction serve as warnings of what happens 
when law and power intersect in the international arena. 
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We found that the International Criminal Court makes no provision for universal 
jurisdiction except in the unique case of a Security Council referral. And although it 
relies on member States to exercise primary jurisdiction in terms of complementarity 
this does not result in a call on these States to exercise universal jurisdiction. 
 
South African legislation provides for universal jurisdiction over a wide range of 
offences with its ICC Act providing for universal jurisdiction over genocide, war 
crimes and crimes against humanity being a prime example. The SALC case brought 
the questions raised in this thesis into the spotlight. Almost all the arguments 
considered, and rejected, above were used by the lawyers arguing for universal 
jurisdiction to be exercised in South Africa over Zimbabwean officials accused of 
torture. The application was successful primarily because the lawyers succeeded in 
convincing the Courts that torturers, like pirates, are hostes humanis generis; that 
South Africa should act as an agent of humanity against a common enemy and that 
nothing in international law prevents South Africa from exercising universal 
jurisdiction. The tactic was to sketch a picture of a world increasingly in favor of 
universal jurisdiction with the logical outcome being that South Africa has followed 
suit by implementing universal jurisdiction legislation. The result was that the 
Constitutional Court went even further than they were asked to go by declaring there 
to be a duty on South Africa to investigate allegations of torture in terms of universal 
jurisdiction.  
 
It is concerning that the lack of historical, or current, support for universal jurisdiction 
internationally was not considered. Because this was not done the challenges, 
potential perils, and a consequent need for caution, were not appreciated. Almost no 
guidance was given as to when exactly investigations against foreigners should be 
conducted. It was said that there must be a reasonable prospect of a successful 
prosecution, which implies a measure of discretion, but should the parties not agree it 
would unfortunately be the Courts who make a ruling, which involves costs and 
hassle. It is ironic that it might very well be the Court rulings, and the associated 
attention drawn to the issue, that result in there no longer being a reasonable prospect 
of a successful prosecution, because the suspects should never visit South Africa 
again. By ruling in favor of universal jurisdiction, South Africa has boldly gone where 
others fear to tread. 
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